University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1941

The United States and the world court.
Eleanor B. Julian
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses

Julian, Eleanor B., "The United States and the world court." (1941). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014.
2459.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2459

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass
Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

FIVE

COLLEGE

DEPOSITORY

THE UNITED STATES
AND THE WORLD COURT

IULIAN

>«/

archives
thesis
1941

J94

1941

THE UNITED STATES

AND THE WORLD COURT

by

Eleanor

B.

Julian

Thesis submitted for degree of

Master of Science
Massachusetts State College, Amherst
June 1941

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
!•

PAGE

THE ORIGINS OF AND PRECEDENTS FOR THE IDEA
OF A WORLD COURT

**••••••

1

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

33

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

70

IV.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT 1921-1930

93

V.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT 1930-1935

115

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

171

II.

III.

VI.

APPENDICES

204

BIBLIOGRAPHY

210

CHAPTER

I

ORIGINS OF AND PRECEDENTS FOR THE
IDEA OF WORLD COURT
The Permanent Court of International
Justice was
one of the major institutions
established after the World
War to further the development of the
peaceful settlement
of international disputes.

It marked the culmination of

a long series of efforts to convert
the idea of a world

court into a reality.

It was no sudden or ill-considered

idea of the value of such a court that induced
its inte-

gration into the framework of peace treaties.

It was

rather the culmination of a long and continuous
recognition

among many philosophers and some statesmen of the
necessity
for such a tribunal that made the realization of the
idea
possible.
The first definite plan for an international court,

as far as can be determined, was drawn up in the Middle

Ages(l306).

The author of this plan was Pierre Dubois, a

French Jurist, who, like all cultured men of his day, wanted to unite the Christian world against the infidels.

Dubois believed that the unity of Christianity could best
be ensured if Justice rather than war were used to settle

international disputes.

He proposed an alliance of all the

powers in the Christian world for the establishment of a

2

permanent court of Arbitration
through which to settle
differences arising among its members 1
.

Another attempt at unifying the
states of the world
was put forth by Dante in his "De
Monarchia" , written about
1309, but not published until 1559.
In that
work, he pro-

posed a "world state" under the guidance
of a central court
of Justice which would serve to
dispose of international
disputes. 2

About the middle of the fifteenth century
came a
series of humanistic plans for the creation
of tribunals
for the settlement of international disputes.

King Podie-

brad of Bohemia negotiated for the formation of
a "Federal
State

made up of all existing Christian powers and held

together by a congress of ministers which was to be per"5

manent.

At the close of the period of the rise of European
monarchies and the break-up of feudalism, came the first

authoritative treatise on the Law of Nations.

This treatise

was prepared by Hugo Grotius, commonly called the "Father
of International Law", a man of great learning, of long

1

Antonio

S.

De Bustamante, The World Court

2

,

p.

8.

George A. Finch, The Sources of Modern Interna tional Law p. 11.
,

^

Ibid .

,

p.

10.
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experience in public affairs, and
of uncommon knowledge
of Roman Law.
His international law had two
sources, the
law of nature, and the consent of
all or most nations;
the law of nature furnished the
legal basis for Grotius’
work and from it he derived his
fundamental idea of the
equality and independence of sovereign
states.
States,

like men, were, according to him,
controlled in their
actions and relations by the operation of a
law of nature.
He believed that law constituted a standard
by which the

conduct of states and individuals could finally
be judged
and that Roman Law afforded an historical example
of
its

successful application in international affairs.

This

theory of his has had to endure for centuries the
incessant

attack

ox

criticism and test of practical experience but

still stands as a monument to the excellence of his work.^

Another plan was that of Henry IV of France, who
proposed to divide Europe equally among fifteen powers
and so do away with any possibility of jealousy over or
fear of a balance of power in Europe.

The Catholic, Cal-

vinist, and Lutheran religions were to be formally recognized; and any disputes arising between nations were to be

settled by representatives of each in a council which was
to be modelled after the Amphictyonic Council of ancient

4

George B. Davis, International Law

,

pp.

17-18.

^

5
-

4 -

3reece.

In 1596, Henry and Elizabeth
of England signed
a treaty of alliance which
was to have prepared for
the
formation of such a league; but
Elizabeth died, and Henry
was assassinated before any
final plans were completed.

Perhaps the most famous plan
of the period was that
of Emeric Cruce called "Le
Nouveau Cynee" which came out
in 1623.

The author in his plan advised
the rulers of

Europe to avoid war and to settle
their difficulties by
arbitration. He proposed a union not
of Europe alone
(as had all the other writers
on the subject) but of the
whole world.
Other schemes (most of them porposed
in the eighteenth century) which deserve mention are:
"The European
•

Diet, Parliament or Estates" of William
Perm, published

about 1694; the "Senate" of the Abbe Saint-Pierre,
presented about 1712-13; "The Perpetual Peace" of
Immanuel
Kant, published in 1795.
"The European Diet" proposed the establishing of
a

body to convene at regular intervals where the
rulers of

Europe could formulate rules of justice and could
settle
all differences among themselves which could not be
decided
by diplomacy.

The decisions of this tribunal were, if

necessary, to be enforced by all its members. 7

5

6

Finch, op. cit.
Ibid.

,

,p.

11.

,

p.

10.

7

Idem .

^
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The Abbe Saint-Pierre's project was
really only
an enlargement of the plan of Henry
IV.
It provided that
if any nation had a complaint to
make against another, it
must present it before a "Senate" made up
of twenty-four

representatives of the powers of Europe.

The "Senate" was

to try to solve the problem by a commission
of mediation;

but if no agreement could be reached, an arbitral
decision
was to be given.

This decision required a majority vote

on the preliminary questions and a three-fourths vote
for
a final settlement.

It provided that any government which

refused to carry out the decision as rendered was to be

declared an enemy of the other nations, which were to band
together to exterminate it.

All costs were to be paid

by the rebellious state.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant, in "The Perpetual

Peace" published in 1795, stated that perpetual peace was
the prime purpose of international law.

He proposed the

formation of a congress of nations which would be voluntary
and permanent and to which every nation was invited.

He

believed that this congress of nations was the only way
that a public

lav;

for all nations could be established by

which differences could be determined in a civil method
9

and not by war."

0

9
^

De Bustamante, op. cit .

Finch, op. cit .

,

p.

12.

.

p.

10-11.

^
-
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Early In the nineteenth century
the philosopher
Jeremy Bentham proposed a plan
for perpetual

peace, in
whicn he stated that the maintenance
of peace could be
Greatly facilitated by the establishment
of a court of
Justice for the settlement of
International differences,
even though the court might not have
the power to execute
its decisions.

^

.

Although all of the proposals for ensuring
perpetual
peace were perhaps too Utopian to be
realized, nevertheless
they drew the public attention to the
idea that relations

between states could be settled better by
arbitration than
by war, and they prepared the way for the
Court of Arbi-

tration, The Court of Arbitral Justice and
the Central

American Court of Justice, which in turn were to
serve as
precedents for the Permanent Court of International

Justice.

The Hague Conference of 1899

In August, 1898, the youthful Emperor of Russia

surprised the world by sending to the diplomatic representatives of the foreign nations, accredited to his Court,
his famous proposal for a World's Peace Confer ence.

Twenty-six nations were invited, and among them the United
States was invited.

The purpose of the Conference was

De Bustamante,
11
»

P.

3.

ojo.

cit .

,

p.

11.

a consideration of the reduction
of armaments as a political method of preserving enduring
peace.
The delegates
soon realized, however, that a
program for disarmament
was doomed to failure unless the
causes of armament were
removed. The efforts of the delegates
were, therefore,

directed toward the consideration of the
rules and principles of that branch of law which seemed

to offer a real

foundation of peace, namely, justice.
In order to facilitate its work, the
Conference

was divided up into three committees, one to
study dis-

armament, the second to study the laws and customs
of

naval warfare, and the third to study peaceful methods
of adjusting international disputes.

It is this third

committee which was important in the development of
plans

for the establishment of the World Court. 12
The American delegation to the Conference, consis-

ted of Andrew D. White, noted educator and American Ambas-

sador to Germany from 1897-1902, Seth Low, President of Co-

lumbia University, Stanford Newel, Minister at the Hague,

Captain Mahan of the United States Navy, Captain Crozier of
the United States Army, and the Honorable Frederick W. Holls,
as secretary.

President McKinley and Secretary Hay instructed these

delegates to strive for the establishment of an inter-

12

De Bustamante,

ojp.

clt .

.

pp. 41-42.

-
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national court and to propose a
plan for a tribunal to which
nations might bring all their disputes,
with the exception of those which might Jeopardize
their political independence or territorial integrity. 13

With the instructions of their State
Department
in mind, the American delegation drew
up and presented the

following provisions which they hoped would
be a valuable
contribution to a working plan for a court of

arbitration:

1.

The highest court of Justice in each
nation was to
nominate one member from its own nation to
sit
at the court as Judge.

2.

The tribunal was to be organized after
nine states
had assured adherence.

j. The

disputing states were to select Judges to hear
and decide the case.

4.

All the members might be called to sit or any un-

even number down to a minimum of three; but if
there were as few as three, none of the Judges
could be a native citizen or subject of the states
in dispute.

5.

The Judgment rendered was to be subject to revision
before the same Judges that had handed down the
decision, in case material circumstances which had
not been know at the time of the decision should
come to light. 15
The actual work of the Third Committee of the Con-

James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences .
American Instructions and Reports p. 8.
,

^

James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague
Peace Conferences Translation of Official Texts--1899.
pp. 834-5.
.

15

De Bustamante, op.

cit .

,

p. 43,

-

9 -

ference was done by a subcommittee called the "Comite'
examen" .
This committee chosen for
the purpose of draftlne a plan for international
arbitration and mediation, heard
the sugsestions offered by
the various dele atlons.
S

The

English proposal, which was presented
by Sir Julian
Pauncefote, was accepted as the basis
of the committee’s
work.
This proposal in turn was greatly
modified and enlarged by suggestions from both the
American and Russian
delegations, and those of the other members
of the committee. 1 ^
In order to show more clearly to what
extent the
suggestions of the American delegation were
embodied in the
final convention drawn up by the committee,
I shall present,
first, a summary of the convention; second,
the fundamental
ideas of an American corollary to the main
plan; and third, the
reasons why several parts of the original American
plan
were not acceptable to the committee.
The following are the points included in the final

convention:
1.

The Permanent Court was to be competent for all
arbitration cases, unless the parties concerned agreed
to set up a special tribunal.

2.

An International Bureau was to be set up at the
Hague to serve as a channel of communications for
the business of the court and as the custodian for
all the transactions of it.

Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
Instructions and Reports, p. 51.

.

American

.

.

10
nt

-

following the ratification

of
+?
?S
% ° reatin
S th e court, each signatory power
was to choose a maximum of four
persons who were
C
p tent in he questions of international
°;
law
a
f,
and
who were ^to serve as arbitrators.
Two or more
a S ree on the selection of one

or more
Their terms were to be six

bitiators in common.

y e ar s
4.
6.

Powers who wished to have recourse to the
were to notify the Bureau of their desire court
and give
the names of the arbitrators whom they
had chosen.

5.

Powers not signatories to the act were also to be
ha e jocess to the court under the
conditions
laid down y
by the convention.
The powers which brought disputes to the
court were
to sign a special act comoromls which
contained
thesubject of the dispute and the extent of the
arbitrator's powers. This act implied the agreement
oi the parties to submit in good faith
to the
arbitral award.
(

)

7.

The decision was to be binding only on the parties
who concluded the " compromis"

8.

Each party was to pay its own expenses and an equal
share of the honoraria of the arbitrators and the
expenses of the tribunal. 1
'

As an addition to the convention drawn up by it,
Mr. Holls of the United States presented to the committee
a proposal for special mediation.

Special mediation, he

said, was to be used when all other methods had failed,

and when war, therefore, seemed inevitable.

According

to his plan, both states in dispute were to choose a neutral

^
ferences

Scott, The Proceedings of The Hague Peace Con1899, pp. 852-858.

—

11

-

power through which they might
enter into communication with
each other in order to prevent
the breaking down of peaceful relationships. This period
of communication between
these seconds was not. except by
special agreement, to be
over thirty days.
During that period the seconds were
to
use their greatest tact to settle
the disagreement.
If,
however, peaceful relations were
severed, the seconds were
still to stand by and use the first
opportunity to restore
peace. Mr. Rolls said special mediation
was based upon the
undeniable fact that there would always be
differences

between nations and governments which neither
arbitration
nor mediation could prevent. Yet it would
be wrong

to say

that in such cases the disagreements must
naturally be
climaxed by a war. Holls believed he had a
solution to
such disputes and so submitted it to the committee. 18
It,

in turn, was accepted by the convention as Article
8

under the section Good Offices and Mediation. 15
From the summary of the draft finally evolved by the
Third Committee, it can be seen that several parts of the
original plan of the American delegation were not acceptable to the rest of the delegation.

The fundamental idea

presented by the Americans was a permanent, continuous

18

ferences
19

Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Con -

—

,

pp.

Ibid .

,

188.
p.

236.
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court made up of not fewer than
nine Judges from whose
number the states In dispute
might choose Judges to hear
their eases.
There was in the American
proposal a provision for the meeting of the entire
tribunal at one time.
This idea of a meeting of the whole
tribunal at once was
not acceptable to most of the
Continental states because
they believed that- there had not
been sufficient experience
with arbitration to warrant a
continuously sitting tribunal.
Another objection to the full membership's
sitting continuously was based on the fear that the court
would assume
a dignity and importance for which the
nations as yet were
quite unprepared. Also they believed that the
expense

involved in payment of permanent Judges' salaries
was likely to emphasize the undesirable side of an
international

court which might have little to do.

Sir Julian Paunce-

fote's plan avoided these difficulties by providing for
a

permanent court, not unlike the supreme court of the State
of New York, consisting of a comparatively large number of

judges who never sit as a whole body but who exercise their

judicial functions either alone or in separate groups made
up from their number. 20 The American plan differed from
the final one in the choosing of judges.

The American

suggestion provided for the choosing of one judge from

20

Scott, The Hapqie Peace Conferences. American
Instructions and Reports, p. 53.

^
13 -

each country adhering to the
contention.
The British
proposal suggested two judges
from each country. Upon
the advice of the Herman
delegate, however, the final
number
was increased to not more
than four, and the powers were
not restricted to their own
citizens in their selection
of

judges, for two or more countries
could choose the same
21
Judge.

Several sections of the American
draft were accepted
by the committee without change.
One was the proposal that
every case submitted to the court
be accompanied
by a

written agreement, on the part of both
the states, to abide
by the decision of the court.
Another part which was unanimously adopted by the committee was the
proposal that
the Convention go into effect
immediately after
its rati-

fication by nine states.

Also the American proposal that

tne oench of Judges be chosen from the
list of members of
the tribunal was accepted without change,
The part, however, which was flatly rejected
by
the committee was the proposal that the judges
of the court

be elected with the co-operation of the highest
courts in

eacn country.

Many of the nations concerned had no one

highest court comparable to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

Also the courts of the Continental countries,

21

IMd«

>

PP.

22 Ibid
.

.

p.

54-55.
55.

14
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being based on Roman law, had
excluded the idea of any selection by a judicial tribunal of
a man for any particular
purpose, even for a judicial position.
Also in many European states the members of the highest
court were prevented
from having any knowledge of the ability
or reputation
of

the most noted lawyers or judges
since no one was allowed
to practice before- the highest court
unless he was a res-

ident of the city of its location and a
member of its particular bar. In those countries the judges
of the high
courts were not the best advisers for selection
of creditable legal representatives. Out of courteous
regard for
this proposal of United States, however, the
comite d'examen
ordered the reporter to mention the importance of
complete

disregard of political considerations in choice of members
to the court. 25

The failure on that point is not par-

ticularly significant in as much as it had little actual

importance in the running of the court itself.

Attention has been called to the fact that the
whole plan for the court and its use was voluntary so far
as sovereign states were concerned.

In order that the United

States should make its position concerning the court doubly
clear, the delegation made a declaration in full session
of the Conference to the effect that in signing the Con-

vention concerning the peaceful settlement of international
«

25

Ibid,

,

p.

56.

’

15 -

disputes, they understood that:
t lnea 1

oonst^rt°n= ?

?

thls oonve htion shall be so

Its^adltlonal^ollo^of n°t lnt™d &
3

to depart from

ministration of any foreign' Stati

;

nor

shS!

anyl

rttltaa * *«"“* purely

With this reservation the United
States' delegates
signed the arbitration Convention.
This reservation did
not seem to draw any verbal protests
from the other members.
In addition to the court, there was
also established
a permanent Administrative Council
set up for the purpose
of supervising the organization of
the Bureau, which was
to remain under the direction and
control of
the Council.

It was composed of the diplomatic representatives
of the

signatory powers accredited to the Hague. 25
The fame of the Hague Conference of 1899
rests mainly on the fine work done by the Convention
in unanimously

agreeing upon the settlement of international disputes
by

arbitration rather than by war and upon the creation by it
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to put the theory
of
p/f

arbitration into actual practice.

Ibid .
25

.

Choate,

26 Ibid .

,

p.

57.

_op.

p.

clt.

19.

f

p.

53.
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Evidence of the practical value of the
Court is found
in the fact that, since its creation
there have been several
hundred disputes settled and over one
hundred and fortyfour standing arbitration treaties concluded
by means of

The Second Hague Conference

Among the movements which prepared the minds of
governments for an accord in the direction of assured
peace among men, a high place may be fittingly given to
the Interparliamentary Union, for it was that body which

prepared the way for the meeting of the Second Hague Peace
Conference.
In September, 1904, its annual meeting was held in
the United States at St. Louis.

At the completion of its

session, there was passed by a unanimous vote a resolution
to have the governments or the world send delegates to an

international conference to be held at a time and place to
be agreed upon for the purpose of considering:
1.

problems left unsolved by the First Hague Conference.

2.

negotiation of arbitration treaties between nations
who sent representatives there.

3.

the advisability of establishing an international
congress to convene periodically for the discussion
of international questions.

27
p.

David Jayne Hill, The Problem of a World Court
Choate, 0£>. clt .
p. 40.

14.

;

,

,

-
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The delegates to that Interparliamentary
Union paid the
honor and respect to President
Theodore Roosevelt of re-

questing him to be the leader in
inviting all the nations
to send delegates to the proposed
conference. That honor
28
he gladly accepted.
President Roosevelt sent notices of the
proposal
for a second conference to all the
governments which had
taken part in the first conference. In the
notices

he made

no attempt to do more than indicate the
general topics

which the Final Act of the First Hague Conference
had named
as unfinished matters for future consideration
and add
the suggestion that it might be desirable to
adopt a pro-

cedure whereby states not signatories to the First Conference might become parties to a second one. 29
Y/ith the

conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in

1905, the time and place for the meeting of the conference

were set for June 15, 1907 at The Hague.
The American delegates, Joseph H. Choate, Horace

Porter, Uriah M. Rose, David J. Hill, George B. Davis,

Charles S. Sperry, and William

I.

Buchanan, went with in-

structions from Secretary of State Elihu Root to work for
a more effective system of arbitration to which the nations

28

Scott, The Hague Peace Conference
Instructions and Reports, p. 60.
29 Ibid
.

,

p.

64.

.

American
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might more readily have
recourse and which would be
obligatory. He instructed them
to work for the development
of the Hague Tribunal into
a permanent tribunal
composed
of Judges who would be paid
adequate salaries , and who
would hear and decide cases with
Judicial methods and with
a sense of judicial responsibility.-^ 0
The work of

.the

Conference was so complicated and

widespread that it was considered
advisable to divide the
Conference up into four commissions
similar
to the three

commissions of the First Conference.

In the study of the

origins and precedents for a world court
the first Commission
on arbitration and international
commissions of inquiry
is of greatest interest and significance.-^
The American delegation proposed to the
Committee
the following detailed and complete plan
for the establish-

ment of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice.

The Court

was to consist of fifteen judges, of whom nine
were to con-

stitute a quorum.

They were to be of the highest standing

morally and of the most competence in international law.
They and their successors were to be appointed according
to a plan to be drawn up by the Conference, but chosen so

that the several systems of law and principal languages

30

Ibid .

,

pp.

77-80.

Ibid .

,

pp.

91-92.
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should be fairly represented on the
court.

Their terms

of office were to be decided by
the Conference.

The Court

was to meet annually at the Hague at
the date specified
and was to remain in session as long as
necessary.
It was
to elect its own officers and, except
for stipulations of

the Conference, draw up its own rules and
regulations.

All the Judges were- to be equal in rank and
were to receive
a salary large enough to enable them to
devote their whole
time to their Judicial duties.
In no case was a
Judge to

take part in the consideration of a case in which his
nation
was a party .

The court was to have the power to review

and determine all cases concerning international affairs
of sovereign nations which had not been solved by means
of diplomacy.

The Judges of this court were deemed compe-

tent to act as Judges on any special tribunal for arbitra-

tion which might be constituted by any power for the consier-

ation of any dispute!

The Court of Arbitration established

by the 1899 Convention was to constitute the basis of the

new Court provided that the powers who signed the 1899

Convention were represented on it.^2
The establishment of a permanent court as proposed

by the American delegation was accepted and supported in

principle by the G-erman and British delegations and the

— 1907,

Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences
vol.II, p. 1015.

”

,

20
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proposed court as framed and
recommended by the Conference
was the result of the co-operation
of the German, British,
and American delegations along
with the loyal support of the
French.

With agreement upon the establishment
of a Permanent
Court of Arbitral Justice concluded,
there remained still
one problem to be solved, namely the
choosing

of the Judges.

Until a method of selecting them was found,
no nation was
willing to submit a case to the Court. Proposal
after

proposal was submitted and rejected.

Each nation argued

that it should be represented on the court on a
plane of

equality with the others whether it was bigger or smaller.
Since, however, there were some forty-four countries
repre-

sented at the Conference, it was quite obvious that a court

consisting of forty-four judges would be unwieldly and
impossible.

Under these conditions all that the Confer-

ence could do was to recommend that the plan for establishing a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice be adopted and
that, as soon as agreement was possible, a convention

providing for the method of electing judges be added. 55
The establishment of the Court was not a mere wish

33

Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
Instructions and Reports, p. 135.
34

35

De Bustamante,

Ibid .

,

P.

63.

ojd.

clt .

i

pp.

.

53-54.

American
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or desire on the part of
the Conference, but a
recommendation to the powers to
undertake the establishment
of the court. The Conference
In turn, on accepting the
convention as the organic act,
recommended that the Court
be definitely and permanently
established by the powers
as soon as they should have
agreed upon the method
of

appointing the judges.

It will be noted that the
number

of powers necessary to establish
the Court was not stated,
nor was the number of judges
specified . 56

The Court of Arbitral Justice
as provided for in
the Convention was not to interfere
with the Court of

Arbitration established by the Conference
of 1899.
The
latter was only a temporary tribunal,
erected for a particular
purpose to decide as arbiters a case
submitted.

The Court

of Arbitral Justice, ,on the other
hand, was meant to be a

permanent court, composed of judges acting
under a sense
of judicial responsibility,
representing the various legal
systems of the world, and capable of assuring
the continuity
of arbitral Jurisprudence.
The contracting powers were
free to appoint either a large or small number
of Judges,

but the judges so appointed were to hold office for
a

period of twelve years and were to be chosen from
among
persons enjoying the highest moral consideration in
their
36

Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
Instructions and Reports, p. 132.

.

American
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respective countries and who
were Jurists of recognized
competency in matters of
international law. 37

From these provisions, it
is evident that the
proposed institution was to be
not merely in name, but
in fact,
court of Justice and that it
was to be permanent in
the
sense that it did not need to
be constituted for any
and
every case submitted to it,
whereas the Court of Arbitration
had been only a temporary tribunal
composed of arbiters
who sat in on disputes, not with
the purpose of rendering
a decision based on international
law and equity, but with
the purpose of suggesting a compromise
agreeable to
the

disputing parties.

Therefore, the new court might be con-

sidered a supplement to the older court.

Along with the problem of the establishment
of a
Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice came the
question

of

making arbitration obligatory. 38

In the meeting of the

First Commission, Mr. Choate, the American
delegate to the
Commission, presented a proposal for such arbitration.
His plan contained the proposal that judicial
differences
or differences in the interpretation of treaties
which

had failed to be settled by diplomacy, be submitted to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, provided that
the independence or honor of the respective states was not

37
38
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Jeopardized in any way.

It was up to each power,
he said,

to decide for itself whether
or not its honor was at
stake.
It provided that, in each
case which came up, a special

agreement should be concluded to
determine exactly the
subject of the controversy, the
powers of the arbitrators,
and the procedure and details to
be followed.
It provided
for ratification of. the treaty and
its communication to the
signatory powers. In the plan there
was also a provision
for tje denunciation of the arbitration
treaty by the
*G
parties.
In the final act of the Conference the
arbitration

convention was concluded.

It was to cover questions already

existing and future ones.

It provided for general or pri-

vate treaties making arbitration obligatory on the
part
of the signatories to the treaties.

^

Thus it can be seen

that the plan of the United States delegation was
followed

closely in the framing and adoption of the arbitration
declaration.

Since, however, the convention as adopted

was vague and indefinite as compared to the proposal
laid

before the committee, the United States delegation refrained

from voting on it.

It was finally agreed that those who

favored it could enter into the agreement while others

39 Ibid
.

,

p. 78.
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.
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could stay out or come in later as they
pleased.
was compelled to be a party to the treaty.

No one

The declaration

concerning obligatory arbitration as drawn up by
the Conference read:
"The Conference, conforming to the spirit of
good understanding and reciprocal concessions which
is the very spirit of its deliberations has
drawn
up tne following declaration, which, while reserving
to each one of the Powers represented the benefit
of its votes, permits them to affirm the principles
which they consider to have been unanimously accepted.
,

It is unanimous:
1.

In accepting the principle of obligatory arbitration.

2.

In declaring that certain differences, and notably
those relating to the interpretation and a application of international conventional stipulations,
are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory
arbitration without any restrictions."^

The American delegation admitted that the declaration on

principle of obligarory arbitration was an advance, but
they continued to hold that it was not the advance for which

they had hoped.
The conventions and declarations drawn up in 1907,

although they could not be put into action because of the
lack of agreement about the election of judges, were filed
in the records of the conference to serve as a working

basis when the court was finally established.

Therefore,

although the Court as planned by the Second Hague Confer-

41
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ence did not become a reality
within the period of the
Conference, the proposals and
declarations for it served
to further the cause of
international justice by keeping
the idea before the world and
by providing a fine foundation for the much desired court
of international justice.
A second projedt before the Second
Hague Conference
was the establishment of an
International Court of Appeal
in Prize Cases.
The question of validity of capture
had
been the source of disputes for many years.
When war
broke out, it had always been the custom for
each of the

nations at war to set up national prize courts
of their
own to pass on the validity of every capture.
With such
a plan the usual result was a judgment
of the case in

favor of the stronger nation.

This decision was final as

far as the law was concerned.

If the decision involved the

disposition of a great amount of property, or was one which
seemed to violate the rules of national justice and equity,

diplomacy was resorted to, in order to obtain reparation
for the neutral whose property had been captured.

Sometimes

joint commissions, appointed by the two nations, reversed
the decision of the national court of the belligerent, but

this action was of little value since the belligerent was

not bound to join the commission.

It was obvious, then,

that the solution to this problem lay in the establishment
of an International court which was unbiased by national
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interests, and which could
Judge the cases on the established principles of equity and
Justice.^ 2

Great Britain and Germany
proposed plans for the
establishing of such a court, but each
with a different
motive.
Great Britain with her great navy
could

seize and

condemn neutral property with ease,
while Germany with a
much smaller navy at that time, took
the chance of being
a neutral at her mercy.
The American delegation did

not
present a plan at first, but gave its general
consent to
the idea of the Court and waited the
development
of the

two plans of Germany and Great Britain and
possible contro-

versies which were bound to arise from motives so
different.
The British and German plans disagreed on four
points

concerning the organization and functioning of the Court,
and it was at the appearance of these difficulties that
the

American delegation came forward to try to find a common
basis for an understanding.

First, Germany believed that

since the whole purpose of the Court was the provision

for a place of international appeal, the appeal should come

after the first decision of the national court.

Great

Britain, with the great reputation of her prize courts,

wanted the appeal to come as a last resort only.

Second,

Great Britain insisted that the court be a permanent one,

Ap
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whereas Germany wanted it to be called
together only at
the outbreak of war.
Third, Germany wanted the appeal to
be made by the owner of the captured
property, whereas
Great Britain wanted it taken by the
nation of
the owner.

Fourth, Great Britain insisted that the
judges of the court
should be pure jurists, whereas Germany
believed that a
court concerned with, naval matters should be
made up of
admiral s.^
In spite of the divergence of opinions, the
Americans

were able to effect a compromise covering the four
points.

Concerning the question as to when the appeal should come,
the American delegation made a suggestion which provided

for the appeal after the second trial by the national court.
This compromise made certain the action of the Supreme Court
of the United States in any case in which the United States

might be concerned.

After a discussion of some length, the

American compromise was accepted by both parties.

Con-

cerning the question of the permanency of the court, the

American delegation sided with Great Britain and finally
persuaded Germany to yield and to agree to have the court
a permanent one. 44 In regard to which should bring the
.
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appeal, the owner of the property or his
government, the

American suggestion that the owner of the
property under
regulation of his government bring the suit was
accepted
by both contestants.
In regard to the composition of

the

Court, the American delegation agreed with the
British
plan, but it also saw the value of the German
plan to have

admirals with experience in naval warfare on the court.

Therefore they proposed that, although the admirals
should
not be made justices, no case should be decided without
a
naval representative of each party present and without
their opinions

being carefully considered.

With a little

pressure from the American delegation the German reoresenta—
tives accepted the plan and a final agreement was reached .
The compromise was adopted by the Conference in that form.
The Convention for the creation of the International

Prize Court was opened to signature on October 18, 1907,

but ratification failed because of the lack of agreement
as to what law should be applied in prize cases. ^6
The Central American Peace Conference of 1907

The interest of the United States in a court for the
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settlement of disputes between
states was not confined to
the Hague Tribunals, tut
also was directed toward the
establishment of the Central American
Court of Justice created
by the Central American Peace
Conference at Washington.^
Prior to 1907, the five Central
American Republics
had been in continual turmoil
economically and politically
as a result of wars and revolutions.
In 1906, there had
been a war between Guatemala and
Salvador in which Honduras
was an ally of Salvador. At that
time. President Theodore
Roosevelt ashed President Diaz of Mexico
to Join him in
offering mediation. This offer resulted
in the peace conference held aboard the U.S.S. Marblehead
during which the
belligerents agreed to end hostilities
and attend another
conference to draw up a treaty of peace.
The proposed second
peace conference was held at San Jose, Costa
Rica.
But
,

President Zelaya of Nicaragua, denying the
right of the
United States to Interfere in the affairs of Central
America,
refused to send a representative. At the same
time Zelaya
was very successful in interfering in the Internal
affairs
of the other Central American countries, especially
Hon-

duras.

Finally, Guatemala and Salvador in their turn started

to incite revolutions against him in both Honduras and
Nica-

ragua.
In the

47

summer of 1907, war among the Central American

Bradley, op. clt .
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countries seemed Inevitable.

30 -

Again the United States

sought by diplomatic intervention
to persuade the Central
American governments to stop
preparations for war. 48

President Roosevelt. with the
co-operation of President
Diaz of Mexico, sent out indentical
notes to the five Central
American governments offering the "good
offices" of the

United States to help in calling together
a peace conference of representatives of the respective
states to be held
9
at Washington, D.C.
The Invitations to the Conference were
cordially

accepted by all the governments, which unanimously
proposed
that both the United States and Mexico send
representatives
to it.

So it was that Mr. William I. Buchanan was
chosen

as the delegate of the United States and Serior Don
Enrique
C.

Creel, the delegate of Mexico. 50

Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States,

called the Conference to order November 17, 1907.

During

the Conference, a number of conventions were drawn up,

the most important of which provided for the establishment
of a Central American Court of Justice .

48

Policy

John H. Latane, History of American Foreign

pp.

,

Tne court, to be

548-9.

49

Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United
States . pp. 308-9.
50
Dana G. Munro, The Five Republics of Central
America p. 210.
,

51

Frederic L. Schuman, International Politics

,

p.

169.

.

-

31 -

established for a ten-year period,
consisted of five judges
one from each of the Central
American
countries.

Those

countries agreed to submit to it without
reservations of
any kind all disputes which could
not be settled by diploma
cy.
In this way the arbitration was
truly obligatory . 52
Although the United States government was
not a party to
the conventions, it considered them
informally binding. 53
The court was set up at Cartago, Costa
Rica, on May
24, 1908, with representatives from both Mexico
and the

United States taking part in the inauguration
ceremonies.
With the establishment of the court, came a fine
gesture

of goodwill and friendship on the part of the
American

people in the form of a gift of one hundred thousand

dollars for the erection of a temple of peace for the
ex-

clusive use of the court. 54

Unfortunately for the peace for Central America, the
court was not to have the success for which its advocates

had hoped.

Ironically enough, it was the United States

which contributed ultimately to its failure. 55
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its purpose of maintaining
peace in Central America for
ten
years and then went out of
existance with the disagreement
over the By ran- Chamorro Treaty
between the United States
and Nicaragua in 1916. In that
treaty the United States
was given canal rights on the San
Juan River which separated
Nicaragua from Costa Rica. The United
States was also given
the right to fortify -Fonseca Bay
which controlled not only
the Pacific coastline of Nicaragua
but also that of Salvador

and Honduras.

The other Central American states
claimed

that Nicaragua had legally no right to
effect a treaty
which affected them so seriously without
consulting them.

And furthermore, they said that Nicaragua
had no right to
give away that which did not belong to
her.

The Court

agreed with the Central American states and
decided the
case against Nicaragua. Nicaragua, however,
with
the

tacit consent of the State Department at Washington
ignored
the decision.

With this refusal of Nicaragua and the

backing of the United States

,

the other states naturally

lost all confidence and saw no value in the Court if
its

members were free to ignore its decisions.

Therefore, in

1917, they refused to renew the agreement which had created
it.

Therefore, ironically enough, that which the United

States had helped to create, it had also helped to destroy.

CHAPTER II
The United States and the
League of Nations

The next important period in
the international relations of the United States which
had an important influence on its attitude toward the
creation and establishment
of the World Court, came with
the close of the World War
and the conclusion of the terms of
peace in the form

of the

Treaty of Versailles.

Since that same treaty embodied
in

it the provisions for the establishment
of an international
court, the history of the court would
be incomplete without

at least a brief study of the League and
the reaction of the
United States to it.
The idea of a league of nations had
been developing

in the United States during the years of
the war, until
on June 17, 1915, there was formed in
Independence Hall,

Philadelphia, a League to Enforce Peace.

Within a year

of its formation, it had branches in almost
every congres-

sional district in the country.

In the statement of its

principles, the League held it to be desirable that the

United States join a league of nations which would bind
the signatories (l) to submit all justicible questions
to

an international court of justice ’’both upon the merits

and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question",
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(2)

to submit all other
questions to a eounell of
concilia-

tion for hearing, consideration,
and recommendation,
(3)
"Jointly to use forthwith both
their economic and military
forcee" against any member
committing acts of hostility
against another before submitting
to arbitration

or conciliation, and (4) to hold periodic
conferences to formulate and codify international
law. 1,1

Presidential opinion was made public
when President
Wilson, in his 1916 campaign, stressed
the hope
that the

war would bring about the creation of
an international
tribunal which would produce some sort
of joint guarantee
of peace on the part of the great
nations of the world.

Until this time there was virtually no
dissent in
the United States from the idea of an
organized peace
to

replace the old drifting policy which always
had led and
forever must lead to war. The active leaders
of both parties
had committed themselves wholeheartedly to a
league for peace
which would protect the rights of all. 2
On January 22, 1917, Wilson delivered a speech in

which he stated that he believed that it was the mission
of the American democracy to show mankind the way to
liberty

;

and in the settlement of new world conditions

1

,

he felt

Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations.
1918-1920, pp. 7-9~
2
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that It could perform a great
service.

That service, he

said was nothing less than adding
its authority and power
to the authority and power of
other nations in order to
guarantee peace and justice throughout
the world.

It was

his belief that the United States
Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which
it would feel justified in asking its people to approve
formal adherence to a
League of Peace. He felt that the conditions
necessary to
a permanent peace were: (l) a peace without
victory, because
a dictated peace would have to be accepted in
humiliation

and would leave but a bitter memory upon which peace
could
not permanently rest.
(3)

(2)

the right of self-determination,

the freedom of the seas,

(4)

disarmament, and (5) a

league of nations to administer the peace.

He stressed the

point that there was no entangling alliance in a concert
of power and that, if peace was to be made to endure, it had
to be a peace organized by the major force of mankind.^

On November 18, 1918, President Wilson announced that
he would go to France to represent the United States at the
Peace Conference.

On November 29, the rest of the delegates

were selected and they Included Secretary of State Lansing,

Colonel Edward M. House, Hon. Henry White, and G-eneral
A
Tasker H. Bliss.

3
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Ao u te criticism was leveled
at Wilson for making
such a decision to represent
the United States at the
Conference.
Colonel Roosevelt, among others,
declared that no
public end of any icind could be
served by President Wilson'
going to the Conference. He said
that the President had
no authority whatever to represent
the American people at
that time, and that' the Congress
came much nearer than he
to having the right to speak the
purpose of the American
people.

During the interval between the Armistice
and his
departure on December 4, Wilson said little
if anything
about his peace plans. He was strongly
censored for this

error of not consulting his people before he
left for
Paris, especially since he had the opportunity
to do so in

his message to Congress on December 2, the day on
which

he officially announced his departure.
The campaign of 1916 does not seem to have produced

any party cleavage on the question of the League.

It did,

however, bring about one issue between Woodrow Wilson and

Henry Cabot Lodge which removed any basis for co-operation
which may have existed between them.

This disagreement came

about after the Cabinet had approved V/ilson'

s

"strict

accountability" note to Germany on the sinking of the

5

6
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Uisltania.

After Wilson had drawn up
that note. Secretary
Bryan privately pursuaded
the Prealdent to permit
him to
draft an Instruction to
Ambassador Gerard, advising
the
German government that the
United States would be willing
submit the questions at issue
to a commission

of investi-

gation.

The State Department at
once saw the inconsistency
of the President's action,
and Wilson was soon beselged
with requests to reconsider. He
did so, and, upon hearing
the counter arguments, ordered
the instruction suppressed.
Senator Lodge of course heard about
this play of forces
within the administration and attempted
to show that Wilson
was indifferent to the protection
of American rights and
that his whole policy shifted with the
currents of public
opinion.
This controversy eventually brought a
reply from

President Wilson to the effect that Lodges’s
statement
was untrue and that his motives in a
crisis had always been
to do what was best and his best judgment
had prevailed.
Shortly after January 13, 1917, Wilson refused
to speak
from the same platform with Lodge, and there is
no evidence
that cordial relations were ever renewed between them. 8

disagreement between Wilson and Lodge, as will
be seen in the later developments of the struggle to
have

the United States join the League, had the important effect
of causing a definite split between the Republican and

7
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Democratic parties, ana, according
to some people, was
one of the important causes
for the failure of the United
States to ratify the covenant.

Senator Lodge revealed his opinion
on the question
of the League and settlement
terms in a speech in the
Senate on February 1, 1917.
In it he pointed out the dangerous implications of the principles
laid down by the President
and definitely parted company with
the idea of a League of
Nations. Although he did not approve
of a League of Nations,
he was not unwilling to use the power
and influence
of the

United States for the promotion of permanent
peace.
He
merely did not want to involve the country
in a scheme
which would create a worse situation than
already existed.
He said it was better to "bear the ills we
have
than fly

to others that we know not of", 9

He had measures which

he believed to be wholly practicable and
which he highly

commended.
(2)

They we re:

(

1)

adequate national preparedness,

the rehabilitation of international law at the close
of

the war,

(3)

"within necessary and national limits, to

extend the voluntary arbitration as far as possible,"
and

mobilize public opinion behind it, and

reduction of armaments by all nations.

(4)

to urge a general

As a conclusion

to his speech, he wished to support whole-heartedly the

policy of Washington and Monroe in regard to foreign relations.

9
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He said that he saw nothing;
but peril
abandoning the
long established policy of
the United States. 10
Senator Lodge had a very close
friend in the person
of Mr. White.
Before he left, Lodge took him
aside and
presented him with a nine-page
memorandum for a guide. In
that memorandum Lodge stood for
a harsh peace.
He believed that heavy indemnities should
be exacted from Germany
and that Germany should be broken
up "into its chief component parts". As for a league of
nations, he said that
the provision for it should, under
no condition, be made
part of the treaty of peace. He had
clearly made up his
mind that the League was to wait. He
confidently asserted
that the contents of the memorandum
represented not only
the views of the Republican Party, but
those of the United
States as well. 11

m

On December 3, the day before the departure
of the
delegation, Senator Knox offered before the Senate
a resolution which declared (l) that our purposes in the
Peace

Conference should be confined to the aim of vindicating
the ancient rights of navigation as established under
inter-

national law and to remove forever the German menace to
peace;

(2)

"that for the safeguarding of those aims the

10
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first essential Is a
definite understanding that,
the saJne
necessity arising in the
future, there shall be the
same
complete accord and co-operation.
for the defence of civilization; and (3) that any
project for any general
league of
nations or for any sweeping
change in the ancient
.

.

laws of
the sea should be postponed
for separate consideration,
not alone by the victorious
belligerents, but by all the
nations, if and when, at some
future time general confernces
on
tnose subjects might be deemed
useful."^

The attack on a league of
nations was opened on December 6. At that time, former
Senator Albert J. Beveridge of
Indiana, in an address before the
Massachusetts Bar Association, raised almost every
conceivable question to a league of
nations.
The following is an example of
the questions. He
asked whether the League bound a
country to make war if so
doing was a violation of its own
constitution. He said that
the only reason given for the
international super-state was
the hope that it might prevent wars.
He asked, on the contrary, whether it did not contain the
very seeds of war. 1 ?
The determination evidenced by Mr.
Beveridge indi-

cated that the League was going to deprive
the accused of
the ancient right of the benefit of the doubt.
Instead
12
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Of being assumed innocent
until proven guilty, it was
to be
assumed guilty on every account
that could be raised against
it.
There was not to be the
slightest presumption in its
favor.
If the American people
accepted it, it would be
in spite of every suspicion and
fear that some of the best
minds in the country could raise
against it. Mr. Beveridge
ended his address by saying that
"our mission was to furnish
the earth an example of a free
and prosperous people, no
less and no more!"*^

Immediately after Wilson’s arrival in
Paris on
December 14, the American press carried
a dispatch saying
that the President thought that the
creation of a league
was the first task of the conference,
and that the League

should be the basis of the treaty. 15
On December 19, Senator Lodge gave notice
in the
Senate that he would address it on the
question of peace
and the proposed league of nations. His
speech on that day
was very long and began with an assertion of the
right of
the Senate to advise as well as consent and declared
that
it was then the solemn and imperative duty of the
Senate
to give advice which had not been invited by the
negotia-

tors.

He said that the Senate was very capable of making

its opinions known to both the President and the Allies

14
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and that the Allies would
therefore not be kept in the
dark
as to the views of the Senate
on the question.
The speech of Senator Lodge
marked the beginning
of the campaign to be waged
by the Senate.
Lodge advised
the Senate not to reply to requests
for advice made
by the

President, but to influence the
negotiations contrary to
his desires as fully as speeches in
the open Senate could
do so.
The drive for postponement was to
be pressed;

and,

in case it and other attempts to control
the course of

negotiations failed, the country and the Allies
were to be
made to understand that the treaty would be
handled drastically in the Senate.
The questions of the treaty of peace and the
possible

creation of a league of nations necessarily brought
with
them a change in party positions.

Until this time it had

been the Republican party, especially from the time of
McKinley to that of Taft, which had worked with one accord
to increase the influence of the United States among nations

and to promote institutions for the safeguarding of the
peace of the world.

In 1919, there were, therefore, many

Republicans who refused to accept the reversal of position

which Lodge was endeavoring to engineer.
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primarily of the party and, in
standing for the League,
believed themselves the truer
interpreters of the party
policy and the best conservers of
18
its future.

Similarly there were many Democrats
who were not
able to stand on the new ground to
which their leader brought
them.
The Democratic party had held to
a strict construction of the powers and duties of government,
especially
when out of power, for too many generations
to be able
to see eye to eye with Woodrow Wilson.
Most of them followed unquest ioningly however, because he
was their party
leader.
Others followed reluctantly and still others
not
at all.
,

,

When all the angles of partisanship have been considered, there were numerous Democrats who, as debate
pro-

ceeded, made up their minds wholly aside from party con-

siderations that the new step was too dangerous.

Also

there were countless Republicans who ignored every appeal
to partisanship and stood throughout for the League of

Nations because they believed it was right.
That latter group of people, whose attitude toward
the League was never determined by partisanship of any

kind, was large in the country but small in the Senate.

On the Democratic side, the one or two Senators who opposed
the League in any shape or form at all were accused of

18
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Personal animosity toward
Wilson. A oonslderabls
group
of Democrats would
Have been s lad to see
resections attachto the Covenant at
the start. Many
Republican Senators
believed in the League
at all times and
would have been
Slad to see it ratified
without reservation. Of
all of
them, however, the only
one who voted for it
as it stood
and every other way was
Senator Porter J. McCumber,
of
North Dakota. Although he
was later the author of
one
of Lodge's reservations,
no party considerations
of any
kind swerved him from his
stand for the creation of
the
League.
On January 7 , 1919 S eator
,
McCumber came forward in
the Senate with a reply to
the speeches which had been
made
against the immediate creation
of the League.
His was a
sentimental appeal for those
countries of Europe which had
been torn apart by the war and
were looking to the United
States and the Peace Commission
for some international
arrangement which would help to make
impossible another
war.
He told the Senate that, if
after peace had been
secured, victory could not secure
reform then all sacrifices had been made in vain and
pretended civilization
was but foolish mockery. He said
that he was optimistic,
in that he believed that great world
wars could
be pre-

vented, and that then was the time to
adopt restrictive
19
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measures and not some indefinite
time in the future.
Senator McCumber next too*
up the "stock criticisms"
aimed at a league of nations.
As for the argument that
auch a league would interfere
in the internal affairs
of
each nation, he said that there
was no chance of an intelligent commission ever creating
such powers for

the League.
If they should neglect such
national sentiment, he believed
that none of the great powers
would ever ratify the treaty.
In reference to the Monroe
Doctrine, he said that certainly
no league founded to guarantee
the territorial integrity

and political Independence of all
its members would be a
menace to the doctrine which did the
same for the nations
of the Western World only.
In reply to the cry for postponement,
he gave the

Senate the clear warning that no matter how
much they legislated, or how many resolutions they introduced
and passed,
three things were certain: (l) that the President
was acting
under his constitutional right when he appointed
delegates
to the Conference; (2) that those delegates
would dictate

and agree upon the terms of peace; and

(3)

that they would

not stop from their deliberations or attach their signatures
to any instrument of peace which would leavd unsettled

the question of the prevention of another war. 20

20
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On Janurary 13, the last
message of Colonel Roosevelt was read before the
Senate,
it Roosevelt stated
that It was his belief that
the Monroe

m

Doctrine was the

most important consideration,
and that it should be strictly maintained.
He said that Europe and
Asia should be
left to do their own policing
and that the United States
should take no position as an
"international Meddlesome
21
Matty".
The next day Senator Borah, of
Idaho, delivered an
attack on the whole idea of a
league of nations. To him
it was only the old Holy Alliance
brought to life. He
was wholly opposed to any kind
of internationalism and
argued that the nationalism which had
won the war would be
murdered by the proposed internationalism. 22
The Peace Conference was finally
opened on January
12, 1919.

President Wilson and Colonel House served
as

the representatives of the United
States on the Commission

which was to draw up the draft for a league
of nations.
The Covenant was completed on February
13, and presented by

Wilson to a plenary session of the Conference on the
next
day.

To that meeting he said that the Covenant was a

definite guarantee of peace against aggression and was a
21
22
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means of putting armed force
in the background . 23
On February 15, the President
sailed for home to
attend the closing of Congress
and to present the Covenant
of the League to the American
people.
Before sailing,
however, Wilson cabled an
invitation to the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate inviting
them to dine with him as
soon as he returned In order
that he might explain the
provisions of the Covenant to them. 2 ^
The Senators had been complaining
that they did not
know what was going on in Paris.
But now that they had
their chance to really find out what
had been done by one
who knew, they, according to Mr.
Fleming, did not want to
have their objections removed by
any sympathetic explanation
of Mr. Wilson.
Therefore, after about twenty-four hours
deliberation, the leading Republican Senators
declared that
the project appeared to surrender American
independence
and upset the Monroe Doctrine. They appear
to have feared
that, instead of being permitted to approve the
Treaty of

Peace without a League, they were going to be
forced to pass
on the League itself first, 'They insisted
that the Senate
25
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would not endorse It, even
by a
President returned to France. 2 5

-

ferity

vote, before the

Senator Poindexter, of Washington,
opened the Inevitable attach on the Covenant
In the Senate on February
19.
He made five specific charges
against the League: (1)
that under It we surrendered
the power of disarmament,
(2) that it called for compulsory
arbitration of all questions without exception,
(3) that it would compel the United
States to participate in the
wars and controversies
of

every other nation" and to assume
the burdens of a mandate
over any part of Europe, Asia, or
Africa that was assigned
to it,

(4)

that the International Labor Bureau
would inter-

fere in our domestic affairs, and
(5) that the United States
would surrender to other nations the
power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations in arms
and amunition. ,26

Senator Borah took the floor on February
21, to maintain that the Covenant did abolish the
Washington and Monroe
Doctrines. He read into Article 10 a guarantee to
England
of the possession of every part of land
then in the British
Empire and hailed the League "as the greatest triumph
for

English diplomacy in three centuries of English diplomatic
asked for a direct vote of all the people of

25
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the nation on the question
of entering the League
and
begged for the maintaining
of full liberty of action
in the
future. 27

Senator Reed followed Borah
the next day with a
bitter blasting of the entire
Covenant. He proved at length
that Great Britain would control
the Lea^e and came to the
conclusion that in any controversy
the votes of the B ritl sh,
French, and Italians and Japanese
would always be against
the United States.

From the first and all times Europe

and Asia would predominate over the
United States. Moreover, he said that the powers of the
League were almost

unlimited, for he believed that every
nation that entered
the League would yield to its arbitrament
and decision
all controversies with other countries even
though they
involved the national honor or national life. 28

Such, then,

were the arguments concerning the Covenant
before President
Wilson met with the Foreign Relations Committee.
The first White House conference between the Presi-

dent and the Committee took place on February 26.

The

Associated Press reported that the discussion covered a wide
range, and that the President was questioned closely. He
answered all questions freely and especially emphasized that
27 Ibid
.
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his guests were free to discuss
the conference and its information with newspapermen and
others. The views of the
Republican members remained unchanged,
however, in spite
Of Wilson's explanations. 25
Senator Lodge, courteously observing
the President’s
request to be allowed to present his
case, had used the
interval to prepare a negative speech
which he delivered
in the Senate on February 28. He said
that no question of
equal Importance had ever confronted the
Senate and that
therefore, there should be no undue haste in
considering
it.

He said that it was his desire that not only the
Senate,

but the press and the people of the country should
investigate every proposal with the utmost thoroughness and weigh

them carefully before making up their minds.

He stressed

the thought that it was no idle thing to abandon entirely

the policy laid down by Washington in his farewell address

and by the Monroe Doctrine.

Eventually he had demonstrated "the uncertainties

which cloud this instrument from beginning to end," and was
compelled, he said, against his earnest desire to do every-

thing that could be done to secure the peace of the world,
to conclude that "this machinery would not promote the peace

of the world, but would have a directly opposite effect."

29
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He then asked if it was not
possible to draft a better,
more explicit, less dangerous
scheme than the one presented
by Wilson, and then proceeded
to present certain
propositions which he thought it might
be well for the peace
confer
ence to consider. He suggested
that it (l) put three lines
into the draft for the League
which would preserve the

Monroe Doctrine,

exclude completely from its jurisdiction such questions as immigration,
(3) provide for
peaceful withdrawal and (4) state
whether the League was
to have an international force
of its own or to have the
power to summon the armed forces of
the different members.
Senator Lodge apparently did not have
much hope
that the Covenant could be made
over so that it would be
acceptable, for he continued: "Unless some
better constitution for a league than that can be drawn,
it
(2)-

seems to me,

that the world's peace would be much better,
much more

surely promoted, by allowing the United States
to go on
under the Monroe Doctrine, responsible for the
peace of this
hemisphere, without any danger of collision with
Europe as
to questions among the various American
states, and if a

league is desired it might be made up by the European

nations whose interests are chiefly concerned, and with

which the United States could co-operate fully and at any
time, whenever co-operation was needed."

In that way he

disposed of the Covenant so casually that it hardly seemed

- 52 -

to be worthy of consideration,
although he did add a final
paragraph of warnings against it.^^

Very little attention had been
paid up until this
time to the position which public
opinion concerning

the

Covenant and the possibility of a
league of nations. The
news previews up to March
1, Indicated a clear prefmderance
of support for it.^
President Wilson sailed back to France on
March 5,
leaving behind him an opposition in the Senate
which he

realized was definitely partisan and not open
to reconciliation.

Nevertheless he returned to his job, determined to

press for the amendments which Senator Lodge had
considered
so necessary, although he believed that the
ends sought

by them were already attained in the Covenant as it
stood.

Wilson therefore drew up, about March 22, the date
when the League of Nations Commissions met for the revision
of the Covenant, a set of amendments covering the points at

issue.

He succeeded in having three of the four desired

amendments passed with comparatively little opposition.
The desire for the right of withdrawal was met by an addi-

tion to Article

30

I,

saying that any member might withdraw
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An attempt to allay the
anxiety

as to interference
with immigration and
tariff was made
by the addition of a
clause to Article 15 which
said! "If
the dispute between the
parties is claimed by one
of them
and is found by the Council,
to arise out of a
matter which
by international law is
solely within the jurisdiction
of
that party, the Council
shall so report, and shall
make
no recommendation as to
its settlement." The fear
of Senator
Lodge that a mandate might
be forced upon the United
States
was countered by an insertion
in Article 22, in describing
those to whom mandates should
be intrusted, of the phrase
and who are willing to accept
it. "33

Wilson postponed the combat with
the Commission
over the Monroe Doctrine
amendment because he knew that
the Doctrine had never been
popular
in Europe, except

among the English.

After delivering many speeches
explaining the Dectrine to the Commission,
Wilson finally
succeed-

ed in persuading it that the
amendment would not injure
in any way the working of the Covenant,
the amendment was

finally accepted and added to the Covenant
as Article 21.
It read as follows: "Nothing in this
Covenant shall be
deemed to affect the validity of international
engagements,
such as treaties of arbitration or
regional understandings,

33 Ibid.

,
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like the Monroe Doctrine, for
securing the peace of the
world. "^4

However complete the success of
President Wilson
at Paris may have been, it was
great enough to cause gloom
in the band of men made up of
Senators Lodge, Borah,

Knox,
Reed, Poindexter, and Beveridge,
who had determined to deny
him the creation of the League of
Nations.
The League
had not only been created, but its
Covenant had been amended to meet the principal American
objections raised against
it.
The entire Treaty of Feace was also
completed and Wilson
was soon to be returning with the finished
document containing the League of Nations so woven into
it that it would
be impossible to separate the two. Added
to their troubles

was the fact that the leaders of public
opinion still

stood overwhelmingly in favor of the League.
z/ith

the influence and belief of the nation’s leaders

strongly behind the League, there was only one recourse
left, to arouse the masses by persistant repetition of
the

cries already raised and many others that seemed likely
to stir the emotion of a considerable block of people.

The opposition decided, therefore, that if the nation would

not think anti-League, it must be made to feel so.

Also

they believed that the nation could be eventually wearied
34
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of the whole League business If
action on It could be
delayed long enough, ^5

This strategy of joining the irreconcilables
and
reservationists was agreed upon by Lodge and
Borah and was

undoubtedly clever and most ably followed
up in months to
come.
The reservationists included Senators
Lenroot, Frelinghuysen, Cummins

Me Wary

,

McCumber, and Kellogg.

moreover, a good bargin for both leaders.

It was,

If it could be

executed, Lodge had had the practical certainty that
at the

worst the Republican trademark would be stamped on the
League; Borah knew from long experience that he need
not

have much fear of any treaty that Mr. Lodge set out to

"perfect".^
One first requisite was essential to success-- the

control of the Senate machinery.

This control was in their

hands as a result of the election of the November before
in which the Republicans had secured a majority.

That

majority meant also a majority in the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations and the power to delay or hasten the
37
action as the needs of their policy dictated.
Not only was the victory in the Committee on Foreign

Relations one for the Republicans, but also for the "Irrecon-

55
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enables" of the party,

with the Irreconcilable Senators
Knox, Borah, the Committee
Included Lod S e, really

an Irreconcilable, Senator McCumber, the most
outspoken advocate of
the League among the Republican
senators, and two staunch
party regulars who could be trusted
to follow the party
leaders.

The extraordinary composition of the
Committee drew
bitter comments from both Republicans
and Democrats.

Senator Hitchcock, in appealing to the
Republicans who
favored the League, pointed out the membership

of the Com-

mittee as evidence that there was a settled purpose
to make
a political issue out of the Treaty.
No explanation
was

offered by any Republican leader in the Senate.

The sole

comment made by Lodge was that it was a strong committee

and such as the existing comditions demanded. 58

With the Committee on Foreign Relations safely
under their control, the lrreconcilables faced the future
with greater confidence.

They were still, however, far

from their ultimate victory and their immediate program
met with failure.

Senator Knox Introduced a resolution

demanding that the Senate be given the opportunity to
ratify the Treaty of Peace without the Covenant which was
70
W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate.
P.

279.

,
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to be left for future
consideration.39

opposition
developed to prevent the Knox
resolution from being pushed
to a vote.^O
It became increasingly clear
during the debates in
Kay and June, when the
irreconcilables continued to display

more activity than the others,
that the Republicans in the
Senate were going to- make the
treaty an issue for party
action.
The best evidence of this can
be found in the
growing alarm of the Republicans
who favored the League
and who knew that partisan
consideration would endanger the
Treaty.

Such was the situation when Wilson
returned with
the Peace Treaty.
On July 10, he submitted the Treaty
to the Senate and delivered a speech
in person. With the
Treaty in the hands of the Senate, the
powers of the Com-

mittee on Foreign Relations were brought
into play.
That
control was the means of keeping the Treaty
from the Senate
for two months.
Delay was essential to their
cause, for

the state of public opinion was such that
prompt action

would have been fatal.
opinion.

Time was needed to arouse a hostile

Devices to gain time proved readily available.

First, the long treaty of several hundred printed pages
was

40

^
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read aloud line by line.

The reading took two weeks.

Then the Committee held public
hearings which lasted for
six weeks more.
At those hearings various members
of the American
delegation to the Conference gave testimony,
but no one
else appeared before the Committee except
representatives
of national groups that felt that
their countries had received less than justice at Paris. 2
The majority report of the Committee on
Foreign

Relations that reached the Senate on September
10, made
several things certain. The irreconcilables no
longer

entertained any hope of persuading the Republicans in the
Senate to unite on a policy of complete rejection. Following the advice of Lodge, the Republicans, who had
openly
desired rejection, proceeded "by way of amendment and reser
vation,

and with Lodge, Harding, and New, recommended

four reservations, forty-five amendments, many covering
the same point.

follows:

(l)

The purpose of the amendments were as

to secure for the United States a vote in the

Assembly of the League equal to that of any power including
G-reat Britain, who, with all her possessions, had six votes
(2)

to provide that where a member of the League had self-

governing dominions and colonies, which were also members
42
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of the League, the exclusion
of disputants under the League

rules should cover the aggregate vote
of that empire.
The remaining amendments, with the
exception of no.
45, had the same purpose, namely, to relieve the
United
States from having representatives on the
commissions established by the League, which dealt with questions
in which
the United States had not and could not have
any interest
and in which the United States had evidently been
inserted by
design.

Amendment 45 provided that the United States have a

member of the reparation commission, but that such a commissioner of the United States, could not in the case of shipping, where the interests of the United States were directly

involved, deal with or vote upon any other questions before
that commission except under instructions from the government
of the United States.

The four reservations drawn up stated that::
1. The United States reserved to itself the unconditional right to withdraw from the League of Nations
upon giving the notice specified in Article I of the
Treaty.
2. The United States declined to assume, under any
article, any obligation to preserve the territorial
integrity or political independence of any country,
or to interfere in controversies between other nations,
members of the League or not, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States in such controversies, or to adopt economic measures for the protection of any other country against external aggression or for the purpose of coercing any other country,
or for the purpose of intervention in the internal conflicts or other controversies which might arise. No
mandate was to be accepted by the United States.

3. The

United States reserved to itself the exclusive

.
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ec de what questions were
within its
J
domestic Jurisdiction
and not under the Jurisdiction
h t at ° r SUbJe0t to
arbitration ^consider”n i of S!
tion
the JS
Council or Assembly or subject
to thp
th
decision or recommendation of any
other power.
A. The United States declined
to submit for arbitrar
qU ati0 *hlCh ’ ln the
of ?he Un^efltSL d
S
V aS related
to the policy of the ’Monroe
Doctrine!^
(

5'

%

«

'

There was no pretence in the report
of the majority that
these changes would make them want to
ratify the Treaty.
On the contrary the report showed a
bitter hostility toward

The Report of the Committee further
showed that of
the ten Republican members, nine were
demanding serious
changes in the Treaty, while six of the seven
Democratic

members signed a report urging its acceptance
with no changes.
The Committee, however, did not accurately
represent the
Senate.

Though the enemies of the League who controlled

the Committee did not propose the direct rejection
of the

Treaty, their report was not one on which the Republicans

in the Senate could be held together.

That Republican unity was not attainable on those
terms, had been made clear even before the report reached

the Senate.

All during July and August when the Treaty
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was still in Committee, the debate in the
Senate had continued, and for the first time the expression
of Republican
Saratorial opinion was not left chiefly to the
irreconcil-

ables.

The speeches of those previously silent
Republican

Senators proclaimed the defeat of the irreconcilables
who

had struggled to commit the party to a rejection of the
Treaty.

Some desired strong reservations, others were

satisfied with mild reservations.

According to newspaper

accounts they expected that about twenty Republicans would
join their movement and hoped that the results would be

accepted by the Democrats, for they were seeking agreement
with the Democrats as much or even more than with Republican
leaders.

The campaign of the irreconcilables may have driven

them to a policy of insisting on reservations to the Treaty,
but with some reservations the Republican majority in the

Senate was going to vote for the entry of the United States
into the League of Nations.

Wilson had begun to fight for his Treaty immediately
after his return from the Conference with the amended form.
He invited many of the Republican senators to the White

House for individual conferences.

He placed his chief reli-

ance, however, on an appeal to the people.

The speaking

tour which he began early in September, ended three weeks

46
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later in his collapse.

With his collapse.it was
evident
that the strongest weapon
that could be used

in behalf of

the Treaty was useless.

The serious consequents of
the lack of leadership
in the fight for the Treaty
became apparent two months
after Wilson's collapse.
Public opinion, which according
to common agreement had been
decidedly in favor of joining
the League and upon which Wilson
had counted for success,
had become confused and had drifted
away from its earlier
47
position.
In the United States, as throughout
Europe,
there was occuring a shift in opinion
which might have

been described as a substitution of
near-sighted nationalism for international co-operation
and the general good.
The people of Europe and America showed
themselves less

willing than during the war to sacrifice
any immediate
national interest for the sake of future
international
peace. 4 ®
While the public and the majority in the Senate
were groping toward some decision, the debate
in the Senate
continued with increasing tension. The intellectual
level
of it gave no cause for national pride.

Many of the speeches

did not compliment the public mind, for there was much

47
48
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demagoguery. Most of this came
from the opponents of the
Treaty, since the circumstances
of the case restricted
them
to the opportunities to
gain favor by paying up to
popular
and nationalistic prejudices.
The hatred of the Irish in
America for Great Britain
was exploited.
The British Ambassador was
informed that
in using the Irish question that
England would be attacked

without mercy but that such an attack
was not stimulated
because of any real animosity. Lodge was
keenly aware of
the possibilities in the Irish question
and realized the

importance of the Irish vote in the United
States.

Other groups besides the Irish received
attention.
One irreconcilable, Sherman, gave a perfect
example of a
demagogue in a speech devoted to the thesis that
the majority of countries in the League would be Catholic,
that the

Papacy had never abandoned its claim to temporal power,
and that the League would be under the dominion of the Pope. ^9
The Democratic irreconcilable, Reed, who generally

warned the public that the six votes of the British Empire
would mean English domination of the League, devoted one
speech to proving for the benefit of the South that the
League would be ruled by colored peoples . ^0
49
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Next to the

"

injustices" of the Irish the
most

frequent subject for the type
of attack were the wrongs
done the Chinese in Shantung.
The Treaty was vulnerable
on this point and probably
the speakers were not unaware
of tne effects of their
speeches on anti-Japanese feeling
along the Pacific coast. The irony
of the situation was
that the Treaty was being opposed
not because of real or
alleged injustices in it, but because
of the machinery
provided to correct international wrongs. 51

When voting began in October, no steps
had been
taken by the Democrats to reach an
understanding with the
Republicans wanting mild reservations, and the
latter were
drifting toward a politically natural alliance
with their
fellow Republicans on terms more hostile to
the Treaty
than those they would have preferred. The
Republican ranks
held firmly together.
As reservation after reservation was added to the

Treaty by the unbroken Republican majority, some friends
of
the League begged with the Democrats to take what
could

be gotten rather than lose everything.

Other sincere

advocates of the League, who were not members of the Senate,

urged the same course. 52
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All the reservations
presented durin s the periods
Of debate in the Senate
may be summarized in
the reservations
presented to the Senate by
Senator Lodge on October
24,

1919:
}• u P° n

giving notice of its withdrawal
+u
League, the United States was
to be toe on?v
e
1
a1
obligations under' th e ^Covenant. ^ ltB

^

.

of any country by employing
the military or naval
1
tateS under the Provisions
oi
Article 10 of
of^rticle^O
of^h
r
the Covenant.
Such action aq th P
declaration of war was to be taken only
or
r
7 by
7 act °
joint resolution of Congress.
'

The United States reserved the
exclusive risht
questions fell within its domestic
Jurisdiction and declared that internal
6.
matters
such as immigration, labor and coast
wise traffic
le
within
Jurisdiction of the United
q+rL!° anda 7 were not the
otates
to be submitted for arbitration
or consideration of the Council or
Assembly of the
7.
League or to any similar agency.
3.

he United States refused to submit any
question
under the Monroe Doctrine to arbitration
of any kind.

J’
J
8.
falling

No person was to represent the United States
5
or
perform any act on its behalf except with the
approval
of the Senate of the United States.
The United States was not to be obligated to
any contribution to the expenses of the League pay
unless
and until such appropriations had been made by the
Congress , even though the United States may have
agreed to a limitation of armaments.
It reserved the right to increase its armaments
without the consent of the Council whenever the
United States is threatened with invasion or engaged

in war.

The United States reserved the right to allow

-
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belligerent countries residing
nited
St8tes
to continue their residence
V
S
1003 Wlth the natlonals of the
Snited S?a?e 3

r

The United States reserved to Itself
the exclusive
1
e ide what questions affected
its
honor
?
J
or vita! interests
and declared that such quesUons
me under the treaty to he submitted
for
tSi+?° or consideration
arbitration
of any kind by
anv
y
agency of the League. 5 3
9.

The effect of the reservations was, for
all practical
purposes, the abrogation, on the part of the
United States,
of all the important responsiblities which
membership in
the League would naturally involve and therefore
the nul-

lification of the effects of the League.

They did, in

fact, deprive the League of the very influence and power

which it hoped to gain from the membership of the United
States.

In connection with the reservations it may be noted

here that several of them, namely those which dealt with
the Monroe Doctrine and matters of domestic jurisdiction,

were used as conditions to the adherence of the United
States to the World Court.

It is perfectly possible that

Lodge and the rest of the opponents of the League were

looking forward to the creation of the court under the League.
On November 19, 1919, the Senate came to a vote.

At that time the Treaty of Versailles was considered with
and without the reservations.

With the reservations it

was rejected by a vote of 39 to 55.

Without the reservations

it was rejected by a vote of 38 to 55.

55
18.

An analysis of the
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vote with reservations showed that
four Democrats voted yes
and forty- two voted no.
In the case of the Republicans,
thirty-five voted yes and thirteen voted
no.
In
the vote

without reservations, thirty- seven Democrats
voted yes and
seven voted no, and one Republican voted
yes and

forty- six

voted no.

This would indicate a definite influence of
party

politics on the vote,- for with but few exceptions,
the Democratic party was in favor of the Treaty without
reservations
and the Republican party with reservations. 54
The rejection of the Treaty caused great amazement

and widespread demands for a bi-partisan conference to
draw

up a compromise.

The conference, however, was unable to

draw up such a compromise, because Lodge refused to accept
any reduction in his reservations. 55
In spite of the failure of the conference, the Treaty

again came before the Senate, and on March 19, 1920, the
final vote was taken.

The Treaty received a majority of

49-35, but not the required two- thirds majority. The Republicans cast 28 for and 12 against, while the Democrats cast 21

for and 23 against the Treaty. 55

An analysis of this vote shows some significant similarities and contrasts with the vote in November.

As before,

the Republican senators cast a practically solid party vote

for the Lodge reservations.
54

In contrast with the

Ibid., p. 297.

55 Ibid

.

,

pp.

298-299.

56 Ibid

.

.

pp.

299-301.
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Republican unity, the Democrats split
decidedly and many
more voted for the Lodge reservations
than in the November
vote. 57
The fate of the Treaty of Versailles was
the result,
I

believe, of three different factors:

(l)

the constitu-

tional struggle of the Senate against the President,
(2)
party politics and (3) personal hatred of
President Wilson.
The constitutional struggle between the Senate
and
the President was due to the indifference with
which Wilson

treated the treaty-making power of the Senate.

He com-

pletely ignored the traditional policy of consulting with,
or even imparting to the Senate any plans which he had
in

mind to present to the Peace Conference.

He made matters

even worse when he went as a delegate himself instead of

remaining at home to take care of domestic affairs,

A

powerful resentment naturally arose among the Senators

against Wilson.

And it was this resentment which was the

underlying cause for the many reservations which ultimately spelled the doom of the Treaty.

The pressure of party politics was easily discernable
in the struggle in the strong and utmost undivided stand

which the Republican party took.

Only the Republicans

entered the battle in the defense of the Senate's prerogatives, and in the last vote the Democratic Party was decidedly

divided on the question and the Republicans practically
57 Ibid . „ p. 301.

-
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unanimous in its rejection.
The personal hatred of President
Wilson, held especially by Senator Lodge, was, I
believe, one of the most
important if not the most important
factor contributing
to the failure of ratification.
It began by a contempt,
on the part of Lodge, for the
fickleness of Wilson's
dealings with Germany at the time of the
sinking of the

Lusitania and was increased by Wilson's
disregard for the
rights of the Senate and by Lodge's supreme
loyalty to his
party over against the Demcratic.
This animosity led
Lodge to exert his influence at every turn
in order to
frustrate any move Wilson made. Lodge's motives
in creating
the reservations, which ultimately killed
ratification, were

based on party loyalty, dislike for Wilson,
and his insistence on the consitutional place of the Senate in the

treaty-making procedure.

He was able to succeed in his

plans mainly because of his superior ability to manage

his party and make moves at the most strategic time.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the Versailles

Treaty should have made one fact very evident to the people
of the United States.

That fact is that conflicts between

the President and the Senate and could so increase the

opportunities for political warfare that the questions of
the merits of treaties could be entirely lost.

CHAPTER III
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE
The Permanent Court of International
Justice may
be said to be the advanced, if not the
final, step in the

movement begun hundreds of years before its
time in the
effort to peacefully settle international
disputes.

The

Institutions* beginning with the Court of Arbitral
Justice

and ending with the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
served
as the stepping stones to this court of
international
Justice and really paved the way for its establishment.
vVith

the end of the World War came new hopes and

aspirations for an organization of the world based on
Justice and order,

in which the weak would not be dominated

by the strong, and in which there would be a means to
apply
all possible guarantees against the recurrence of the horri-

ble devastations of another war.

So it was that the

period following that war was to see the establishment of
a great international organization, in which nations small

and large were to have the same influence, and which would
act as a collective body for the good of all nations rather

than a chosen few.
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Establishment of the Court
The unofficial drafts of the Covenant
for the

League of Nations, drawn up prior to the
Peace Conference
of 1919, contained references to an
international

court, but

laid very little emphasis on its

importance.

With the convening of the Peace Conference
in

January 1919,

several more proposals were made.

In Jan-

uary, Lord Robert Cecil of Great Britain
circulated a

draft sketch of a League of Nations in which he
referred
to a “judicial body

15

which he described as the existing

Hague organization, with any additions or modifications
made by the League, or by the Peace Treaties 1
.

In Jan-

uary 1919, also, President Wilson formulated two
drafts 2
,

which, although they indicated that he did not think
a

court important, did provide for arbitration and for a

possible appeal from an arbitral decision to a “Body of
Delegates'*.

His drafts continued to refer to the settle-

ment of disputes by judicial decision or arbitration.
At a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace

Conference on January 25
^ David H.

p. 63

Miller,

.

2

Ibid., pp. 65

,

,

1919,

a resolution was adopted

Drafting of
the Convenant
“

,

vol.

II,

^
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approving the principle of the League
of Nations and
creating a commission to work on the
details of its
organization.

With the creation of this commission,

began the first step, not only in the

creation of the

League of Nations, but also in the establishment
of a
court.

On January 31

,

of the same year, it was agreed

at a conference of American and British
representatives,

that definite provisions regarding the method
of arbitration were not essential and that Just a
general provision should be inserted for the creation of
a permanent
court.
made,

Shortly afterward, the Hurst-Miller draft was
and it was this draft which was

placed before the

Commission by President Wilson.
This Commission of the League,

set up under the

resolution began its work on February
1919, with the
3
Hurst-Miller draft as the basis of its deliberations.
,

That draft, reported by the Drafting Committee as articles
13 and l4 and adopted by the Commission* read as follows?
"

Article 13
The High Contracting Parties
agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall
arise between them, which they recognize to be
suitable for submission to arbitration and which
.

^

4

Ibid

.

.

Ibid.,

vol. I,

p.

61.

vol. I, p. 67 .
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cannot be satisfactorily settled by
diplomacy
SUbrQ
the Wh0le object matter to
ar
ra 0n
For
purpose the Court of
^J' *?'
to whlch the c ®-se Is referred
shall
e C ° Urt
sreed on b 7 tbe parties or stipu? +o^
^
any Convention existing between theS.
ThP
The High Contracting Parties agree
that
carry out in full good faith any reward they will
that may
be rendered.
In the event of any failure to
carry
out the award, the Executive Council shall
propose
what steps can best be taken to give
effect thereX»0

^blt^on

*

^

^

1

•

Article l4.
The Executive Council shall
formulate plans for the establishment of a
manent Court of International Justice, and Perthis
Court shall, when established, be competent
to
hear and determine any matter which the parties
recognize as suitable for submission to it for
arbitration under the foregoing article.
11

11

These articles appeared in this form in the draft
Covenant

which was reported to the Preliminary Peace Conference
in

February 1917.^
In March several amendments were added.

President

Wilson and Lord Cecil agreed upon the addition to Article
lA of the words:

"and also any issue referred to it by

the Executive Council or Body of Delegates." 6

This ad-

dition was the forerunner of what was to be classed as an

advisory opinion.

At a meeting of the Commission on

March 2k several minor amendments and additions were proposed to Article

5

6

Hudson,

14-

by the English and French delegates.

The P.C.I.J

Miller, op. clt

. .

.

—

Treatise, pp. 89-90.

vol. II, p. 729

.
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Two days later a drafting
committee was set up which made
several important changes in the
drafts of Articles 13 and
14.
Those provisions which finally
became the second para-

graph of Article 13 and the third sentence
of Article 14
were reported by this drafting Committee,
adopted by the
Commission on April 11 in the following form,
were included
in the conditions of peace to the
German delegation, and
later embodied in the Treaty of Versailles:

^T^clg—
The members of the League of
nations agree that whenever any dispute
shall
arise between them which they recognize
suitable
for submission to arbitration and which
cannot be
satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will
submit the whole subject matter to arbitration.
Disputes as to the Interpretation of a treaty,
as to any question of international law,
as to
the existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of any international
obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the
reparation to be made for any such breach, are
declared to be among those which are generally
suitable for submission to arbitration.
For the consideration of any such dispute the
court of arbitration to which the case is referred
shall be the court agreed upon by the parties to
the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
The Members of the League agree that they will
carry out in full good faith any award that may be
rendered, and that they will not resort to war
against a member of the League which complies therewith.
In the event of any failure to carry out
such an award, the Council shall propose what steps
should be ta&en to give effect thereto.
Article l4 . The Council shall formulate and
submit to the Members of the League for adoption
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court
of International Justice. The Court shall be
competent to hear and determine any disputes of an
international character which the parties thereto
submit to it. The Court may also give advisory
1
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Up n any dls P ute or question
re ferred to
i? £v°+l
it
by the S
Council or by the Assembly."?

According to the mandate In
Article 14 of the League
Covenant, the Council elected a
Committee of Jurists to
prepare the plans for the Court. 2
Among the Jurists elected
by the Council was Elihu Root, who,
as Secretary of State

of the United States, had been
responsible for the policy
of the American representatives at
the Hague Conference in
1907All the credit for the contributions
which the
United States was able to make to the
organization and
estsblishment of the Court is due him for
the fine work
done while he was a member of that
Committee.
At the first regular meeting of the
Jurists, Mr. Root
proposed that the Committee adopt "as the basis
for con-

sideration the subjects referred to it in the
Acts and
Resolutions of the Second Hague Conference at the
Hague in
19°7The members of the Committee, however,
preferred
not to be bound by the Draft Convention of
but
1907,

favored proceeding more Independently.

They did not over-

look the value of the work of the First and Second
Hague
Conferences, but wanted to enlarge the scope of its
work

^ Miller,

&
9

Hudson,

op.cit

. .

vol. II,

The P.C.I.J,

—

p.729.

Treatise, p. 106.

Ibid ., p. 107.

James Brown Scott, The P roject of the P.C.I.J.
Resolutions of Advisory Commission of Jurists, p. 1~5
.

a nd

^
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11
beyond the point suggested by Mr.
Root.

After the Committee came to an
agreement concerning the rules of procedure for
the conduct

of business,
the delegates, led by Mr. Adatcl
of Japan, came forward
with their plans for the establishment
of the Court. 12
V?itn the presentation of the
various plans, it became
very clear that the big obstacle in
the way of the

establishment of the Permanent Court of
International
Justice was the very same obstacle which
had prevented
the realization of a court at the time
of the Second
Hague Conference in 1907- That obstacle
was the
claim

of the so-called great powers to permanent
representation
in the court regardless of the principle of
"equality of
nations" and the claim of the "small" states that
the

principle of equality should be observed in the
formation
of the court.

A deadlock seemed Inevitable in the Com-

mittee of Jurists, unless some method could be found
which would satisfy these claims.
That method so necessary as a compromise between
the great and small powers was proposed by Mr. Elihu Root.
In making his proposal, he took advantage of the agencies

11
12

15

Ibid

.

,

p. 15.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid ., p. 29.

^
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of the League of Nations and
also of the experiences of
his
own country in bringing into
peaceful harmony the interests
of the larger states and those
of the smaller states in
drafting the Constitution of the
United States of America.
He showed that the American problem
in 17^7 was solved by
the creation of two chambers, one
in which the states were
represented on a basis of equality, and the
second in which
representation was based on size and
population
Mr. Root
did not intend that that method be accepted
as such, but
merely mentioned it to show how divergent
interests could
be reconciled.
He pointed out that the Paris Peace
Conference, composed of representatives of
large and small
.

states which, without satisfying the views of
the other,
had created the League of Nations consisting of

two chambers,

one the Assembly in which all powers big or
small were equal
and the second chamber the Council in which the
great powers

outweighed the small.

With such an ideal arrangement he

asked why the judges could not be elected by a concurring
vote of the Assembly and Council.

He pointed out that the

necessity of a concurring vote of both the bodies would
make it impossible for either body to violate the special
interests of the other.

Quoting Mr. Root*s own words!

The effect of the practical working would
that in the Assembly, where the smaller powers
11

be,

l4

w
Ibid.,
pp. 29-30*
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e
a ^° r t ?’ they would project the
interests
a™ i?
+
of the smaller
states,
and that in the Council the
h V ng the P re P° n ^- eran ce would
protect
i erests
SU h r Ctical ?
int
of their greater trade,
? +? f
and their greater production and their
greater interests as would be submitted to the Court.
15

Should a difference arise between the two
bodies, the Assembly and the Council, Mr. Hoot suggested that

a smaller

joint committee of the two houses could be
appointed and
this committee, similar to the joint committees
of the
Senate and House in the United States, would serve
as a

practical method to reconcile the differences between
the
16
^
Assembly and Council.
.

Lord Phillimore, of Great Britain, was very much

impressed by Mr. Root*s plan for the election of the
judges to the Court and so organized it into the follow-

ing five articles:
”1.
The judges of the High Court are appointed
by the joint authority of the Council and of the
Assembly of the League of Nations.”
"2.

The Council votes a list which is transmitted to the Assembly.”
H

The Assembly considers the list voted by
3*
the Council and any names brought before it as
candidates by any state which is a member of the
Assembly and then votes its list.”
"4.
The names which are found on both lists
are to be elected.”
”5*
As to the residue the Council votes afresh
and the Assembly votes afresh and so they continue
until a final agreement is reached.”

16

Ibid.,

p.

3 2.

15 Ibid
.

,

pp. 31-32.
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79 “*• 11001,8 Plan thUS
reduced ^0 the form of
articles by

Lord Phillimore became known
as the Root-Phillimore
1
Plan. ?
After being organized by
Lord Phillimore, the
plan
was placed before the committee,
and the fundamental
idea
was approved by seven out of
the nine Jurists.
But
several

amendments had to be made before
it was accepted.
Loder of Holland, in- discussing
Mr.

Roofs

Justice

plan,

said the
basic idea of collaboration between
the Council and the
Assembly was an excellent suggestion
but that the method

used to work out the plan was open
to criticism.
He said
it WdS very unlikely that both
the Assembly and the Council
would draw up lists containing the
same names,

since each

body represented a different group
of states. In order to
preserve the good of the Root-Phllllmore
project and to
eliminate what he considered defects in
it, Justice Loder
advocated the addition to it of part of the
plan of Baron
1
Descamps of France. ^ The Baron had advocated
a close bond
between the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice
of 1907
and the P.C.I.J. by having it elect the
Judges.
This
plan,

however, was seriously criticized because it
made the

Permanent Court dependent upon the Court of Arbitration.
17

Ibid., p. 3

.

16

Ibid ., pp. 36—39
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Mr. Loder then suggested that instead
of having the

Arbitration Court elect the judges it should
prepare a
list of nominees for the Council and the Assembly

of the

League to vote on.

This list, however, was to be the one

and only list from which to take names for the
election of
19
judges.
Mr. Loder*s plan, of thus combining the best

parts of both plans, served to set up a bond between the
work of the Second Hague Conference and the Permanent

Court draft committee and solved the problem of the equality of the States.^ 0

The question of compulsory jurisdiction and advisory

opinions was next discussed by the committee.

Mr. Root

said he believed that the limits of compulsory Jurisdiction

ought to be clearly laid down, since states would not
accept a court which had a right to settle disputes in accordance with rules established by itself.

The draft

finally adopted by the committee provided for obligatory

arbitration of disputes which could not be settled by
diplomacy.

in the matter of advisory opinions the pro-

posal of Messrs. Phlllimore and Root restricted the giving
of advisory opinions to any subject or question submitted

Ibid

. ,

Idem

.

21

Hudson,

p

.

39

The P.C.I.J

.

—

Treatise, p. 162.
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by the Council or Assembly.

Mr. Root explained that
he

was opposed to the Court's giving
an advisory opinion
“with reference to an existing
dispute". Later on he
abandoned, this position 22
.

With the foregoing changes made
in the RootPhillimore plan, the draft was sent
to the Council with
Just a little over a month's time having
elapsed from the
time of the selection of the
Committee to the drawing up
of the final draft.
Upon its arrival in
the Council,

the draft statute was amended by the
Council and Assembly

of the League and was adopted by the Assembly
on December
2k
On December 16, 1920, three days after
13, 1920.
the

Assembly's adoption of the Statute, the Protocol
containing it was ready for signature.^ In that
Protocol of
Signature it was provided that as soon as it had been

ratified by a majority of the Members of the League, it
would come into force.

Since the required majority rati-

fled the Protocol by September 1
22

,

1921,

the Statute may

^

Ibid., p. 179 .

23

2k
25

26

De Bustamante,

Hudson,

The P.C.I.J
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Hudson,

op.

op.
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Treatise, pp. 113 - 117 .
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Treatise, p. 120.
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be said to have gone Into effect
then.

The election of

Judges took place that same month and the
first meeting of
the Court was held on January
30, 1922.
The official inauguration of the Court
took place

February 15, 1922, at which time it was
installed in the
Palace of Peace, the building made possible by
the gift of
Andrew Carnegie. With its inauguration, the
long-lookedfor Court was established with the hope that it
might prove
to be the faithful guardian of International
peace and goodwill.

Organization of the Court

Proceeding from the brief account of the process of
establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice,
we come to the actual organization of the Court itself.

A

study of the Court may be divided for the sake of convenience into three separate sections, namely composition,

jurisdiction, and procedure.

First of all the Statute of the Court provides for
the qualifications, election, terms, and duties of the
judges of Court. 28 The judges are independent and elected

regardless of nationality from ‘‘persons of highest moral
27

28

De Bustamante, op.

clt ., pp. 110-111.

Hudson, The P C

.

.

I

.

-- Handbook, pp. 156-I6I.
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character”, who possess the qualifications
necessary for
appointment to the highest Judicial offices
in their
respective countries. The Court consists
of eleven Judges
and four deputy- Judges. Provision is also
made, however,

whereby the number of Judges and deputyJudges may be increased by the Assembly upon the proposal of
the Council
to fifteen, nine Judges and six deputyjudges.

The Statute also provides for the selection
of a

judge for parties not represented in the Court.

In case

only one of the contending parties is represented
among
the Judges,

the other party may choose from among the

deputy-judges, a Judge of its nationality to take part.
In case, however,

there is no deputy- Judge of its nation-

ality, it may choose a judge, preferably from those nomi-

nated in the manner that the regular ones are chosen.
Should it happen, however, that neither of the contending
countries are represented among the Judges, each may select
a judge in the same way.

The Judges so chosen must conform

to all the qualifications of the regular Judges and may

take part in the decision on the basis of complete equality

with the other Judges.
The system for the election of judges is necessarily

very complex and long for it has to take care of the old

dispute concerning the equality of the large and small
states in the matter of representation.

The members of
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the court are elected by
the Assembly and Council
from a
list drawn up by the national
groups In the Court of Arbi-

tration with the provision
that
League of Nations which are

m

case of Members of the

not represented In the
Court

of Arbitration, the lists should
be drawn up by national
groups appointed by their
governments

for that purpose.
The same conditions prevail
as for the nomination
of members
by the Court of Arbitration.
The candidates who obtain
an

absolute majority of votes In both
the Assembly and Council
are considered elected. In the
event that more than one
national of the same member of the
League Is elected by the
votes of both the Council and the
Assembly, the eldest only
is to be considered elected.
If, after the first meeting
for the election, there are one or
more seats still to be
filled,

the Statute provides that a second
and even a third
meeting be held. If, after the third
election meeting,
there are still seats vacant, the Statute
contains a provision for the creation at the request of
either Assembly

or Council of a Joint conference of six
members, three appointed by the Council and three by the Assembly,
for the

purpose of choosing one name for each seat to be
filled.
These names are then submitted to the Council
and Assembly
for acceptance.
If the Conference agrees unanimously upon
any person who fulfills the required conditions,
then his
name may be included in its lists even though it has
not

-
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been included either in the
list of nominations prepared
by the nationals in the Court
of Arbitration or in the
list
prepared by the national groups
which are not members of
the Court of Arbitration.
If, after this process
of nomination, the Joint conference is
not sure of securing

an
election, there is a provision whereby
the members of the
Court who have already been appointed
may, within a time
llmlst set by the Council, fill the seats
by selecting
candidates from those who obtained votes
either in the

Council or in the Assembly.

In case of a tie,

the eldest

Judge is given the deciding vote.
The terms of the Judges are,

continuity of action, long.

for the purpose of

They are elected to serve

for a period of nine years and may be re-elected
and may
continue to perform their duties until their
places are

filled by a new election.

Any vancancies which occur are

filled according to the provisions for the flrat
election.
The deputy- judges are called upon to sit in the
order laid

down in the list prepared by the Court.

The names on this

list are considered first according to priority of
election

and secondly, according to age.

In order to maintain absolute impartiality in the
court,

there are certain restrictions concerning the cases

which the Judges may hear and also concerning the dismissal
of Judges for malfeasance while in office.

No member of the
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court may take part in the
deoiling of any case in
which
at some time previous he
has actively taken part
as agent
or counsel for one of the
contending parties, or has
taken
part as a member of a national
or International court
or
Commission of Inquiry. A member
of the court may be dismissed if it is the unanimous
opinion of the other members
that he has ceased to fulfill his
duties a s a
Judge.

Provisions are made in the Statute
concerning the
duties of the Judges when sitting
in full court or when
sitting in a special court created
to take care

of special

duties or speed up the work.

The Statute provides that

the Court meet on June 15th of
every year.

The full Court

meets except where there is an express
provision drawn up
by the court to do otherwise.
If eleven Judges cannot be
present the needed number of deputy-judges
are called in.
In case, however,

eleven Judges or deputy-judges are not

available nine judges may constitute a
quorum.

Provision

is also made for the appointment
of special chambers of

Judges to hear cases concerning questions of
labor, transit,
and communications.
These special chambers may, with the

consent of the parties to the dispute, sit
elsewhere than
at the Hague.
In all cases heard by these special

chambers,

the Judges will be assisted by four technical
advisors, who,

however, have no vote.

Annually,

the Court may also form

a chamber composed of three Judges, who may at the request
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°f the contending parties hear
and determine oases by
summary procedure.
This special chamber is created
to
speed up the work of the Court in
general. Judges of the
same nationalities as the parties
to the dispute have the
right to sit in on the case.
The salary of the judges is
determined by the
Assembly of the League, acting upon the
proposal of the

Council.

This salary cannot be decreased during
the period
of the judge's appointment.
The Assembly also draws up
the

regulations governing pensions for the personnel
of the
Court.
It is interesting to observe that ever since
the

creation of the Court, there had been an American
judge
taking part in its activities, elected, not by
the United
States, but by the European countries in the
Council and

Assembly of the League of Nations.
have served as judges are:

Those Americans who

John Bassett Moore, who was

elected for the first period and who served until
192g;
Charles Evans Hughes, who served from 1923 until his ap-

pointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United States in 1930; Frank Billings Kellogg, late secretary of State who was elected for the second period and

served until 1935

>

and Manley

0.

Hudson,

the principal

American expert on the court and professor of law at
Harvard, who was elected in 1936 to succeed Judge
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Kellogg.

?9

Preceeding from the section on the
composition of
the Court we come to the portion of the
Statute

devoted to

the jurisdiction of the Court.

In regard to states which

may be parties to disputes before the Court,
it is provided
that states not members of the Court may use
the Court
on

a basis of equality with the member states,
provided that

they make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction
of the

Court in accordance with the Statute and the rules
drawn
up by the Court.

Also,

they must make a pledge to the

effect that they will carry out in full faith the decisions
of the Court, and that they will not resort to war against
any state complying with these rules.

cept the Jurisdiction as compulsory

H

Non— members may aclpso facto” in all or

any disputes concerning questions of treaty Interpretation,

international law or breaches in international obligation.
These qualifications are drawn up by the Council and are

subject to the special provisions of the treaties which

may be in force at the time.
Concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over cases
brought before it, this section on jurisdiction of the
Statute provides that the Court may hear all cases which
the aforementioned parties may refer to it,

especially

questions mentioned in treaties and conventions already
29
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In addition to its right to give
decisions on

cases brought by qualified states, the Court
may give
advisory opinions. These advisory opinions
are given after
the deliberation of the full Court.
The request for an

advisory opinion must be written and signed either by
the
President of the Assembly or Council of the League or
by
the Secretary-General according to Instructions from
the

Assembly or Council.

The request must contain an exact

statement of the question on which the opinion is desired

and must be accompanied by all documents which would be of
assistance in settling the question.

Any advisory opinion

given by the Court and the request for the opinion are

printed and published in a special collection.^ 0

In case

of a disagreement, the Court itself decides whether or not
it may assume Jurisdiction over a certain dispute.

The

Court bases its decisions as far as possible upon inter-

national convention recognized by the disputing states,

upon international customs and lastly upon the general
principles of law as recognized by the nations of the world.
If the nations agree, however, an exception may be made to
the effect that the court may use its own judgment as to

what is

good and just in rendering its decision.^

IMd.

^

,

pp.

202-203*

Ibid., pp. 161-162.
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The third section of the
Statute deals with the
procedure of the Court in regard
to the languages to be
used, the methods of bringing
disputes before the Court,
the actual hearing of the disputes
and finally the binding
power of the decision itself.

The official languages of the
Court are French and
English. In the case, however, that
no agreement can be
maae concerning which language is to be
used, each party
may use the language it wishes and the
decision is given
in both languages. Also the Court may
at the request of
the disputing parties, authorize that
a language other
than the two mentioned be used.

Cases may be brought before the Court
either by
notification of a special agreement of the disputing
parties to refer their dispute to the court or by
written

application sent by the parties to the Registrar of
the
Court.
The notification or application must Include

the

subject of the dispute and the name of the parties
involved.

The application is then made known to all
those

parties concerned and to the members of the League.

Court proceedings are divided into two parts, oral
and written.

The written proceedings consist of the noti-

fications to the judges and parties, and the papers and

documents used in support of the cases.

A certified copy

of every document is given to all the parties concerned.
The oral proceedings consist of the actual hearing of the
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case by the Judges ana also Includes
the speeches of the
witnesses, agents, experts, and counsel.
The public may
attend the hearings unless the Court
or parties decide
otherwise.
The Court may, at any time, permit
organizations,

commissions, or individuals to carry on special
investigations or give expert opinions.
A period of
time is

agreed upon for the presentation of evidence
and after
that time is up, the Court may refuse to accept
any

more

evidence, unless both sides consent to it.

The Judgment

must be given by a majority of the Judges present
at the
hearing and, in the case of a tie vote, the presiding
officer
has the deciding vote.
The Judgment must contain the

reasoning upon which it is based and the names of the
judges who took part in the decision.

If one of the parties

does not appear in Court to defend its case, the other party

may demand that the Court render the decision in its favor.

Upon the completion of the presentation of the case by

both parties, the presiding judge may declare the hearing
closed and the Court withdraws into private quarters to

consider the judgment.
Perhaps the most important rule of procedure is
that concerning the binding power of the Court's Judgment.
The decision of the court is binding only on the parties

concerned and only in respect to that particular case. The
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judgment is final and without appeal, except upon the
ap-

plication for revision by one party based upon the discovery of a decisive factor which was unknown to the court

when the decision was rendered.

The application, however,

must be made within six months of the discovery of the new
fact and the omission cannot have been due to negligence.
A State which considers that it has a legal Interest in
the decision rendered, may make a request to the Court that

it be permitted to intervene as a third party.

If the

Court grants the request, that State has a right to intervene in the proceedings, but if it uses this right, the

judgment of the Court is equally binding on it.^ 2
The final provision in the Statute concerns the

cost of the Court and provides that, unless the Court

decides to the contrary, each party shall bear its own
costs.

32
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CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COURT 1921-1930
The long campaign for adherence
began on August 15,
1921, when Secretary of State Charles
Hughes received
a

certified copy of the Protocol of the
Permanent Court of
International Justice from the Secretary-General
of the

League of Nations. 1

On February 17, 1923, formal
action

began,

for on that date, Secretary Hughes
sent a letter
to President Warren Harding requesting
him
to ask the

Senate to take action in favor of the
adherence of the
United States to the Protocol of December
16, 1920
He
advocated the acceptance of the adjoined Statute
of the
Court, but not the optional clause for
compulsory Juris«

diction.

Adherence, hov/ever, was to be based on four

reservations which he drew up and which were to be
made
part of the Instrument of adherence. Those
reservations
stated that, (l) adherence was not to be taken to

involve

any legal relation on the part of the United States
to the

League of Nations;
to participate,

1

Hudson,

(2)

the United States was to be permitted

through representatives designated for the

The World Court

.

1921-1934, pp. g;21g-224.
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purpose, upon a basis of
equality with the members of
the
League In the election of Judges
and In the filling 0 f

vacancies;

the United States was to
pay a fair share
of the expenses of the Court as
determined and appropriated
by Congress; (4) the Statute for
the Court was not to be
(

3)

amended without the consent of the
United States. ?
One week after receiving the letter
of Secretary
Hughes, President Harding honored the
request by sending
to the Senate a message of his own
concerning the Court
and adherence. President Harding stated
that the Permanent
Court of International Justice had been
established
at the

Hague and was, at that time, functioning.

He informed the

Senate that, although the United States was
not a member
of the Court, it could, through provision of
the Statute

creating it, legally bring suits before it with the
same
rights and privileges as enjoyed by the regular members
of the Court.

Expressing his own opinion, he said that the

position held by the United States was not sufficient for
a nation which had so long been committed to the peaceful

settlement of international disputes.^

He pointed out that

the United States had been conspicuous in its efforts to
2

Ibid ., p. 2 24.
^
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create a tribunal which would be
instrumental in the
settlement of disputes between the
nations

of the world,

and that deliberate public opinion
was now overwhelmingly
in favor of the full participation
of the United States in
such a tribunal.
The following passage, which
I will quote
from his message, seems to me to sum up
clearly his attitude
toward the World Court. He said:
no
a new Problem in international relationship.
It is wholly a question of accenting
an established institution of high character*,
making effective all the fine things which haveand
been said by us in favor of such an agency of
advance civilization. It would be well worth the
while of the Senate to make such special effort
as is becoming to record its approval.
Such action
would add to our own consciousness of participation
in the fortunate advancement of international relationship, and remind the world that we are ready
to take our proper part in furthering peace and
adding to stability in world affairs.” 4
.

L

In spite of the recommendation of Secretary Hughes
and

the request of President Harding, the Senate was not

disposed

to take any action whatever on the matter. Mean-

while the Secretary of State renewed the arbitration con-

ventions drawn up with France, England, Norway, Sweden,
Portugal and Japan In 1903, and renewed for five year

periods in 1913* and 1913.

In the neglotations Secretary

Hughes concluded agreements which provided for the modifi-

cation of each convention so that, in the event that the
4
Ibid., p. 224.
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Senate ratified adherence, all
disputes, provided for in
the conventions, would be taken
to the newly created
permanent Court of International Justice
instead of the older
Court of Arbitration. Each country was
informed that
the

use of the new court by the United States
was in complete
agreement with the foreign policy which
the United States
had always pursued 6
'

.

At the next meeting of the Senate, President
Coolidge
revived the question of adherence to the
Court.

In the

message to the Senate, President Coolidge made
an appeal
for favorable action concerning adherence. He,

like Hughes

and Harding, mentioned the fact that, since its
efforts to
establish the Court of Arbitration in 1899, the United
States had hoped and worked for the creation of a
permanent

world court of justice.

As for his own opinion, he went

on record as being in full accord with the policy of adherence, and as favoring the establishment of a court which

would Include the whole world 6
.

Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin, then introduced a

resolution for adherence which contained, with only three

5
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exceptions, the same reservations
as those included in
the proposal of Secretary Hughes.
Those additions were
as follows: 7
A11 independent states which
had diplomatic
representatives accredited to the Hague^d
whLh
n
t0 the Protoco1 of December
16,
T
Q?n
°h
1920, but which accepted the Statute
of the Court
were to be permitted to adhere.

1*
l

The judges were to be elected, not bv
Council and^ Assembly of the League, but by the
the
diplomatic representatives of the states
adhering
to the Protocol and accredited to the
Hague.
Those
representatives were to be divided into two
groups
A and B. Group A, consisting of Great Britain, P
France, The United States, Brazil, Germany
and
Italy, was to perform the election duties
of the
council, and group B, consisting of the remaining
states, was to perform the election duties
of the
Assembly.
2.

•

The expenses of the Court were to be paid by
the adhering states, rather than by the League
of
3*

Nations.

The resolution of Senator Lenroot marked the be-

ginning of a series of proposals which were introduced
into the Senate in the next few weeks.

These new reso-

lutions contained various conditions and reservations,
too numerous and unimportant to mention here.

The signifi-

cant thing, however, in connection with these proposals
was the fact that in spite of their number, the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations was too busy to conduct a

hearing until compelled to by public demand.

7

Ibid ., p. 151.

The committee

98

-

consisted of Senator Lodge as chairman
and Senators Borah,
Brandegee, Johnson of California, Moses,
McCormick,

Wadsworth, Lenroot, Willis, Pepper,
Shipstead, Swanson,
Pittman, Shields, Robinson, Underwood,
Walsh of Montana,
and Owen. Of this group, Senators Lodge,
Borah, and
Johnson were the outstanding opponents
of adherence. Not
until April 30, 192V was a hearing given,
at which time
Senator Claude Swanson introduced the
proposal that the

United States adhere to the Court according to
the
Hughes - Harding terras.^
From the discussion which followed the
presentation
of the Swanson proposal, it was soon evident that
the

factor which was to prove the obstacle in securing
the

committee's acceptance of a plan was not the difficulty
of coming to an agreement concerning which terras should
be set as the basis of adherence, but in the basic con-

struction of the Court as an Instrument of the League of
Nations.

As long as that problem of the relationship of

the Court to the League was unsolved it was obvious that

there could be little hope for any agreement on a plan

for the adherence of the United States. 9

Furthermore, it

S
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9
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was the election of the Judges
by the Assembly and Council
of the League which tied up the
Court with the League.
Therefore ,lt was obvious that the
election of Judges was
really the source of the trouble.

Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, himself
a member of
the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, came forward on
May 22 1924 with a plan for the election
of the
,

,

judges

of the Court which he believed would
separate sufficiently
the Court and the League of Nations.
His plan permitted
the Council and the Assembly to continue
as the electoral
bodies, provided that they were called to order,
not by
the League but by an official of the Court. 10

Senator Pepper’s plan, like all the rest received
a very cool reception by the Foreign Relations
Committee.

The committee was not satisfied that the League-Court

relatlQ^iip had been cleared up and saw a new danger to
the prestige of the United States.

That danger lay in

the provision of the Article l4 of the League Covenant

which empowered the Court to give advisory opinions at
the request of the Council and Assembly on any question

of International law.

According to that arrangement, the

committee believed that it was possible that the Council

might ask the Court’s opinion as to whether the World War
debts should be paid according to the terms agreed upon.

Congressional Record
p. 9157-

.
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It was also possible that Japan might
ask,

through the

Assembly or Council, for an opinion concerning
the action
of the United States which excluded all
Japanese
immi-

grants from its borders. 11

That danger as envisaged by the committee
was, in
reality, without a firm foundation for three reasons.
In
the first place, advisory opinions were binding
on no

one.

Secondly, a protective precedent had been set up by
the

Court in the Eastern Carelia Case between Finland and
Russia,

in which case the Court had refused to give an

advisory opinion because one of the parties, Russia, had

denied that the Court had Jurisdiction to give such an
opinion.

thirdly,

it was a well established precedent in

international law that no state could, without its consent,
be compelled to submit its disputes to mediation, arbi-

tration or any other method of pacific settlement. 12
In spite of the three above-mentioned reasons, the

committee said that it could not exclude the possibility
that the Court might be compelled to give an advisory

opinion harmful to the United States, a non-member, if it
should be necessary to do so In order to fulfill its
functions in the interests of peace under the Covenant of

11

12
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Thus in the face of possible

humiliation at the hands of the League,
it was argued
that the only way that the United
States could defend
Itself was by taking its place in the
Council and
Assembly, where both as a member of the
League and a
signatory to the Statute of the Court, it
could defend
itself by both vote and voice. 1 3
As early as May 23, 1924, it was decided
by the

Committee on Foreign Relations that a reservation
on
advisory opinions must be added. They believed

that the

lawyers in the Senate could easily be persuaded that

nothing should be left to the good sense of the
Judges of
the Court and that everything should be made safe
for all

time by another added clause or two.
24,

Therefore, on May

the committee finally let the Court proposal go to

the Senate for discussion of an amendment. 1 ^

A year*s time elapsed between the time that the
proposal was presented to the Senate and the time when
any action was begun.

During that period Senator Lodge

had died and Borah had taken over the chairmanship of the
Foreign Relations Committee.

Borah,

still strongly an-

tagonistic toward the Court, used the period of Senate
13

14
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Inaction to campaign throughout the
country against the
Court, branding it as a “League Court".
His campaign met
with little success, however, for with few

exceptions, the

great national organizations, both lay and
religious, were
in favor of the Court.
Numbered among these organizations
were the American Bar Association, the American
Federation
of Labor, the Federal' Council of Churches of
Christ
in

America, and the National League of Women Voters

It was the House of Representatives and not
the

Senate which took the first real action.

On March 3

,

1925

,

it passed by a vote of
30J-28 a resolution recording its

desire to have the United States adhere to the Court.

The

resolution was divided into two parts, the first of which

recommended early adherence in accordance with the reservations proposed by Secretary Hughes and approved by

Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

The second section con-

tained a statement of its willingness, following the
approval of the Senate, to participate in the enactment of
such legislation as would necessarily follow such approval.

"Such legislation" referred to a bill appropriating the

funds necessary to enable the United States to pay its
share of the expenses of the Court.

15
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Even after the gesture of
approval of the House,
the Senate still did not mahe
any move to consider the
question for nine months. Then on
December 17, 1925,
Senator Swanson Introduced the
long-awaited fifth amendment to the Hughes Reservations,
which It was hoped would
solve the problem of the advisory
opinion Jurisdiction
of

the Court.

His reservation stated that;

The United
advisory
pursuant
states had had

“
given

i*

1^

States should In no way be bound
opinion of the Court which was not
to a request In whloh the United
a part*

The signature of the United States should
not
ll
be affixed to the Protocol of the Statute
until
the states signatory to the Protoool had
Indicated
through an exchange of notes their acceptance
of
the five reservations as the basis of the
adherence
of the United States*
The reservation drawn up by the court proponents

led by Senators Swanson, Lenroot and Robinson, was considered worthless by their opponents.

The opponents were

led by Senators, Borah, Reed, Johnson, Shepard and
IS
LaPollette*
The reservation was not rigid enough because there was in it no provision which would create any

opposition to adherence either in the United States or in
Europe among the members of the Court*

17

Therefore, their

Ibid., p.974*

IS

It may be noted here that with the exception of
Senator Ships tead, the same Senators, Borah, La Follette,
Johnson and Reed opposed the United States entry into
the League of Nations*
1

^
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immediate plan of action became that
of making the conditions of adherence so stiff that
the signatory powers
would be very unlikely to be in a
position to accept them.
While Borah and other opponents
of the Court
thundered on in the Senate about the Court's
connection
with the League and the resulting peril
to the Monroe
Doctrine, Senator Pepper drew up a new
reservation.
In
it he demanded first,

that all the members of the Court

pledge themselves to make forever binding the
principle

laid down in the Eastern Carelia Case, to the effect
that no advisory opinion be given when one of the
parties

did not accept the Jurisdiction of the Court, and
secondly
that no advisory opinion be given on any matter affecting
the United States unless the Court was given the consent

of the United States to do so.
The anti-Court men believed that those demands ac-

complished the desired end, namely the proclaiming abroad
that the members of the League and Court were not to be
trusted, and were likely at any time to take back their
word.

These demands also had the effect in the Senate of

making it appear that the proponents of the Court were
really seeking to put the United States at the mercy of a

bunch of cut-throats in the persons of the League Council
and Assembly .
19
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In order to make their strategy
secure, the antiLeaguers procured the assistance of
the American
Judge,

John Basset Moore, who had served
on the Court since 1922.
Judge Moore had never been friendly
toward the
League,

for

he had not approved at the very beginning
of the giving of
advisory opinions to the Council or to
the Assembly of the
League.

He had later- supported the establishment
of the

same full and open procedure for the
consideration of ad-

visory opinions as for the consideration of
cases In which
a Judgment was to be given.
In 1923 he had ably and
ef-

,

fectively opposed a proposal for a secret procedure
in the
giving of advisory opinions.^
With such an attitude toward the League Judge Moore
was Just the man to assist in the remaking the fifth
reservation.

Therefore, with his assistance Senator Swanson*s

reservation was expanded and reintroduced into the Senate
on January 23» 1926.

It contained the following provisions j^l

1.
The Court was not to render any advisory
opinion until due notice had been given publicly
to all states adhering to the Court and to all
states interested in the question, and until
public hearing or an opportunity for a public
hearing had been given.

2.

an

20

21

The Court was not to entertain a request for
advisory opinion touching any dispute or
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question In whloh the United States had or
claimed
an in
The signature of the United States was not
to
until the powers signatory to the Protocol had Indicated, through an exchange of
notes,
their acceptance of the foregoing conditions
and
reservations as the only conditions under which
the United states would consider adherence
to the
Court*
3*

t)e ,

Recourse to the Court for the purpose of settling disputes, between the United States and any
other state was to be had only by agreement through
general or special treaties concluded with the
parties*
4*

Adherence to the Court was not to require the
United States to abandon its traditional policy of
not intruding upon, interfering with or entangling
itself in the political questions of policy or the
internal administration of any foreign state*
5*

The resolution as amended by Judge Moore was passed

by the Senate on January 27, 1926, by a vote of 76-17, with
the same anti-Leaguers Borah, Johnson, La Follette and

Shipstead holding out against

it,

and with Senators Pepper,

Lenroot, Robinson, Swanson and Pittman as the influential

proponents voting in favor. 22
indicate two things.

Such a vote would seem to

In the first place, it showed that

the opposition to the Court in the Senate was slowly

dwindling.

Secondly, it indicated,

I

believe, that the

opponents were not sincere in their creation of the reso-

lution and had to vote against it because they realized
that they were going to be forced to take a definite stand

22
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against the Court in the final vote.
clusion which

This second con-

have drawn seems to me the only
possible
answer to the question as to why the
opposition should
have voted against a resolution of
their own creation.
With the passage of the reservations by
I

the Senate,

Secretary of State Kellogg proceeded according
to the instructions in the fifth reservation, to
communicate the
proposal to the signatory powers and to the
SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations.

The Secretary-General

in turn sent copies of Secretary Kellogg's letter
to the

members of the League and after the meeting of the
states,
wrote back to, and Informed Secretary Kellogg of the de-

cision of the League to hold a meeting on September

1,

1926*

to which the United States was invited to send a
delegate
to meet with the signatory powers.

The meeting was to be

held for the purpose of discussing the problem of adherence
of the United States and for the purpose of framing any new

agreement which might be necessary in order to put into
effect the special conditions drawn up by the United States
as the basis of its adherence.

In response to the letter and invitation of the

Secretary- General, Secretary Kellogg sent a rather brusque

letter stating that he could see no useful purpose could
23
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be served by designating a
delegate from the United States

government to attend the conference.

The United States, he

had given Its consent to adherence
to the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International
Justice with certain
specific conditions and reservations
set forth
said,

in the

resolution.

These conditions he believed to
be clear and
concise and declared that they had to be
accepted by exchange of notes between the United States and
each of the
forty-eight signatory states before the United
States could
become a party to and sign the Protocol. As
the Secretary
of State, he informed him that he had no authority
to

modify any of the conditions or reservations as
stated in
the resolution.

2k-

In spite of the seeming lack of cooperation on
the

part of the United States in assisting in making some

agreement possible between the United States and the
signatory powers, the conference was held as planned.

At

the meeting the signatories accepted the first four reser*-

vations completely, but the fifth they accepted in part
only.

According to the directions included in the reso-

lution passed by the Senate, they were to communicate

individually their acceptance or rejection of the tenns.

24
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It was, however, as a group that they
drew up the answer. 2 5
The answer of the signatories, therefore,
was con-

cerned mainly with a discussion of the fifth
amendment
since the first four were acceptable as they
stood.

Con-

cerning the first part of that amendment they
pointed out
in the articles 73 and 74 as revised, there was
definite

provision for a public hearing before the delivery
of an
2
advisory opinion, ^ As to the second part which dealt
with
the question of the giving of an advisory opinion
in cases

in which the United States was not a party, but in which
it had or claimed an interest, the signatories agreed that

the United States should possess the same right to prevent
the adoption of a proposal for such an advisory opinion
as

any other state which was represented either in the Council
or the Assembly of the League.

Since, however, a unanimous

vote was not necessary for the adoption of a request, the

United States could not have the deciding vote. 2 ?
Upon receiving the reports of the decision of the
signatories which were sent in accordance with the specifications laid down in the resolution of the United States
Senate, Secretary of State Kellogg passed the report on to
the Secretary General of the League of Nations on February

25

^
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1th the report he enclosed a message of his

own In which he stated that the United States would
have

liked to avoid any proposal which might Interfere with
the
work of the League of Nations. He said there was no

choice

In this case,

because the security of the United States

was still uncertain under the arrangement presented by the

signatories.

The one and only answer that he could give,

since the fifth amendment of the signatories was not ac-

ceptable to the United States, was that the United States
could not consider adherence under the aforementioned con-

ditions.^
In spite of the failure of the United States to

accept the decision of the signatories, the Council of
the League was still determined to find a solution which

might prove favorable to the United States.
on March
plan.

9,

1929,

Therefore,

it held a meeting to work out such a

As a result of that meeting, a resolution was

passed in which the Committee of Jurists, appointed by the
Council in December, 1929, was requested to consider a

revision of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

That committee was instructed to

M

make

any suggestions which it felt able to offer with a view
to facilitating the adherence of the United States on

26
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conditions satisfactory to all concerned.

" c '/

In order to further persuade the United
States
that It was desirous of formulating a plan In
which the
interests of the United States would be fully
protected,
the Council invited Elihu Root from the United
States to
serve on this second Committee of Jurists.

It may be re-

called that It was Mr. Root who was chiefly responsible

for the success of that first committee which framed the

original draft of the Statute of the Court.
The Invitation extended by the Council was gracious-

ly accepted by Mr. Root, who Immediately consulted with

Secretary of State Kellogg and members of the Senate In

order to draw a general plan which he might present to
the Jurists at their meeting.

Although his plan was not

in written form before he left the United States, by the
time of the meeting on March 11, 1929, Mr. Root had it in
final form and ready for presentation.
It was Mr. Root's plan which became the basis of
the discussion of the committee,

and also the basis of the

revised protocol drawn up by it.^°

29

In its revised form

League of Nations Publications V Legal, 1929» v 4.

p. 15.

World Peace Foundation Pamphlets JeBeup, P.C.,
The "United States and the World Court", pp. 646-647*
,
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the protocol contained the following
provisions:^

Th ® Un

1
; ,
ticipate,

-

ed states was to be permitted to
par^
through representatives designed for

P^ rp0 ® e upon a basis of complete equality with
the signatory members of the League in
any and all
proceedings of either the Council or the Assembly
in the election of Judges.
The vote of the
States was to be counted in determining the United
majority of the vote required by the Statute.absolute
>

The Statute was not to be amended without the
consent of all of the contracting states*
2*

The Court was to render advisory opinions in
3*
public session after notice and opportunity for
hearings had been given, as provided in the revised
Rules of Court.
The Court was not to entertain without the consent of the United States any request for an advisory opinion which concerned any dispute in which
the United States had or claimed an interest* 32
4.

The above provisions were unanimously adopted by the

signatories at their conference on September l4, 1929 .

Following the adoption, the Secretary- General sent a formal
communication to Secretary of State Stlmson enclosing the
texts of the meeting of the Committee of Jurists and the

adopted protocol.
In answer to the communication of the SecretaryGeneral,

the official confirmation of the Department of

State was given by Hugh R. Wilson, American Minister to

League of Nations Pamphlets V Legal

.

1929,

pp. 132-133.

For complete details of the Protocol see
Appendix pp. 1 - 3 .

v.

5*

.
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Switzerland.

He,

-

according to Instructions from Washington,

delivered an aide memo Ire acknowledging the receipt
of the
documents and containing a personal message from Secretary
Stimson.

In his message Secretary Stlmson said that after

a careful examination of the draft protocol, he considered
It an effective medium for meeting the objections of the

United States and would constitute a satisfactory basis
for the adherence of the United States to the Protocol and

Statute of the Court.

He further promised that he would

ask the President for the necessary authority to sign the

protocol and recommend that it be submitted to the Senate
for its consent and ratification. 23

Accordingly Secretary Stimson sent to the President,

on November 16, 1929, the report of the work of the committee of Jurists and the report of the adoption of the

protocol by the signatory states and asked him to authorize
the American Minister in Bern, Switzerland to attach the

signature of the United States to the three protocols.
The willingness of President Hoover to further the

cause of adherence was shown when he allowed only a little

over a week's time to elapse before he authorized Secretary

^

Hudson,

The World Court

3^ Ibid., p. 251 .

,

1921-1934, pp. 24o-2*&
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Stimson to make the necessary arrangements for the
signing, on the behalf of the United States, of the Protocol

of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice,

the Protocol of Accession of the United States,

and the Protocol of Revision of the Statute of the

Permanent Court of International Justice . 25

35 Ibid
., p. 259

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT 1930-1935
The real proof of President Hoover's interest
in the
campaign for the adherence of the United States
to the

World Court came on December 10, 1930, when he
formally
presented the three aforementioned protocols to the
Senate
and asked for immediate action on them.
In his message,
he informed the Senate that the protocols not only
freed the

United States from any entanglement in the diplomacy of

other nations, but also made it impossible for the United
States to be summoned before the Court without
sent.

its own con-

On the otherhand, they permitted the United States,

with the agreement of the other member nations, to seek the
services of the Court at any time.

He also pointed out that

the protocols permitted the withdrawal of the United States

whenever it so desired.
any ill will or reproach.

Such withdrawal waB not to reflect
He concluded his remarks by

saying: "Our great nation, so devoted to peace and justice,

should lend its co-operation in this effort of nations to es-

tablish a great agency for such pacific settlements."

1
p.

504

Congressional Record

.

1

71st Congress, 3rd Session,
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On January 21, 1931, the Senate took the first
real
steps in the consideration of the revised protocol
as pre-

sented by President Hoover.

On that day, it requested Mr.

Root to appear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to explain in detail the protocol as revised by

him and the Committee of Jurists.

At that meeting, Mr. Root

emphasized, as the es-sential step in preparing for adherence,
the thorough study of the five reservations which constituted

the

back bone of the draft.

The discussion of Mr. Root was confined to the contro-

versial fifth amendment, since the first four had already
been accepted by the signatories.

According to him, that

reservation, as embodied in the draft protocol of 1929, pro-

vided ample protection for the United States against the
action of the Council.

Under the fifth reservation, the

Council would still have the legal right to request an

opinion and the United States would still have the legal
right to interpose before the Court an objection based on

the claim of interest and refusal to consent.

But in an

agreement terminable at will, the exercise of these powers,
he said, had to be free from subterfuge and concealment of

motives or the agreement would surely come to a speedy end.

The procedural provisions which followed the statement that the Court would not, without the consent of the

United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion
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concerning a question In which the United
States had or
claimed an interest, did not in the slightest
modify the
provisions of the reservation. On the otherhand,
they

merely provided a means of protection for the
signatory
powers against the misuse of the reservation by
the United
States.

He believed that it was only fair that they
be

afforded the same protection as the United States.
Under such circumstances, Mr. Root said that he was
sure that the United States would want to come to an early

agreement because, although the signatory powers were very
desirous that the United States adhere to the Court, the

United States itself had much to gain from the successful

working of the Court.

The Court, if backed by all of the

powerful nations, especially the United States, could help
to preserve peace in Europe, peace which was so necessary
to the material interests of the United States. 2

From the time that Mr. Root appeared before the Com-

mittee on Foreign Relations to discuss the protocol, until

March of 1932, efforts on the part of the proponents

late in

of the Court were sporadic.

This was probably due to the

fact that the peace organizations had begun to devote them-

selves with great fervor to the support of the disarmament

2

Hudson, op. clt

.

,

pp.

266-270.
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it might also have been due to
the fact that

the leaders In the Foreign Relations
Committee were the
11
anti-Court Senators, Borah, Johnson, and
Reed.

Their

presence would Indicate that the committee
was hostile
as before to any more in favor of
adherence.

On March 2 2, 1932, however, Secretary
of State
Stimson, at the request of the Foreign
Relations Committee, sent a message setting forth his views
concerning
the revised or Root protocol.-

The following is an

exerpt from his message:
M

The protection which is given us by this
Protocol as to advisory opinions is a special
protection given upon our request and given to
no other nation.
The fifty odd other nations
who are members of the World Court have joined
that institution without requesting or apparently feeling the need of such a precaution, although nearly all of them are weaker and smaller
than we and thus presumptively are more in need
of such protection against being overreached by
their members. It is a protection which goes to
the very jurisdiction of the Court, and if we
Join, cannot be annulled or amended without our
consent; ... by joining we incur absolutely no
liabilities (except the Insignificant liability
to pay our share of the Court* s expenses) while
on the contrary we gain a power to exeroise our

3 Jessup,

P. C.,

International Security

,

p. 26.

k

Congressional Directory
Session, December 1930. p. TTSTT"
5

,

71st Congress,

3 rd

The committee was made of largely the same men
as in 1926 with the exception of Senators Lenroot and
Pepper and a few new men who were not particularly
important.
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only in
choice of the Judges of
n lts metil0ds of procedure as
well,
wh?r*h° we do not
+
now have. Never before was the
world in greater need of orderly development
of
international rules of conduct by the wise
method
Judicial decision, which we Americans are so
C
intSd ith 1 the dev elopment of common
2
r
law in ?^
this country.
We have delayed long
availing ourselves of that opportunity. I in
sincerely hope that we will now assume the
privlllges
and the responsibilities of taking part in
that
growth in the future.” o
Urt, t)Ut
r>

^

The Foreign Relations Committee made a report
to

the Senate on June

1,

1932.^

It recommended adherence

with reservations which were substantially the same
as
those already approved by the League, and so contributed

little to the progress of adherence.

The reservations

provided that:
1.
The United States advise and consent to the adherence to the three protocols (not Including the
optional clause for arbitrary Jurisdiction) with
the understanding that the Court would not entertain any request for an advisory opinion concerning
any dispute in which the United States had or
claimed an interest.
2*
The signatory powers indicate their acceptance
of the reservations as the condition of the adherence of the United States before the signature
of the United States be affixed.

The United States approve the Protocol and
3*
Statute with the understanding that cases might be
brought before the Court through general or special
treaties concluded between the parties to the
dispute.

Hudson, op. clt .
7

.

pp. 272-277*

Ibid*, pp* 277-289*
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4.
the adherence of the United States
be taken to require the United States was not to
to depart
ad lonal polloy of not interfering
£f?!J “V!:
4 S Up0n he P° lltlcal questions of
?
any foreign nation,
or >
imply the giving up
traditional attitude toward purely Americanof its
questions*

“

™

After presenting the reservations, the committee
gave a history of the campaign for adherence
from the
time of President Harding to that date. It
concluded

its

report with the following statements^*
“Whether the question be viewed selfishly

or altruistically, our government ought to give
the Court the moral support that would follow
from association in maintaining lt* w

The passage of the Foreign Relations Committee

report seems to me to be in complete discord with the
spirit of the reservations preceding it*

The reservations

seemed to have as their purpose the obstruction of any
move which might be made to facilitate the plans for ad-

herence of the United States to the Court.

The final

statement on the other hand seemed to convey the idea
that the committee was ready to recommend adherence*
The work of the Foreign Relations Committee was

therefore, very confusing.

To the casual observer it

would seem as though the committee had been trying by
means of its various resolutions and reservations to
facilitate adherence, whereas in reality their plans were

g

Idem
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only a means of blocking or delaying any
attempts on the
part of the proponents to secure adherence®
A further
delay was caused by the closing of the
Seventy-Second

Congress before any action had been taken by the
full
session of the Senate, Because of that the
protocols

had to be referred back to the Committee on Foreign
Relations until the next session of Congress convened.^
Late in

after the matter had been dropped

temporarily by the Senate, the House of Representatives
took the question.

At that time it voted to appropriate

the money necessary to pay the share of the United States
in the expenses of the Court.

By voting such an appro-

priation, it is my belief that the House hoped to convey
to the Senate the fact that it was in favor of adherence

and thereby perhaps to stimulate it to real action on the

question.

If that were its purpose, it failed because

there is no record of the action in the record of the

Senate meetings.

At the time of the appropriation voted by the House,

hearings were held for the purpose of securing public

opinion concerning it.

At these hearings were many men

prominent in the field of law.

To mention only a few,

they were Dr. Manley 0. Hudson of the Harvard Law School f

9

Hudson, op. clt ., p. 2S9*
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Charles H. Strong, secretary of the
Bar Association of New
York City, Professor Edwin Dickinson,
professor of law at
the University of Michigan, and
the Hon. Irving Lehman of
the Court of Appeals of New York
City,
All present at the hearings seemed
to be in accord
In approving of the appropriation as
a way to make easier
the entrance of the United States into
the Court.
Both
Mr. Hudson and Mr. Dickinson believed
that the money should
be available since the United States was
free to use the
Court whether or not it adhered to its Statute
or Protocols,
and since the United States could not feel free
to use the

Court unless it paid its share of the expenses.

Mr.

Strong

said that his association urged strongly the adherence
of
the United States to the Court and so would endorse
the

appropriation.

Mr. Lehman said that the appropriation

could lead the United States into no harm and might help
to show that the United States was really interested in

establishing a means for preserving peace among the nations
of the world.

10

Again, however, the proponents of the Court met

with defeat, and no action was taken because agreement

could not be reached as to the wisdom of such a move in

Hearings before the committee of Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. on H.J.Res.
37S on the P.C.I.J. pp. 2-12; 26-29.

—
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the face of such strong opposition
in the Senate. 11

It would seem as though the House
had gone to a
great deal of work knowing that the
opposition was still
strong in the Senate. It was, I believe,
an example of
an attempt on the part of the House to
do something worthwhile, even though the odds were against
them, with the hope
that It might again help to break down the
opposition in
the Senate.

After the failure of the House resolution to
appropriate a sum equal to the share of the United States
in
the expenses of the Court, action on the question
the

World Court was dropped until the Spring of 1934.

At

that time hearings were again held before the Foreign

Relations Committee.

Separate hearings were granted to

the proponents and the opponents.

On March 23 the pro-

ponents were heard and on May 16 the opponents were heard.
Present on March 23 at the hearing were over forty
speakers representing the Republican and Democratic parties,
the various bar associations,

state legislatures, chambers

of commerce, and committees on international peace which
were in favor of adherence.

A review of the representative

speeches of the more important organizations will give a

clear indication of what part of the American public

favored adherence.
11

Jessup, op. clt .

,

pp. 28-29.
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The position of the American
Bar Association was
presented by Clarence E. Martin,
Past President. He stated
that the association with its
30, 000 members had repeatedly

endorsed adherence as a necessity
for national honor and
welfare. He added the hope and
recommendation that the
Senate would consent to the ratification
of the three
protocols.
The endorsement of the Republican
party was presented by Miss Margaret Buttenheim, who
represented the

National Committee of Republican Women for
the World Court
and the Women's National Republican Club.
She presented
the World Court plank adopted by the Republican
party in
June 1932, in which it had advocated membership
in the

World Court in order that it might offer to the
United
States a M safer, more Judicial and expeditious
instrument
for the constantly recurring questions between us and

other nations.

..

M

She added that the Republican party

still advocated adherence according to the plank of 1932.^
The stand of the Democratic party concerning ad-

herence was presented by Mrs. Carroll Miller, National

Decmocratic Commit tee woman for Pennsylvania.

T^e 1932

plank of her party advocated adherence as had that of the

12 Hearings
before the Committee of Foreign Relations
of the United States Senate 73 Congress, 2nd. Session
relative to the Protocols concerning the adherence of the
United States to the P.C.I.J. Friday, March 23,1934. pp. 17-19.
15 Ibid.
pp. 37-3S.
,

.

^
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Republican party and like the Republican party was still
In favor of adherence*
Mr. Forrest C. Donnell, Chairman of the St. Louis

World Court Committee and a member of the Missouri Bar
Association, presented at the hearing the report of the

action of 65 state and local bar associations.

He re-

vealed that the 25 state associations and the 4o local
associations had given the question serious consideration

through debates and special committee investigations and
as a result of those debates and investigations had passed

resolutions favoring adherence*

The virtual absence of

any expression of opposition by any state or local organ-

ization was, he said, a slgnifcant indication of the bari^

President Henry

I.

Harr im an of the Chamber of

Commerce of the United States appeared in behalf of the

approximate one million businessmen in the United States
with the message that the Chamber of Commerce since its

organization had urged the participation of the United
States in the World Court along beside the other nations.
He said he believed that the Court provided a mechanism

for settling many international disputes, some of which

might otherwise end up in war.
lk
Ibid .

15

,

pp.

39-40.

Ibid *, pp. 21-23.

The interest of the
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businessman was, he stated, In the orderly
conduct of
International affairs. Membership on the
part of the
United States would not only help to stabllze
and Increase commerce, but would also help to
establish good
1
^
International relations, he said.

Theodore F. Greene, Governor of Rhode Island,
pre-

sented reolutlons passed in 1933 and 1934 by
sixteen state
legislatures all urging the Senate to consent to and
ratify
the three pending protocols. 1 7

The resolutions of those

states represented some of the industrial and
agricultural

Interests of the country.

The resolution of the Rhode

Island legislature is typical of all the rest and so will
serve as a good example.

It read as follows: 1 ^

"Prompt ratification - the reaffirmation of
our faith in the Judicial process as the primary
substitute for war - would be of Instant and immeasurable encouragement to a world striving, in
the face of threats of wars which would ruin it,
to emerge from the worst depression in history."
The eleven women’s national organizations in the

National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War were

Ibid .

,

pp. 24-26.

^

Resolutions in Rhode Island, N. J., Ark., Del.,
Tenn., Oregon, Vt. , Md., Ohio, were passed by both
houses, while those in Conn., Fla., Nev., and Miss, were
passed by the Senate only and those in No. Carolina, and
So. Carolina were passed by the House only.
Iowa,

18

Hearings Cited., pp. 28-30
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represented by Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, Honorary
Chairman
of the conference. At the meetings of the conference
were

from 10,000 to 12,000 women.

The organizations which she

represented Included the American Association of University
Women,

The Council of Women for Home Missions,

The Feder-

ation of Women’s Boards of Foreign Missions of North
America, The General Federation of Women's Clubs, The

National Women's Christian Temperance Union, and The
National Women's Trade Union League.

Mrs. Catt said that

according to polls recently taken, it was shown that the
number of senators approving of adherence had increased
to the necessary two- thirds,

that the two political parties

had endorsed adherence and finally that President Roosevelt

had given the plan his approval.
With such an almost ideal situation she said that
she could not see why the Senate had delayed so long.

Quoting from her speech, she saidj
"There is nothing more sickening, discouragand disheartening than the hopeless, helpless drifting of the world at this moment towards
The world needs now a few gestures towards
war.
peace instead of so many in the direction of war.®
ing,

She said that the Court might not prevent war, but that
it was still the necessary part of the machinery of peace.

She believed that unless the United States became a part

of the Court,

it would not work perfectly.

Therefore,

she and the organizations which she represented begged the
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Senate to take such action upon the World Court
as would
make the entrance of the United States as easy
and quick
as possible.
The stand of the dally newspapers concerning
ad-

herence was presented by Mr. W.

W.

Waymack, associate

editor of the Des Moines Register, Des Moines, Iowa.

He

reported that in response to a poll taken of 2,306 papers
concerning ratification by the United States of the three
protocols,

1,

357 or 67 per cent replied that they were in

favor of ratification while 263 or 13 per cent replied
that they were opposed to ratification.
the papers took no stand at all,

Fifty-eight of

fourteen sent replies

too ambiguous to make a fair classification possible, and
3^-2

papers sent no answers at all.

A further analysis of the newspaper poll showed the
following statements to be true.
no replies represented,

The 3^2 papers which sent

so far as their combined cir-

culation was concerned, only 6 per cent of the combined

circulation of all of the daily papers in the country.
X

»

The

357 dally papers that favored ratification included most

of the leading papers of the country, from the New York
Times 8nd Herald Tribune in the East, to the San Francisco
Chronicle, The Seattle Star, the Los Angeles Time, the

19 Ibid.,
pp. 31 - 34 .
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Portland Oregonian In the West.
In New England, the papers advocating adherence
In

their editorials included the Boston Transcript, the

Boston Herald, the Boston Post, the Christian Science
Monitor,

the Springfield Republican, and the Hartford

Courant.
In the South the papers favoring adherence were the

Atlanta Constitution, the Birmingham Age Herald, the New
Orleans Tlmes-Picaycime, the Chatanooga News, the Memphis

Commercial Appeal and the Richmond Times.
The Mid-West papers advocating adherence were the
Des Moines Register, the Cleveland Plain Dealer,

the

Indianapolis Star, the St. Paul Pioneer Express, the Omeha

World Herald and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Times-Star,
and Globe- Democrat.

20

As a result of the poll Mr. Waymack said that there

could be found no grounds for the contention that the news-

paper support of the Court was sectional.

The most clear-

ly affirmative states represented all sections of the

country.

Connecticut, with 32 papers, registered 25

favorable, none opposed, and 7 which did not reply.

case of Pennsylvania, out of

15£>

daily papers, 106 regis-

tered favorable and only 24 were opposed.

20

Ibid ., pp. 34-36.

In the

Twenty-four of

130 the 29 Kentucky papers replied as favorable.

of Iowa,

34 of the 45 papers were favorable.

In the state

In Colorado

twenty- two of Its twenty-nine were favorable, as were the

nineteen of the twenty-five in Oregon.
The opposition, Mr. Waymack said was concentrated

in the papers owned by Hearst.

Thirty- two of the 265 papers

opposed to the Court made up three fourths of the total
circulation of the opposition.

Of the thirty-two papers,

twenty- four of them belonged to the Hearst chain.

Mr.

Waymack concluded his report by saying that when two thirds
of the American press favored adherence it was safe to say

that it was also the voice of a majority of the American

people. 20

'

The National Grange was also represented at the

Its position concerning adherence was presented

hearing.

by Frederick Brenckham, Washington representative of the

National Grange.

Mr. Brenckham said that since 1924, at

each annual convention the Grange had unanimously recorded
its conviction that the United States should adhere to

The plea of the Grange was, he said, based on

the Court.

the conviction that only in an international order, depend-

ing upon the application of the principles of law for the
settlement of disputes could there be security of life or
,

20

‘

Idem.
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livelihood for any of its citizens* 21
The recommendations of the log World
Court com-

mittees throughout the United States was
presented by Tom
Wallace, editor of the Louisville Times and
member of the
Louisville World Court committee. He reported
the committee, which he represented, had waited patiently
since

1925 for the United States to do its part in maintaining
the World Court*

find was ’•delay”.

The only explanation which it could
In explaining why his and other com-

mittees believed that delay was the cause of the failure
of the plan for adherence, he made the surprising state-

ment that opponents of adherence claimed to have within

their ranks officers of the army, navy, and American
Legion, distinguished lawyers In both the Republican and

Democratic parties, all members of World Court committees

and some of them even chairmen of their respective committees

1

In spite of the possibility of such a situation

he asked that the protocols be reported quickly so that
the Senate could take immediate action on them.^
The last organization to be heard by the Foreign

Relations Committee of the Senate was the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in America.

21

22

Ibid .

,

pp.

36- 39 .

Ibid ., pp. 42-44.

Its representative was

132
Dr. S. Parkes Cadman,

-

former president of the Council.

He said he believed that the World Court
could prove a

source of social and political cohesion as
well as judicial among the nations of the world as had the
Supreme

Court of the United States among the forty-eight
states

of the Union.

He went on to say that the Senate was not

to be criticized for its delay in ratifying the
protocols,

for he believed that it was much better "to make haste

slowly in controverted issues" in order that the public

might be completely educated concerning the question.
did consider,

He

however, that the moment had come, when affairs

in both the United States and abroad were so confused, for
the United States to ratify the protocols and so bring to
a successful completion its active service in the World

Court.

In addition to the individuals who spoke in behalf

of their respective organizations were two men prominent
in public affairs, Alfred E. Smith and Admiral William S.
Sims.

Mr. Smith favored very strongly the adherence of

the United States to the World Court.

He said that in

times when the peace of the world was threatened by war,
the United States should certainly do its part to persuade

the nations of the world to settle their differences by

23

Ibid ., pp. 46-47

i
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reason and law rather than by force.
Admiral Sims spoke very briefly, but said
that the
rights of the United States were amply protected
by
the

protocols already signed and that the Court would be
of
great Influence In promoting confidence in the relations

among the countries of the world.

^

On May 16, of the same year a similar hearing was
held for the opponents of the Court.
hearing,

As at the other

there were present prominent citizens and repre-

sentatives of numberous interested organizations.

Among

the individuals who spoke were former Senators Reed of

Missouri, and Pepper of Pennsylvania, Judge Daniel F.
Cohalan, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the state
of New York, and Edward A. Hayes, National Commander of
the American Legion.

Former Senator James A. Reed of Missouri began by
saying that the controvery over adherence to the Court
was the most important question before the Congress, was
in fact so important that if a mistake was made there

would be no mind capable of prophesying the results of
the mistake.

He said that the proponents of the Court

were proponents of the League of Nations and were seek-

ing by means of the Court to gain a back door entry into
pi

Ibid., p. 24.

25 Idem.

-

the League.
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Their pro pogan da, he said, was financed

entirely by large contributions from the Carnegie Foun-

dation and Mr. Curtis Bok of Philadelphia and carried
on through the efforts of agents hired for that purpose.

With such funds at their disposal it was no wonder to

him that such a system of propoganda was possible.

He

brought in, in connection with the financing of proponent
propoganda, the fact, perhaps unknown to the general

public at the time, that the officers of the Carnegie

Foundation were none other than Elihu Root, James Brown
Scott, Joseph H. Choate, the foremost advocates of ad26

herence.

Leaving the matter of proponent propoganda,
Senator Reed proceeded to a discussion of the Court and
the proposed protocols.

In answer to the statement made

by Admiral Sims to the effect that the rights of the United

States were amply protected by the protocols, he asked
why, if the five amended reservations had the same pro-

tective power as the original five, the amended reser-

vations were any more acceptable to the signatory powers
than the original ones.

His answer to the question was

that the five amended reservations did not guarantee suf-

ficient protection for the citizens of the United States.

26

Ibid ., pp. 105-107
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Next Mr. Reed proceeded to take the Court apart
and prove that It was not a court at all.

In the first

place, he said that the Court was made up of men, who
even
If they so desired,

of country would,

their actions.

could not be Impartial because love

In any dispute,

always come first In

In the second place, he said the important

essential of a court was that It should act under a code
of laws drawn up by the people to be governed.

Since the

United States had had no part of the League of Nations it
seemed to Mr. Reed very queer that it should want to be

governed by a court created by the League.

He not only

though it queer but very dangerous for the United States
to adhere to a court whose rules and regulations had been

drawn up by foreign powers.

Government by the governed,

he said was the basis of liberty.

In the third place, the

Court lacked the power inherent in a true court, namely,
the power to enforce its own decisions.

The only way

that the World Court could enforce its decisions was by

combining by force all the nations possible against the
offender.

Lastly, Mr. Reed said that the World Court was

not a true court because it had the power to give advisory
opinions at the request of the League of Nations, and not
necessarily at the request of the litigants.

27 Ibid.,
p. 112
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He concluded his speech by ashing the
Committee on

Foreign Relations why the United States
should be swayed
by paid propogandists when ,by following
the advice of such
great statesmen as Washington and Lincoln, the
United
States had prospered without meddling in foreign
2S
affairs.

Former Senator George Pepper, of Pennsylvania, was
the next to speak.
Incidentally, he was the same Senator

Pepper who supported the Court in 1926.

He began by saying

that the World Court was a tribunal with a dual character,

one of a Judicial character and the other of an advisory

or non- judicial character.
ing,

In its twelve years of function-

the Court delivered twenty-two Judicial decisions and

twenty-five advisory opinions.

He claimed that a judicial

body which had spent more time and effort during the
twelve years of its life in giving advice to a political

body than it spent on cases submitted to it for judicial
decision was not entitled to be regarded exclusively as
a Judicial body.

Such a situation, he

said, only helped

to strengthen his argument that the Court was merely a

tool of the League of Nations.

As long as there was such

a tie between the Court and the League,

Senator Pepper

said that the Court could never measure up to the

28
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American ideal, and was, therefore, worthy only of un-

compromising opposition on the part of the citizens of
the United States.^

With his analysis of the Court as Judicial body.

Senator Pepper continued the attack on the Court as a
non- Judicial body.

In doing that, he tried to show that

the Court had been greatly overrated as a factor in

international life.

He believed that the proposition of

adherence had been seized upon by League propogandists

merely because the Court was an organ of the League. 3°
In conclusion, he said that he believed that there

had been a deliberate attempt on the part of advocates
of adherence to force the hand of the Senate in compelling
it to accept whatever a group of signatories might choose

as a substitute for its better Judgment.

He again urged

the Senators to realize the trust which they had in their

hands and not to be stampeded by strong proponent
propoganda. ^1

Judge Daniel Cohalan followed Senator Pepper in

presenting his views on the subject of adherence.

29
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said that the arguments used by the
proponents just preceeding the Senate Resolution of January
27 1926, had
been destroyed by the action of the Court
In the meantime.
He cited as an example the statement
made by the Court
,

advocates to the effect that the Court was
a body whose
decisions were not affected by political trends
or national
bias.
It was in September 1931,

that the action came

which Mr. Cohalan presented as evidence that the
state-

ment of the proponents was false.

At that time, a matter

concerning the Austro- German Trade Union was submitted
to the Court.

According to the comment at the time, the

case was decided entirely on political grounds by a vote

of seven to eight against the validity of the Austro-

German customs pact.

That,

in his estimation, was an

example of the nature and character of that legal body

which the United States was being asked to join.

He said

that under such conditions the United States was not going
to submit its problems to the Court composed of foreign

and biased Judges.

The United States, he said, had always

had and would have enough internal problems of its own to
keep its government busy.

It would have no time to go

abroad to try to settle disputes and incidentally take
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the chance of Involving Itself in a European
32
war,
Mr. Cohalan then rapped the proponents
by saying

that not one of them had given any sound reason
why the

United States should join the Court.

Their arguments

were Just other examples of the passion of a small

minority of the people of the United States trying to
regulate the lives, habits and interests of the rest of
the people.

He concluded by saying that the only way to

maintain peace and sanity among the peoples of the world
was to mind our own business and to leave the Old World
to do likewise. 33
Mr. Edward A. Hayes, National Commander of the

American Legion, spoke in behalf of his fellow comrades
all over the United States.

He said that he realized

that resolutions in great numbers could be passed with
little or no actual consideration of the subject concerned.
He came to impress upon the Senate the fact that the

American Legion had considered the question for over two
years before coming to their decision.

When their de-

cision was made, it was made by men and women who had

already given their country a sample of their patriotism.
Their final decision had been that America^ interests

32
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came first and that those Interests could be best served

by staying out of the Court*
was worded simply and clearly.

Their resolution, he said,
It read as follows:

H
Be It resolved by the American Legion
That It is opposed to the' entry or the United
States Into the League of Nations or to the
adherence to the World Court, either with or
without reservation."
,

That resolution, according to Mr. Hayes, was the unanimous

expression of 10,879 posts of the American Legion and
nearly 8,000 units of the American Legion Auxiliary.
The International Seamen's Union of America was

represented at the hearing by Mr. Andrew Furuseth, its
president.

He said that he came before the committee

representing a

class of people who were “utterly opposed

to the United States entering the League of Nations either

by the front door or indirectly through the World Court".
They were opposed to it because it was destructive of the

fundamental ideas and principles adopted by the colonists

and won through the War of Independence.

He explained

the fundamental difference in sovereignty and freedom in

America and Europe.

In America,

it was placed by the

Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in the
hands of the voter , whereas in Europe it was in the power

of the King or those who exercised the kingly power.

3 * Ibid .,
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would be impossible, he said, to Join in conferences,
treaties or courts in which those fundamental
questions

might be at issue without Jeopardizing the American
way
of life. 35
Mr. Charles Francis Adams, director of First

National Stores, presented to the committee a statement
of Governor Joseph B. -Ely of Massachusetts and also his
own
'

opinion.

The governor wanted to go on record as opposing

the adherence to the Court on the basis that the United

States had enough problems to solve at home without getting

caught in the complicated disputes in Europe.
As for himself, Mr. Adams said that it was his

belief that any participation, interference with, or even
advice to nations in such a state of mind was bound to

antagonize or displease either that or some other nation
and might destroy what good will the United States had

or any pleasant or profitable relationship which we might
have in the future.

He used as proof of his belief

examples in the past where the United States loaned money
to foreign friends and allies,

and helped them to fight

wars of their own making only to find as a result little
el se but death,

debt,

disappointment,

and misunderstandings.

35 Ibid .,
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He concluded by reminding the committee
of the

opinion of time-honored Americans who warned
their country
to stay out of any foreign entanglements.
If those warnings were not respected, he said the country
could well

fear for the future
No survey of public opinion directed against the

adherence to the Court would be complete without some

mention of the Hearst newspaper chain.

Mr. E. D. Goblentz,

editor of the New York American, and supervising editor
of the Hearst newspapers, represented those newspapers

and presented their petition protesting against adherence
to or participation in the World Court.

This petition

was gathered under the auspices of that newspaper chain

and represented a cross-section of the entire nation and
was signed by 1,334,347 citizens.

It read as follows;

M

We protest against the United States participating in the League of Nations or in the
World Court of the League of Nations, with or
without Reservations*

We petition our Federal Government to keep
our United States 'free from foreign entanglements as the Father of our Country wisely
1

enjoined.
We urge our Congress at Washington to keep
our Government from meddling in foreign affairs,
and to keep foreign nations from meddling in our
American affairs."

36
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As loyal American citizens, we ask our loyal
representatives to keep our country out of foreign
conflicts and complications, and to keep foreign
conflicts aud complications out of our country#**

The statistical report of this League of Nations
protest

included twenty-two Hearst papers from Los Angeles,
California, to Boston, Massachusetts* 37
In studying the reports of the two hearings an

interesting observation may be made.

The largest number

of the speakers in favor of adherence were representatives
of some organization, whereas in the case of the opposition,
the largest number of speakers were people, distinguished

not because they held an office in some powerful organization, but because they had been prominent in national affairs.

In regard to the arguments presented at those hearings,

I

believe that the opponents presented the best

arguments.

Each speaker had a definite point against ad-

herence, and presented it very forcefully and clearly.
As for the proponents,

given.

very few convincing arguments were

The importance of their hearing, therefore, lay

not in the presentation of reasons for adherence, but

rather in the indication of what groups were in favor of
adherence.

For that reason

I

consider that the opponents

hearing contributed more to the debate on the question

37 Ibid ., pp. 205-207
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of adherence*
The Impetus gained by these two
hearings before

the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate in the

spring of 193^ was not lost, because the
Committee announced that the protocols would be brought up
for con-

sideration by the Senate early in the next session*
The new Congress met on January
3
time, Mr* Roosevelt,

,

1935 ,

At that

like every President since the

World War, indicated that he approved of adherence*
January 5

,

On

he called a conference of the Senate leaders

and representatives of the Department of State including
Secretary of State Hull, Democratic leader Senator
Robinson, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Senator Pittman, and Assistant Secretary of

State Francis B. Sayre*

^

The purpose of the meeting was

the consideration of immediate action on the protocols.

Four days later the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by a vote of fourteen to seven,

report recommending ratification.

submitted a

That committee, headed

by Democratic Senator Pittman, was overwhelmingly DemoIn fact only four of the nineteen members were

cratic*

Republicans*^

The opposition was held, as usual, by

xg
J
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Senators Borah, La Follette and Lewis.

The recommendation,

however, was accompanied by an “understanding".

The

conditions of the "understanding" were based on the

promise "that the Permanent Court of International
Justice
shall not entertain, over an objection by the United

States,

any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute

or question in which
0
interest.^

-the

United States has or claims an

This reservation was really only a re-statement

of the fifth reservation which the Senate had included
in its consent to ratlficatio n in 1926.

At that time, the

members of the World Court had taken exception to it. Since
that time, however, the Department of State had made in-

quiries which Indicated that the leading members of the
Court,

in view of the provisions of the Root protocol,

no longer objected to the provision.

Also it was believed

by friends of the Court that such an additional phrase

would go far to cut down the opposition in the Senate.

4l

Two days after the recommendation was presented,
a correspondent of the New York Times reported that the

the opposition in the Senate had dwindled down to a

40
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handful of “bitterenders", of which six were
known to be,
the Republican minority leaders Borah and
Johnson,

Senators Nye and Cutting, the Progressive Senator
La
Follette, and the Farmer-Laborite Senator Ship
stead. *2
1

The resolution of adherence was debated
intermit-

tently from January 15, until January 29.
Roosevelt,

President

contrary to his frequent custom, did not send

his message to the Senate until it had considered the

question.

On January 16, after the opposition had begun

to crystallize,

he sent the following notet^

"The movement to make international justice
practicable and serviceable is not a subject to
partisan considerations. For years Republican
and Democratic administrations and platforms
alike have advocated a court of Justice to which
nations might voluntarily bring their disputes
for judicial decisions.
To give concrete realization to this obviously sound and thoroughly American policy, I hope
that at an early date the Senate will advise and
consent to the adherence by the United States to
the Protocol of Signature of The Permanent Court
of International Justice, dated December 16, 1920,
the Protocol of Revision of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, dated
September l4, 1929, all which were submitted to
the Senate on December 10, 1930.
I urge that the Senate’s consent be given in
such form as not to defeat or delay the objective
of adherence.

The sovereignty of the United States will be
in no way diminished or Jeopardized by such action.
At this period in international relationships,
**

2
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when every act is of moment to the future of world
peace, the United States has an opportunity once
more to throw its weight into the scale in" favor
of peace*
15

Debate in the Senate was opened on January 15, by

Senator Robinson of Arkansas*

He said he saw no basis for

the fear that the entry of the United States into the

Court would involve it in the League of Nations Just because it had access to the Council and Assembly of the

League and could not understand why the Senate had

delayed so long#

He argued, that since the kinds of cases

which could be brought before the Court were limited to
the four enumerated in the section on the Jurisdiction of
the Court, he oould see no reason why the United States,

in

bringing cases before the Court, would in any way be com-

promising its sovereignty or sacrificing its independence#
He pointed out that by reservations,, the Court could not

recognize any dispute in which the United States had or

claimed an Interest except as it had the consent of the

United States.

Senator Robinson concluded by saying that

the right of the United States to bring disputes to the

Court was made possible not by "natural right", but by
the organized efforts of other nations.

He said that if

the United States would rather be a "sponger" than an

equal participant in the backing of the great work of
the Court,

then the responsibility for the failure of the

^
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other nations to take part would weigh on the
shoulders
of the United States.

This responsibility he considered

hardly worthy of a nation which had taken so much
interest
and had put so much effort into the creation of the
Court.

On the next day Senator Johnson of California continued the debate by presenting a defense of the Senate's
delay in ratifying the protocols.

As for the belief that

the Senate was to blame for the delay, he said that it was

not the fault of the Senate, but of the scheming European

diplomats and conservative Americans.

Those persons, he

said, by means of their reservations, had reduced the pro-

tection of the United States to a point where adherence
could not be safely attempted.
He next developed a series of arguments why the

United States should not join the Court.

He said that it

was foolish to think that the United States could help to

maintain peace in Europe by joining the Court.

The fact

that there were countries, Bolivia and Paraguay, which had

been at war for years and which had made no effort to bring
their dispute to the Court, proved that the Court was useless unless the nations would bring their disputes to it.
If the European nations would not make

use of the Court to

solve their disputes, he could see no reason why the adherence

44
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of the United States could possibly bring peace
to Europe.
It could only lead to the entry of the United States
Into

quarrels and wars In which It would be expected to play
the part of the savior.

His second argument was based on the fact that the

United States had been able to maintain peace for over one
hundred years by means of arbitral courts and arbitration
treaties.

To say,

then,

that adherence to the Court was

the only way to maintain peace was, according to him,

counting as nothing the great record of the United States
government in its relations with the other countries of
the world.

Another of Mr. Johnson*s reasons for opposing adherence to the Court was based on the very sensible idea
that charity began at home.

Therefore, he believed that

the United States government could well afford to deal

with its own problems, such as unemployment, and let

Europe take care of her own.
His concluding argument was based on the fact that
the Court was an instrument of the League of Nations.

He

said that since the United States had chosen to stay out

of the League, Joining the Court would amount to a blunder-

ing into the very thing which it had chosen years earlier
to avoid.

He had opposed the Court in 1926.

He summarized

his whole speech by saying that there was enough in the

United States to take the time and efforts of the government

150

-

and that therefore the people should be satisfied to remain
44’

just plain "Americans"

I

Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, also an opponent of
the World Court, presented his opinion during the debate
in the Senate*

He said that the title of the campaign

for the adherence of the United States should be "America
since, according to him, the

for Sale",

adherence of the

United States to the Court would mean the outright sale of
this country to Europe

.

Senator Long also based his arguments against the
adherence of the United States to the Court on the fact
that the United States had maintained peaceful relations

with foreign countries for

over one hundred years by

means of an agent which was purely American*
was the Monroe Doctrine.

That agent

In spite of such an unusual

record the United States was ready, he said, to scrap that
doctrine which had been used to keep Europe out of the

Americas and to plunge itself right into the middle of

European troubles and conflicts.

This he said was a

drastic and sudden change from the policy followed by the
government, which not only kept the United States out of

European affairs, but also kept Europe out of the affairs
of the Americas.

44
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Concerning the argument that the United States could
withdrew from the Court at any time after it had Joined if
it were dissatisfied with the running of it, Mr. Long said

that it would be just as hard for the United States to do

that as it was for the Southern States to secede in 1661

and even more disgraceful.

,

The only way he could see for

the United States to get out of the Court was by having an

army big enough to stand up against the Court and all its
members.

Senator Long concluded by saying that the United
States might think that it was doing a good thing for all

concerned by Joining the Court, but it also thoughtthe
same thing back when it fought Europe’s war in order to

make the world safe for democracy, and came out of the war

with the name

M

Uncle Shylock” and with almost all of its

war loans repudiated.

With such an experience any move

to Join the Court would not be only dangerous but foolish .

During the address of Senator Long, Senator Robinson

interposed several opinions concerning adherence.

He said

that he could see no reason why a condition of war in

Europe was any excuse for the United States to refrain from

doing what it could reasonably do to encourage the peaceful disposition of those disputes.

In answer to Senator

Robinson’s remark, Senator Long asked him what possible

45 Ibid
., pp. 563-57S.
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chance there was for the United States
to avoid war, If it
Joined the Court, which was composed almost
entirely of
representatives of nations which had defaulted
In their
debt obligations to the United States.

Senator Rpblnson answered the question of Senator

Long by saying that the threat of possible conflict
was
no excuse why the United States should allow the
destruction

of millions of lives and billions of dollars worth
of

property.

He pointed out that there were only two ways

to settle disputes.

arbitration.

One was by force and the other was by

He believed that It was both proper and right

that the United States should contribute in every Instance

that it could, to the settlement of those disputes by

peaceful means.

46

After the speeches In the Senate against the adherence of the United States, Senator Vandenberg came
forward and presented to the Senate his amendment to the

protocols of adherence which read as follows:^7
H
Resolved further That adherence to the
said protocols and statute hereby approved shall
not be construed as to require the United States
to depart from its traditional policy of not
intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling
itself in the political question of policy or
internal administration of any foreign state; nor
shall adherence to the said protocols and statute
be construed to imply a relinquishment by the
United States of its traditional attitude toward
purely American questions.
.

1®
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Senator Vandenberg declared that he did not present
the amendment with the idea of defeating the fundamental

issue itself as had the opponents of adherence.

On the

contrary, he believed that the protocols without such an

amendment were ample protection for the interests and
territorial Integrity of the United States.
fit,

For the bene-

however, of those who did not share his opinion, he

presented the amendment as a means to ensure what he

believed was already provided for in the protocols.
He admitted that he did not want the United States
to Join the League of Nations, but still maintained that

it was possible to create an effective discrimination and

distinction between the League and the Court and that the

protocols secured that distinction.
In the discussion which ensued during the period

of Senator Vandenberg'

s

speech,

Senator Logan of Kentucky

came forward to refute the statement of the opponents
the World Court was a League Court.

that

He said that it would

be Just as sensible to say that the Constitution of the

United States was a Magna Charts constitution as that the

World Court is a League Court.
Senator Logan next considered the attitude of the

United States in refusing to be bound by any rule of interw
Ibid ., p. 637-635
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national law.

He said that there were only
two alternatives,
namely, complete co-operation with
the other nations in the
Court, or complete withdrawal and
isolation from international
affairs.
If the United States accepted the
second alternative,
he said, it would be necessary for it
to have the largest
army and navy in order to defend itself from
all others.
In answer to the arguments of Senator Johnson
and

Senator Long that the United States had maintained
peace over
a period of one hundred years by means of arbitration,
he

declared that adherence to the Court on the part of the
United
States would not prevent the use of the Court of Arbitration
at the Hague.

He also stated that the United States had

made use of arbitration partly because there was no court
that could be used.

Senator Logan further attacked the arguments of the
opponents by trying to prove how foolish was their argument
that the decisions of the Court would be rendered by foreign

and biased judges.

He declared that that very thing could

be said about the courts all over the United States.

Some-

body, he said, is always saying that courts are not fair.

He said that no American would ever attack the scruples of
the American Judges, Hughes, Kellogg, and Moore who had

served on the World Court and that, therefore, what right

had they to do that very thing to any judge Just because
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he was not from the United States.

Courts, he said, might

make mistakes, but they were almost always
fair.

Senator Logan concluded by saying that
peace among
the members of the human race had been
brought
to its

present state by the process of education and
growth and
through a better understanding of each other. To
say that
law could not be substituted for war, denied that
society
was capable of further progress and advance.

He declared

that it was up to the United States to show that inters

national law could be substituted for war.

Even though its

entry into the court might not stop wars, Senator Logan

insisted that it was at least a step in the right direction
and a step which should be taken immediately. 45

On January 21, Senator Borah entered the debate on
the proposed World Court protocols.

He based all his op-

position to the court on its power to give advisory opinions.
If the power of the court to give advisory opinions had not

been included in the protocol, he said that he would have
had no objection to the Court at all.

He went on to

explain that the proposed Court was not a Judicial body

but an advisory tribunal and no matter how many reservations
were added,

it would always remain an advisory body.

He objected not only to the power of the court to

49
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give advisory opinions but also to the method by
which
those opinions could be secured, namely, the
action of the
League of Nations.
That Jurisdiction, therefore, was not
in the Court itself but in the League.

With that arrange-

ment Borah could see no way of preventing politics from

entering the opinions.

To back up his argument he cited

the example of the Austro-C-erman customs decision, which
case, he was certain, was decided on a purely political basis.

senator Borah explained the attitude of the opponents
in connection with the argument that they were opposing a

movement which had been advocated in the United States for
years.

He did that by saying that the United States had

always advocated Judicial tribunals for the settlement of

international disputes, but that this court was not a
Judicial one in the true and accepted sense of the word.
Furthermore, he said that no leading American, prior to
the time of the advisory Jurisdiction, created in the

World Court, had ever advocated such a Court, or that any
advisory power be attached to it.

The World Court was,

therefore, not an American product, and did not come as
the result of any American proposal*

50

Senator Thomas of Utah followed Senator Borah in
an attempt to discredit the term “League Court” as applied

50 Ibid.,
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He said that the only connection
that

the League had with the Court was In
Article 14 of the
Covenant, which created the Court.
There the relationship
stopped.
After the Court was established the
power of

Article 14 was spent.

Furthermore, he said that the Court

was created by a multi-lateral treaty drawn
up by a con-

ference of representatives of many states, in which
members

and non-members of the League took part.
As for the opposition to the Court because of its

power to give advisory opinions, he declared that the

United States would be safer as a member of the Court.

It

would be safer because as a member, the Court could not,

over the objection of the United States render opinions
touching any disputes in which the United States had an
interest.

He,

therefore, believed that the United States

was completely protected by the 1929 Protocol of Accession.'"'

Senator Reynolds of North Carolina recorded his

opposition to adherence on January 24.

He said that our

ancestors left Europe and faced starvation and cold to
come to America to realize freedom of government.

Since

their settlement, this country made the greatest progress
of any nation of the world.

That progress he said was due

to the fact that the people minded their own business

51 Ibid
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and kept out of the affaire of other nations.

He believed

that just so long as the people continued
to mind their
own business would they remain great. He continued
with
the statement that the people did not want their
country
to enter the Court because doing so only meant
an entry
into the League of Nations.

The experience of the World

War and the resulting taxes, he said, had taught
the

people that another entry into foreign affairs would only
result in added hardships and misery#

Continuing his speech, Senator Reynolds asked the
question,

What had tne United states to gain from adherence

to the Court”?

His answer was nothing.

We had no boundary

questions or International problems of immigration or
tariff.

He said that the people of the United States were

busy enough minding their own business and taking care of
themselves.

Until some one could give him a sensible

reason why they should Join the Court, he was definitely
of the opinion that they should stay out.^ ?

On January 25, Senator Norris of Nebraska presented
an amendment to be added to the end of the amendment pre-

sented earlier by Senator Vandenberg.
n

It read as follows:

Re solved further that the adherence of the
Government of the United States to said protocols
,
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,
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and statute is upon the express
understanding that no dispute or condition and
question In
1
J i ^' ed States Government
is a party
Th
?? be submitted
5
hall
to said Permanent Court of
International Justice unless such
submission has
Unlted States Senate by
a
J H
two-thirds vote.” 53

According to his amendment, Senator Norris
provided
that any dispute or controversy in which
the United

States
was a party, had to have a two- thirds vote
of approval

by the Senate before it could be brought before
the Court
for a decision. He demanded the two-thirds vote
because
such action was in the nature of a treaty. He said
that

he had always been opposed to the League and
would oppose

adherence to the Court without some reservation amounting
in substance to the one he proposed.

He insisted upon

that because he realized that, if the United States did

Join the Court, someday an important question would come
up which demanded the uttermost precaution.

He said he

did not want his country to become involved in European
questions,

not because he did not trust the Europeans, but

because he did not want his country to enter a court made
up of judges whose environments and ways of living were
so different from those of his own country.

He admitted

that they would probably act very conscientously and

still be biased toward the European type of civilization

and so do great harm to the United States.

53 Congressional Record
p.

964

,
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Therefore, he

Congress, 1st Sess.
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was not willing that the United
States submit any dispute
to the Court unless the matter
had the same consideration
by the Senate as a treaty would
have.
He looked ahead to
the possibility of the rejection
of adherence because of
his amendment by the members of the
Court.
That very
rejection, he said, would be the very
best reason why the
United States should stay out of the Court .

While debates on the resolution were being
held in
the Senate, public opinion was voiced. On
January 13 the
National World Court Committee sent a message
to the Senate
commending the action of the Foreign Relations
Committee
,

taken on January 10

,

when it reported the three protocols

favorably to the Senate.

The message also contained a

plea that the Senate delay no longer but take the immediate

action which was so important to the foreign relations of
the United States.

That plea was signed by such prominent

members as Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of State, Professor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard University, Professor

Manley 0. Hudson also of Harvard University, Mr. Scott M.
Loftin, President of the American Bar Association, and

Professor Phillip

C.

Jessup of Columbia University.

On the same day that the World Court Committee

message was sent to the Senate, the ministers of 150

54

Ibid., pp. 964-966.
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Brooklyn protestant churches urged their congregations
to
send telegrams to their congressmen urging them
to vote

m

favor of adherence.

Taking the side of the opponents In an article
appearing in the January 13 issue of the New York Times, Senator

Johnson assailed the so-called "World Court Plan".

He said

that adherence under the three protocols would mean the

abrogation ox the policy of the United states of non-interference in the political questions of foreign countries.
He saw no reason why the Court would afford the United

States any greater avenue to judicial settlement, but could
see clearly how it could be a certain way into a European

war.

The article ended with the statement that the Court

could not settle any difficulties for the United States
because the United States had none which it would want
to have settled

by a group of foreigners .

1

The propoganda of the opposition was reenforced on

January 20 by Father Charles E. Coughlin, who delivered
a firery speech denouncing the Court.

In that speech he

said that “joining the World Court to maintain peace

strongly stinks of diplomatic conceit".
enough, he said,

He was old

to prefer Washington and his logic and

principles to Wilson and those who followed him with their
crude internationalism and their unsound love of minorities
55

New York Times

,
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He said that It was neither the farmer nor
the laborlte

who was anxious that the United States go
International*

They believed, on the other hand, that the American
struggle

should be to preserve the American standard of living rather
than to “enmesh ourselves with the debasement of the

standardized poverty of Europe".

According to Father Coughlin, the World Court was
a” brotherhood of men founded not upon love,

not upon the

right of the majority to rule, but upon the right of the

minority to disrupt".

He concluded by saying that the

Court was nothing more than an "artificial creation of
those who wish to exempt themselves from all national
law,

of those who wish to profit by the injustice of the

Treaty of Versailles"

On January 25, the day before the Senate vote was
to be taken,

the proponents and opponents had their last

chance to try to bring the Senate to their respective
sides.

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler gave a heated speech

in which he "chided the World Court foes" and said that

their attitude was inexplicable save on the ground that
they had "neither ideas, principles, nor courage, nor any

concern for the highest interests of the American people".
In the evening of the same day, Father Coughlin

New York Times

,
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renewed his battle against the Court, urging
his listeners
to wire their Senators as a last chance to
block
adherence.

He appealed to every stolid American who
loved democracy,
the United States, who loved the truth, to stand
back of

the tired and true Senators in their hopeless but
honest

fight to keep "America safe for Americans and not the

hunting ground of international plutocrats"

*
*

I

The objections offered in the Senate, over the
radio, and through the Hearst and other newspapers, bore

little relation to the proposed protocols.

In the Senate,

it finally became necessary to set a limit to the length

of the Senators* speeches because the effort on their

part to delay action by filibuster."
In that final attack, the Court was denounced as
a creature of the League.

The administration was accused

of attempting to sneak Into the League by the back door,
and the Court itself was criticized as a political body.
The country was told that membership in the Court would

result in the cancellation of the Allied war debts, the

lowering of the bars of immigration, and the end of tariff
protection for the working class, and the complete disappearance of the Monroe Doctrine.

57 New York Times
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said that the United States,

if it Joined the Court,

would
find itself embroiled in European
quarrels and wars.
The arguments of the proponents,
especially in the
speeches of Senators Vandenberg, Logan and
Robinson, were
to the effect that the Court was not bound
to the League
any more than the Constitution of the United
States was

bound to the Magna Charta; that the protocols,
along with
the Vandenberg amendment, gave adequate protection
to
the

United States; that the Court was not a “foreign" one
Just because the Judges were Europeans; that the mere

fact that there were wars going on in Europe, was no
excuse why the United States should not expend some effort
to try to bring them to a peaceful settlement; and, finally,

that adherence to the Court would in no way hinder the

United States in its use of the Court of Arbitration, if
it so desired*

In other words, the proponents believed

that adherence could help to establish international
peace, and yet not force the United States to do anything

that was foreign to its traditional policy of the Monroe

Doctrine*
Finally, on January 29,

came to a vote in the Senate.

the question of adherence

It was the opinion of

Washington observers that the fate of the measure had been

decided during the preceding few days when the well or-

ganized opposition had delivered its powerful mass attack.

^
-
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Evidence of the strength of the attack
was found In the
fact that on a single day 40,000 telegrams
were delivered
to the Senate.
Before the vote was taken, President Roosevelt
was
informed that four votes would mean the success
or failure
of the measure.

He,

therefore, called to the White House

Senators Cutting, Gerry, Walsh and Donhahey for a con-

ference in the hope that he might persuade them to lend

their vote to the cause of the World Court.

Senator

Cutting, however, was the only one who stood by the Presi60
dent.
The final poll showed fifty-two Senators in favor

of adherence and thirty- six opposed

—

Just seven votes

short of the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification.
An analysis of the vote shows that of the fifty- two votes

cast for adherence, forty-three were Democratic and nine
were Republican.

Of the thirty-six votes cast against

adherence, twenty were Democratic and fourteen were

Republican, one Progressive and one Farmer-Laborite.
This analysis would seem to show that neither the Re-

publican nor the Democratic parties solidly were for or
against adherence. 6259
Shepardson and Scroggs, op. cit ., p. 226.
6n
62-
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may be

clearly seen by means of the accompanying map*

Two centers

of the country were definitely in favor of adherence, the

Southwest and the Mississippi Valley*

The one center of

the opposition to adherence was in the states of the

Northwest*
The map also shows that the senators in thirteen

of the states split the votes of their states*

In four

of those cases only was the split along party lines.

In

seven cases, however, the split was within the party itself*

Such an observation serves to prove all the more

strongly that the Court question was not a party question.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the protocols,

revealed a change in attitude toward the Court since the
vote taken in 1926.

At that time, it had approved the

Moore amendments to the resolution of adherence by a vote
of 76-17*

During the intervening time, the opposition

had increased by nineteen votes, and those nineteen votes
spelled the defeat of ratification*

A comparison of the two votes in tabulated form
reveals the following facts in regard to the source of the
increase of opposition:
1.
Of the thirty-six senators who voted
against adherence in 1935 twenty-one of them
were men who had been elected since the 1926 vote*
>

Of the eight senators who had been opposed
to adherence in 1926, and who voted in 1935* only
one, Senator Robinson, left the ranks of the
opposition and voted for adherence in 1935*
2.
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the fifty-two senators who voted for
ln 1935> thirty- eight were new since
the 1926 vote*
3*

0f>

Of the fifty- two senators who voted in
favor of adherence in 1935, thirteen had voted
the same way in 1926.

Of the senators who had favored ad5»
herence in 1926, and who also voted in 1935,
eight swished to the side of the opposition
The data gained from this comparison shows that
the increase of opposition came primarily from the votes

of the new senators, and only secondarily from a change
of position from 1926 to 1935*

^

There is no evidence,

however, either in the Senate debates or hearings, which

can be used to pick out any one group which can be held

responsible for the killing of ratification.

The eight

senators who switched their position towards adherence
were not outstanding as either proponents or opponents

and so there is no record in the Senate proceedings of
any statement on their part as to why they made the
change.

The new senators who voted against adherence

were also inconspicuous in the debates in the Senate and
so made no statement which would indicate why they voted

62 The eight senators who changed their position
Senators Gerry, Metcalf Norbeck, Norris, Smith,
were:
Trammell, Walsh, and Wheeler.
63 For the tabulated votes see Appendices V and VI.
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The answers

to these questions will have to

wait until the biographies or private letters of
those

senators are published and their personal opinions
are

brought to light.
In connection with the question of why the senators

voted as they did, comes the question of the sincerity of
their

beliefs and arguments.

There is no evidence that

either the proponents or the opponents were insincere in
their belief that the United States should or should not
Join the Court, as there had been In the case of the

opponents of the League of Nations, where a personal ani-

mosity entered into the question.
the proponents of the Court,

Also in the case of

there Is no evidence to

show that they were insincere in the presentation of their

arguments and amendments.

On the contrary,

In the case

of the opponents, there is evidence that they were not
sincere in their presentation of amendments as a means
to make adherence safe for the United States.

That

evidence is found In the account of the amendment process
At that time the

of the famous "fifth reservation".

opponents openly admitted that the reason for their
refusal to accept the amendments to that reservation was

based on the fact that they were not rigid enough to be
unacceptable to the members of the Court.
in presenting amendments was then,

I

Their purpose

believe, either to
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make the conditions to adherence so harsh
that they could
not be accepted, or to hold off the vote long
enough to

muster more opposition to their side*
With the failure of the Court to ratify adherence,
the United States was prevented,

for the second time in

fifteen years, from taking its place with the other
nations
of the world in an association for the maintenance of

International peace.

To the proponents the failure was

an overwhelming disappointment, and to the opponents it

was a wonderful victory*

In the following chapter,

I

will attempt, through

a summary of the whole story of the struggle for adherence
to the World Court,

to come to some conclusion as to why

the campaign for adherence failed.

here,

Suffice it to say

that the question, as to whether the right side won

in 1935 »

is still a matter of personal opinion*

What the

future holds for the United States and the World Court

only time can tell*

The best that we can hope for,

is

that our United States may be able to continue to maintain peaceful relations with all the countries of the

world

CHAPTER VI
Summary and Conclusions
The idea of the association of nations
or peoples

for the preservation of peace and liberty
originated in
Europe in the fourteenth century. This fact
is very likely
to be quite new to most people of this day
whose belief
it probably is that such moves began with the
Hague Confer-

ences and not much earlier than that.

Those early statesmen

and philosophers, originators of the idea, had the same

basic proposition underlying their plans, namely, the united
efforts of nations to establish peaceful and just methods
of settling disputes, although the actual plans had several

variations.

The plan of one of the first men, Pierre Dubois,

for example, had as its prime purpose the uniting of the

Christian World against the infidels.

Dante in his project

came nearer to our idea of a World Court in his proposal

for a "world state" with a central court of justice.

King

Podiebrad of Bohemia presented a project very similar to
that of Pierre IXibois and Dante in his plan for the uniting
of the nations of the Christian world into a Federal State

held together by a permanent congress of ministers.
None of these early proponents, however, formulated
any system of international law which was so necessary in
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the fulfillment of their projects.

It was not until the

time of Hugo G-rotuis, during the
period of the break down
of feudalism, that such a system
of law was produced.

His

was then the first authoritative
treatise on the law of nations.
Other plans, preceding the Hague Tribunals,
were
those of Henry IV, Emeric Cruce, William Penn,
the Abbe
St- Pierre, Emmanuel Kant and Jeremy Bertham.

These schemes

like the earlier ones had the same methods but
slight vari-

ations in the ends to be secured.

Henry IV, for example,

wanted to establish a system whereby Europe was to be

divided up evenly among fifteen powers which were to be

represented in a Council where all disputes among them
could be settled.

The purpose of it all was the avoiding

of any possibility of jealousy over or a fear of a balance
of power in Europe, Emeric Cruce, on the other hand, pro-

posed a union of the states of the whole world for the

peaceful settlement of disputes.

His was perhaps the most

famous of all the plans of the period.

The rest of the

projects were more or less enlargements of the proposals
of the foregoing men and were valuable in that they con-

tinued the idea up until the time when practical means
for carrying out the ideas were developed.
In 1899, the calling of the First Hague Conference

by the young Czar of Russia marked a practical attempt
to bring about the realization of what, up until that time,

had been only plans and projects on paper.

The convening

-
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of the Conference also marked the
entrance of the United

States into the problem of European
peace and stability.
The American delegates, Messrs. White,
Mahan, Crozier,
Low and Holla were instructed to strive for
the establishment of an international court and to propose
a plan for a
tribunal to which the nations might bring their disputes.
The value of the American suggestions and the
influence

which they had upon the work of the Third Committee of the
Conference was evidenced by the fact that there was but one
point which was flatly rejected and the rest were accepted

either without change or at least with very little change
into the final draft for the Court of Arbitration.

In the

case of Mr. Holls' special mediation, it was accepted as a

separate article under the section of

G-ood

Offices and

Mediations.
The convention drawn up and accepted by the members
of the Conference made the use of the Court purely volun-

tary.

In order to make its position clear, the American

delegation made a declaration in full session to the effect
that in signing the Convention it understood that nothing
in it was to make the United States depart from its tradi-

tional policy of not intruding upon or interfering with
the political questions of any foreign state.

This state-

ment was accepted by the Conference without any protest and
was the first appearance of the reservation which was to

-
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be used time and again by the
opponents of the World Court
as an argument against the adherence
of the United States
to the World Court.

In 1904, five years after the establish-

ment of the Court of Arbitration, the
delegates to the
Inter par limentary Union Conference at
St. Louis asked President Roosevelt to take the leadership
in inviting the nations
to send delegates to a second conference
at
,

the Hague.

That

conference they proposed for the purpose of
considering

questions left unfinished by the first one in
1899 and also
to consider the advisability of establishing an
international
congress which would convene periodically for the discussion
of international questions.

The President accepted the charge and sent out the

invitations, but the conference was not convened until
1907, after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.

Seven

men, including Joseph H. Choate, Horace Porter, Uriah M.

Rose, David J. Hill, George B. Davis, Charles

S,

Sperry

and William I. Buchanan, were sent by the United States as

delegates with instructions from Secretary of State Root
to work for the development of the Hague Tribunal into a

permanent one composed of Judges who were Judges and were
paid adequate salaries for their services and who would use
Judicial methods in deciding cases.
The American delegates showed the same enthusiasm
as had their predecessors at the first conference.

They
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presented to their committee a detailed
plan for the organization of the court according to the
instructions given
to them by Secretary Root, Their
plan was accepted and supported in principle, that is with a few minor
modifications, by German, British, and French
delegations and adopted
by the conference.
The only point at which agreement could
not be reached was the question of the method of
the election
of the Judges
Therefore although the court was not
actu-

.

ally established within the period of the Conference, the

American delegation succeeded at least in laying its foundation.

The Americans were not as successful, however, in

their efforts to make arbitration obligatory.

The conven-

tion as finally concluded merely provided for general or
private treaties which made arbitration obligatory only
for those who entered upon them and even then entering upon

such treaties was purely voluntary.

Because this arrange-

ment fell short of their hopes and expectations the United

Stated delegation refrained from voting on the matter at all.
A second project taken up at this Second Hague Conference was the matter of establishing an International Court,
of Appeal in Prize Cases.

In working out the convention

the American delegation was instrumental in working out a

compromise between the projects of Great Britain and Germany
and by so doing facilitating its acceptance by the Confer-
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Although the plan for the Court failed to be
ratified because of a disagreement as to what
law the
Court

would apply

,

it still served as a step toward the
realiza-

tion of international co-operation.
The interest of the United States in a Court for
the

settlement of disputes between states was not confined to
the Hague Tribunal, for in 1907, it engineered the
establish-

ment of the Central American Court of Justice as a means
of maintaining peace among the Republics of Central America.

Although the Court was in existance for only ten years and
was ironically ignored by the Republics after the ten year

period because of a disagreement with the United States,
it was still aamonument to the American desire for the

establishment of judicial means for securing peaceful
relations among nations.
The post war era ushered into the United States a

period of intense interest with the presentation of the

problem of the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and
the League of Nations.

Although the idea of a league of

nations had been in circulation before the war ended, the

conclusion of the war and President Wilson's determination
to see the idea put into effect, brought the question to

the attention of the people and the Senate of the United

States.

Up until 1916, both political parties had been in
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accord in their approval of a league.

A break did come

between them, when Senator Lodge, Republican
leader, came
to a disagreement with Wilson over his
foreign policy

toward

G-ermany and the sinking of the "Lusitania".
I

To this break,

believe, can be attributed at least part of the
cause

of the failure of the League of Nations in the United

States.
In January 1917, President Wilson stated his condi-

tions necessary to a permanent peace, the most important
of which were disarmament and a league of nations.

Just

about one month later Senator Lodge stated his position

concerning the peace settlement by pointing out the dangerous implications in the principles laid down by the Presi-

dent and then parted company with the League forever.

He

gave as his reason the desire not to involve the United

States in a scheme which might create a worse situation

than already existed.

He stated, however, several measures

which he believed were as practical and more commendable
than the League.
(l)

Those measures contained provisions for

an adequate national preparedness, (2) the rehabilitation

of international law,

tration,
(5)

(4)

(3)

the extension of voluntary arbi-

the general reduction of armaments and finally

the strict observance of the doctrines of foreign

policy of both Washington and Monroe.
The signing of the Armistice brought the announce-

ment from the President that he would attend the peace confer'
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ence in person as a representative of
the United States.
That announcement of his proved to be
a source of much bitter feeling on the part of government
leaders, especially
the members of the Senate, who believed
that it was the

President's duty to stay home and manage the
business of
the government.
They argued that he had no authority

to

represent the American people at that time.

Wilson incurred still more criticism when he failed
to even mention his plans for presentation at the
conference

in nis farewell speech to the Senate prior to his departure

for France.

Senator Lodge did succeed, however, in making

known to the delegation through his friend Henry White
what he believed were the sentiments of his party on the

matter of peace terms and a league of nations.

He did

this by presenting to Mr. White a memorandum calling for

heavy indemnities from Germany and the exclusion of any
provisions for a league of nations in the treaty of peace.
On December 6, two days after the departure of the

American delegation, the attack on the League of Nations
was begun.

At that time Senator Albert Beveridge declared

that instead of avoiding future wars, it would be more

likely to become the very source of them.
The speech of Senator Lodge in the Senate on December
21, marked the beginning of the determined battle on the

part of the Senate to defeat any plan which Wilson might
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propose for the organization of a league of nations.

In

that opening speech Lodge made it clear that
since the

negotiators

(

referring to Wilson) had not sought the ad-

vice of the Senate, the Senate would not in the future

respond to any such requests, but would influence negotiations contrary to the desires of Wilson as fully as speeches
in the open Senate could do so.

With the decision of Senator Lodge to fight the
proposals for a league of nations necessarily came a reversal of the former policy of the Republican party concerning

international relations.

Up until that time it had been

the conservative Democrats who had been the isolationists.

The Democrats, on the other hand were believers in the

strict construction of the powers and duties of government
to be able to see eye to eye with President Wilson.

followed him unquestionally

,

Many

however, because he was their

leader, others reluctantly, and still others not at all.

Consequently, there were numerous Democrats who, as debate
proceeded, made up their minds wholly aside from party con-

siderations that the new step was too dangerous, and countless Republicans who ignored every appeal to partisanship

and stood throughout for the League of Nations because
they believed that it was right.

This latter group was

large in the country but small in the Senate.

On the

Democratic side the one or two senators who opposed the

League in any shape or form probably held a kind of personal
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animosity toward Wilson. 1
The speech of Senator Me Cumber was
an example of the
opinion held by a Republican who favored the
idea
of a

league of nations and, therefore, is of interest
in a summary
of the opinion concerning the League.

The speech was a

sentimental plea for the countries of Europe which
had been
torn to pieces by the war. He told the Senate
that, if,

after peace was secured no means for making it
perpetual
were instituted, then all sacrifices had been made
in vain,
and pretended civilization was but foolish mockery.

As

for the overused argument that a league would interfere

with the internal affairs of the members, he maintained
that no intelligent commission would ever create such powers
for the League.

In case such powers were granted, however,

he was sure that none of the great nations would ratify
the treaty.

In regard to the Monroe Doctrine, he said

that no league, founded to guarantee the territorial integ-

rity and independence of its members, would be a menace to
a similar doctrine applicable to the Western World.

Further arguments against the League, before Wilson's

return with the first draft of the Covenant, were voiced
by Borah and Colonel Roosevelt.

Roosevelt believed that

Europe and Asia should do their own policing and that the

1

Fleming,

ojd.

cit .

,

p.

84.

181 -

United States should maintain strict adherence
to the
Monroe Doctrine and take no position as an
"international
Meddlesome Matty"
Borah said that nationalism would be
.

murdered by the League and therefore was against any form
of internationalism*

The inevitable attack on the draft Covenant began

in the Senate with the return of Wilson from the conference.

Charges were made against it to the effect that, (l) under
it the United States surrendered the power of disarmament,
(2)

it called for compulsory arbitration of all questions

without exception,

(3)

it would compel the United States

to participate in the wars and controversies of other nations,
(4)

it would force the United States to surrender to other

nations the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
in arms and amunition,

(5)

England would control it in

accordance with her own interests, and

(6)

under it the

powers of the League were unlimited.

A White House conference between Wilson and the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations followed upon the

outburst of Senatorial criticism.

At that meeting Wilson

had to answer many questions put to him by his opponents.
In spite of his explanations, the Republican members remained

unchanged in their views, and were all the more determined
to continue their campaign against it.

Senator Lodge began the new assault in a speech
in which he made a plea for caution in the consideration of
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the Covenant by all the people in the country.

He stressed

the fact that it was no small thing to abandon entirely a

doctrine laid down by America’s great statesmen Washington
and Monroe.

He asked if it were not possible to draft a

better, more explicit, and less dangerous one than already
drafted.

He then drew up his four amendments which stated

that the Covenant should,

(1)

preserve the Monroe Doctrine,

contain a section which would
(2)

exclude from the juris-

diction of the League such questions as immigration,

(3)

provide for the peaceful withdrawal of any nation from
the League, and (4) state whether the League was to have

an international force of its own or the power to summon
the armed forces of the different members.

Wilson then returned to the Conference to try to
come to an agreement with the other powers in regard to

Lodge's four amendments.

He secured the acceptance of all

the amendments with little opposition except for the one

concerning the Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, however, after

much explaining and assuring that the change would not
affect the protection of European countries under the League,
he secured the acceptance of the fourth amendment.
The success of Wilson in securing the changes demand-

ed by Lodge, made necessary a different plan of attack on
the part of the opponents.

With the Covenant amended to

to meet the principal American objections, and with the
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masses of people still strongly behind the League, the
anti-Leaguers decided that if the nation would not think

anti-League that it must be made to feel so by a persistant

repitition of the cries already raised against it and others
which could be counted on to appeal to the emotions.

Also

they believed that the nation could be wearied of the idea
of the League if the action on it could be delayed long

enough.

Fate seemed to have played into the hands of the

Republican opponents of the League because in the election
of the November previous to the change in plans

received a majority in the Senate.

,

they had

Thus the machinery needed

for the success of the plan was theirs.

During the Senate

debates in May and June, when the irreconcilables continued
to display more activity than the others, it became more

evident that the Republicans were making the Treaty and
League an issue for party action.
Such was the situation when Wilson returned from
Paris with the amended Treaty.

With the Treaty in the

hands of the Senate, the powers of the Committee on Foreign

Relations were brought into play.

Devices instrumental in

the plan for delay were right at hand.

First the long

treaty of several hundred printed pages was read aloud
line by line.

That reading took two weeks.

Next* the Com-

mittee held public hearings which lasted for six weeks.

At
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those hearings,..members of the American
delegation gave
testimony. No one else appeared except
representatives
of national groups tnat felt that their
countries had re-

ceived less than justice at Paris.

Because of the lack

of important speeches, the hearings were of
little actual

value except as they wasted time.
The majority report of the Committee on Foreign

Relations, which came out in September of that year, made

several things certain.

In the first place, it showed that

the irreconcilables in the Senate no longer had any hopes
of pursuading the Republicans to unite on a policy of com-

plete rejection, for the report recommended forty-five

amendments, many covering the same point.

Those amendments

were obviously in accord with Lodge's plan of proceeding
"by way of amendment and reservation".

There was no pre-

tence in the report that those changes would make them want
to ratify the Treaty.

On the contrary, it showed a bitter

hostility toward it.
For the first time, during the debate in the Senate

during July and August, the expression of the Republican
senatorial opinion was not left to the irreconcilables.

At

that time the speeches of those previously silent Republicans

proclaimed the defeat of the irreconcilables who had struggled to commit the party to a rejection of the Treaty.
Some desired strong reservations, others were satisfied

-

with mild reservations.
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It seemed then as though the

Republican majority in the Senate was going to vote for
the entry of the United States into the League with
reserva-

tions.

In September, Wilson began his speaking tour, for

he had placed his chief reliance on an appeal to the people.
The tour, however, ended in his collapse and the loss of
the most important leadership that the League had.

With

the breakdown of President Wilson, public opinion, which

had according to former reports been overwhelmingly in favor
of the League, began to drift away.

In the United States,

as in Europe, there seemed to be occuring a shift in opinion

which has been described by Mr. Holt as a substitution
of near-sighted nationalism for international co-operation

and the general good.

That shift in feeling was just what

Lodge hoped to gain in his program of procrastination.

While the public and the majority in the Senate were
thus groping about for some decision, debate in the Senate

continued on.

The arguments used were the ones referred

to by Senator Lodge as those which would appeal to the

emotions.

They were of very low calibre and consisted of

such statements as, "The League would be under the power
of the Pope because most of the countries in the League

would be Catholic," or "The League would be ruled by colored
people."

Each argument was aimed to sway one section of
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the country against the League and
if viewed intelligently
were utter nonsence. The Irish question
was also cleverly
used by Lodge in an effort to win over the
large Irish vote
in the country.
No steps had been taken by the Democrats to
come to

an understanding with the Republicans, wanting
mild reservations, when voting began in October, and the latter
were

drifting toward a natural political alliance with their
fellow Republicans on terms more hostile to the Treaty
than those they would have preferred.

The Republican ranks

then were for the first time firm.
The final vote in the Senate took place on March
19, 1920.

The resolution of ratification received a majori-

ty of votes cast but not the required two- thirds majority,

and with that vote Senator Lodge succeeded in his efforts
to block the entrance of the United States into the League

of Nations.

As for a conclusion as to the reason for the failure
of the Senate to ratify the Covenant,

I

an inclined to

agree with Mr. Holt that it was the intense dislike of Mr.

Lodge for the way that President Wilson disregarded the

right of the United States Senate in the negotiation of
treaties with foreign countries, and his superior ability
in handling the affairs of his party in the Senate.

opinion is justifiable,

I

This

believe, because of the fact that
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Senator Lodge actually made a statement to the effect that
he would not make any response to the suggestions of the

American negotiators at the conference, but would do everything to oppose any move that they made.

That statement

he made in his speech to the Senate on December 21, 1918.

Also, the fact that he changed his tactics several times in

order to win over the desired groups to his side, showed
that he did not want the League at any price.

And his

animosity toward Wilson is the only evidence that

I

can find

for his being so opposed to the League.
The ratification of the Covenant by the nations of

Europe not only brought into existence the League of Nations,
but also through Articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant, provided
for the creation of the World Court.

It may be said that

the United States was partly responsible for the suggestion
of the idea of the Court because President Wilson in his

drafts for the League of Nations had a provision for such a
court.

Most of the credit for the actual drawing up of the

Convention creating the Court goes to Elihu Root, who as
the Secretary of State of the United States, had also been

responsible for the policy of the American delegates at
the Hague Peace Conference in 1907.

A Committee of Jurists was elected by the Council
of the League according to the mandate in Article 14 of

the Covenant of the League.

Among the jurists elected was

188 Mr. Elihu Root.

As a Jurist he was responsible for solving

the problem of the election of Judges and together
with

Lord Phillemore drew up the draft, which with but few amendments

y the Council and Assembly of the League, became

the Statute which established the Court.

The Statute was

opened for ratification on December 16, 1920 and was ratified by the required majority by September

1,

1921, and

went into effect on that day.
The long campaign for the adherence of the United

States to the Court officially began with the receipt of
the copy of the Protocol by Secretary of State Charles

Evans Hughes.

Formal action, however, did not begin until

February 17, 1923, when Secretary Hughes sent a message to
President Harding requesting him to ask the Senate to take

action favorable to the adherence of the United States
to the Protocol of December 16, 1920, subject to four reser-

vations which he had drawn up and enclosed.
One week after receiving the message of Secretary

Hughes, President Harding delivered a message to the Senate
in which he passed on the request of Secretary Hughes and

recorded his approval of adherence to the Court.

The Senate,

however, made no move to consider the question, and the
whole matter was dropped until President Coolidge made
an appeal to the Senate for favorable action.

Like Hughes

and Harding, he was completely in favor of the establish-

189 -

ment of a court which would include the nations of the
world.

Senator Lenroot followed up the message of Goolidge

with a resolution containing reservations concerning the
election of judges, the countries which should be allowed
to adhere to the Court, and the method of paying the ex-

penses of the Court.

.His resolution was just the beginning

of a series which were presented in the Senate.

No hearings

were held in the Foreign Relations Committee until April
30, 1924.

At that time it became obvious that the question

of the election of Judges was going to cause trouble.

Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, a member of the

Foreign Relations Committee, made an attempt to solve the
problem of the election of Judges in a plan which he presented to his fellow committeemen.

This proposal was treated

very cooly by Chairman Lodge and the rest of the Committee,
who proceeded to find another point to argue over.

That

point was the relationship of the League to the Court, es-

pecially in the power of the League to request advisory
opinions of the Court.

The Committee believed that with

that authority, the League could injure the prestige of the

United States.

Even after evidence had been given to dis-

prove the fears of the Committee, it still stood fast in
its convictions.

The pressure brought to bear on the Foreign Relations

Committee by proposals finally brought on an admission on
power of the Court
its part that an amendment to the advisory
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must be added.

In May, therefore, the Committee allowed the

proposal to go to the Senate.

During the time that the

matter was before the Senate, Senator Lodge had died and
Borah had taken over the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee, and had used the period to campaign over
the country against the Court, branding it a "League Court".

He met with little success because the great national

organizations were in favor of the Court.
The Senate was just as slow in taking any action as
its committee had been, and it was the House which finally

came forward to record its approval of the Court by a vote
of 303-28.

Nine months later the long-awaited move on the

part of the Senate came in the form of a resolution drawn

up by Senator Swanson, one of the ardent proponents of the
Court.

In his resolution he offered what he believed was

a solution to the problem of advisory opinions.

His plan,

however, met with the same fate as the former ones.

The

Committee still did not believe that the rights of the

United States were securely protected.

To most observers

the reason for its failure was the fact that it was not

rigid enough to make sure that it would not be accepted by
the signatories or the proponents of adherence in the United

States.

With the rejection of Senator Swanson's proposal,

it was becoming more and more evident that the opponents

in the Committee were not working for a plan which would

protect the rights of the United States, but were seeking
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of

the Committee, such a program was easily explained, since

he was just as antagonistic toward the Court as he had been

toward the League.
In order to make their position more secure, the

ant i-Leaguers secured the aid of Judge Moore in drawing up

an amendment to the Statute of the Court.

That amendment

was introduced into the Senate in January 1926, and was

passed by a vote of 76-17, with the same opponents Borah,
Johnson, LaFollette, and Shipstead holding out against it
and the proponents Pepper, Lenroot, Swanson and Pittman voting
in favor of it.

The notice of the Senate's approval of adherence ac-

cording to the amended reservation was sent to the League

and in turn to the signatory states.

At a meeting of the

signatories it was decided to hold a meeting to discuss with
the delegate from the United States the possibilities of

adherence according to the reservation.

The United States

refused, however, to attend the conference and so it was

held without it.

At the conference the signatories accepted

the four reservations based on the first four of Secretary

Hughes, but could not accept completely the rigid terms of
the advisory amendment.

The signatories said that the United

States could not have the desired deciding vote in the adop-

tion of a request for an advisory opinion because a unanimous vote was not necessary.
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The failure of the United States to come to an agree-

ment with the signatories did not discourage the League,
for it was determined to find a solution favorable to both
sides.

It therefore, held a meeting and passed a resolution
,

appointing another Committee of Jurists to consider a re-

vision of the Statute of the Court.

Again Elihu Root was

invited and accepted the invitation to serve on that committee.
He drew up a plan covering the question of advisory opinions

which, with a few minor revisions was accepted by the
,

Committee and served as the basis of the revised protocol

drawn up by

it..

The provisions were adopted unanimously by

the signatories and sent to the Secretary of State Stimson

who believed that the revised protocol would meet the ob-

jections of the United States and would constitute a sat-

isfactory basis for adherence.

He promised to ask the Presi-

dent for the necessary authority to sign the protocol and

recommend that it be submitted to the Senate for consent and
ratification.
The willingness of President Hoover to further the

cause of adherence was shown when, in a little over a week's
time, he gave the necessary authorization for the signing
of the Protocol and in less than a month he presented the

protocols to the Senate and recommended imediate action in
favor of adherence.
Senate action took the form of an invitation to
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Foreign Relations Committee
to explain the revised protocol.
At the meeting Mr. Root

discussed the Protocol in detail and
tried to show the
members that the United States was duly
protected by it
and that therefore adherence was perfectly
safe.

Additional evidence of the policy of the Foreign
Relations Committee to stand in the way of adherence

came

as a result of its report after the meeting
with Mr. Root.

In the report it presented reservations, which
if adopted,
would have pushed proceedings back to the stage
following
the vote taken in the Senate in Janrary 1926.

The closing

of the Seventy-Second Congress before any action
could be

taken was another delay which seemed to play right into
the hands of the Committee.

Late in 1932, the House took up the question which

had been temporarily dropped by the Senate, and drew up a

resolution appropriating the money necessary to pay the
share of the United States in the expenses of the Court.

Although no final action was taken because of the strong
opposition in the Senate, the move was an indication that
the House did want adherence.

Action on the World Court was dropped, after the
gesture of the House, until the spring of 1934.

At that

time hearings were held before the Foreign Relations Com-

mittee, one for the proponents and one for the opponents of

-
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the Court.
At the hearing for the proponents, the following

went on record as approving of the adherence of the United
States: The American Bar Association with its 30,000 members;

The Republican and Decocratic Parties; 65 state and local

bar associations; The Chamber of Commerce of America; the

legislatures of sixteen states; eleven national women's
organizations, including the American Association of University Women, The C-eneral Federation of Women's Clubs, The

National Women'

s

Christian Temperance Union and The National

Women's Trade Union League; The Federal Council of Churches
of Christ in America; Alfred E. Smith; and Admiral William
S,

Sims.

The following registered their opposition to ad-

herence at the hearing for the opponents: Senator Reed;
Senator Pepper, Judge Daniel Cohalan; The American Legion;
The International Seamen's Union; Governor Joseph B. Ely;

Charles Francis Adams, director of First National Stores;

and The Hearst Newspapers.
The two hearings marked the only action which was

taken until the new Congress met on January 3, 1935.

At

that time President Roosevelt, in his opening speech in-

dicated his approval of adherence and two days later called
a conference of the Senate leaders and representatives of

the Department of State including Secretary of State Hull,

Democratic leader Senator Robinson, Chairman of the Foreign
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Relations Committee, Senator Pittman, and Assistant
Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre.
ing

v:as

The purpose of the meet-

the consideration of immediate action on the

protocols.

Four days later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by a vote of 14-7, submitted a report recommending

ratification.

That recommendation, however, was accom-

panied by an understanding which amounted to a restatement
of the battle scarred fifth amendment.

Two days after the

report of the Committee of the Senate was presented, the

New York Times reported that the opposition in the Senate

had dwindled down to a handful of "bitterenders" of which
six were the Republican minority leaders Borah and Johnson,

Senators Nye and Cutting, the Progressive Senator La

Follette and the Farmer- Laborite Senator Shipstead.
The final debates began in the Senate on January
15, and continued until January 20.

Senator Robinson, of

Arkansas opened them with a speech in defense of the Court.
He argued that the United States had nothing to fear in

joining the Court because the Court could not recognize
any dispute in which the United States had or claimed an

interest without its consent.
Senator Johnson followed with a new argument against
the Court.

He said that he wanted peace just as much as

anyone else but was quite sure that it was not to be found
in the World Court.

He backed up his argument with the
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example of Bolivia and Paraguay,
both members of the League
and Court, who had been fighting for
over three years without seeking any assistance from either
the League or the
Court. He also showed the ineffectiveness
of the Court
in the taking over of Manchuria and China
by Japan and the
blowing up of Corfu and the invasion of Abyssinia
by Italy.

According to Huey Long, the campaign for adherence
should have been called ’’America for Sale"

,

for he believed

that the entry of the United States into the Court would

amount to the outright sale of it to the countries of
Europe.

He said that the experience gained in the World

War should have taught the United States that it was useless to think that it would gain anything but debts and

hard feelings from adherence to the Court.
Senator Vandenberg continued the debate by presenting
his amendment which provided that the adherence of the United

States should not make it depart from its traditional policy
of non-interference in European disputes.

He said that as

far as he was concerned, the amendment was not necessary,
but was presented for the benefit of those who still believed
that the rights of the United States were not sufficiently

protected.

He admitted that he had opposed the entry of the

United States into the League, but was certain now that the
Court was sufficiently separated from the League under the

proposed protocols and that it was safe for the United States
to join the Court.
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Senator Logan followed Senator Vandenberg with
a
refutation of the arguments of Senators Long and
Johnson.
He declared that the mere fact that the
United States had

maintained peaceful relations for the hundred years
by
means of arbitration was no argument against the

Court.

In

the first place, it was no proof that the same peace
could

not be maintained by the use of the World Court.

In the

second place, the arbitration Court was the only means
for settling disputes at the time.

He next attacked the

argument that the Court was made up of foreign judges.
That argument he saw was ridiculous because, the fact that
they were not Americans did not make the judge unscrupulous foreigners.

He said that the Americans would resent

the same belittlement of its Judges by the Europeans and so

had no right to do the same to the European ones.
Senator Borah's opposition, aired in the Senate,
was based entirely on the advisory power of the Court.

He

said that that power made the ^ourt nothing but an advisory

tribunal and no number of amendments would ever change that
status in his opinion.

Therefore, he was going to oppose

adherence to the Court as long as that provision was in the
protocol.

Senator Thomas followed Senator Borah in an attempt
to disprove the name "League Court" as applied to the

World Court.

He claimed that the relationship of the Court
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and League ended with the establishment of the Court, according to Article 14 of the Covenant.

Furthermore, he said

that the Court was created by a conference of representatives
of many countries, not all of which were members of the League

and was, therefore, not a pure creation of the League.

He

concluded with the statement that he believed the rights
of the United States were completely protected by the 1929

protocol.

Senator Reynolds recorded his opposition to adherence
by saying that isolation had made the United States great
and isolation only would keep it so.

He backed up this

opinion by citing the results of the World War in the

United States in the form of unbearable taxation forced on
the people for generations to come.

Until some one could

give him a good reason why the United States should Join
the Court, he was determined to oppose adherence.

Senator Norris entered the debate with an amendment
to the effect that any dispute in which the United States

was a party had to have a two- thirds vote of approval of
the Senate before it could be brought to the Court for a

decision.

The acceptance of that amendment by the members

of the Court was necessary before he would vote for adherence.

Its rejection by

the Court members, he said was the

most reasonable excuse possible why the United States should
stay out of the Court, Without its protection, he believed
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that ruin might be brought on his government.

During the period of debate in the Senate, public

opinion really came forward and asserted itself.

World

Court Committees sent messages to the Senate begging it
not to delay any longer but to take immediate action.

The

ministers of 150 Protestant churches urged their congregations to send telegrams to their congressmen

to vote

in favor of adherence.
The propoganda of the opponents was re-enforced by

Father Charles E. Coughlin, who delivered a fiery speech
denouncing the Court.

He said that "joining the World

Court to maintain peace strongly stinks of diplomatic
conceit."

The Court, he said, was based not on the right

of the majority to rule* but on the right of the minority

to disrupt, and was nothing but an "artificial creation of

those who wished to exempt themselves from all national

law and to profit by the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.
The evening before the final vote was to be taken,
the proponents and opponents had their last chance to try
to win the Senate over to their respective sides.

Dr.

Nicholas Murray Butler delivered a very heated speech against
the opponents and said that their attitude was inexplicable

save on the ground that they had "neither ideas, principles,

courage, nor any concern for the highest interests of the

American people".

That same evening, Father Coughlin
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urged his listeners over the radio to wire their senators
as a last chance to block adherence.
11

He appealed to every

stolid" American, who loved democracy, to stand back of

the Senators in their honest fight to keep America safe

for Americans.
So strong was the final attack of the opponents,

that on one day only, 40,000 telegrams were delivered to
the Senate.

It was the opinion of observers in Washington

that the onslaught of fire and criticism against the Court

had taken its toll in the ranks of the proponents, and would
be the deciding factor in the struggle.

In any case the

vote on the following day was 52-36, just seven votes 'short
of the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification.

In the attempt to come to a conclusion as to why the

Senate failed to ratify adherence to the World Court after
it had been favored for so many years by successive presi-

dents, secretaries of state, and even by public opinion,
I

have picked out three factors which

contributory.

They are:

(l) The

I

believe were

failure of the Senate to

ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations,

(2)

The

carry-over of leadership of the opponents in the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate from the time of the
League to that of the Court, and

(3)

The failure of the

senators to carry out the wishes of their constituents
in their votes.
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failure of the Senate to ratify the Covenant
of the League provided the necessary background and setting

for the action on adherence to the Court.

It not only

built up the prestige of the Senate's constitutional right
to give advice and consent to treaties with foreign coun-

tries

,

but also showed that a handful of senators with un-

usual powers of leadership and strategy could sway the vote
of the Senate to their side in spite of the wishes of the

administration.

This factor, then,

I

believe was the first

cause for the failure of the Senate to ratify adherence.
The second cause for the defeat of adherence followed

naturally and opportunely upon the heels of the first. The
presence on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of
the two anti-League leaders, Lodge and Borah, and their

followers Senators Johnson and Reed, was a powerful aid to
the foes of adherence in the Senate.

Although Lodge died

and his place as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
was taken by Senator Borah, his successors were able to

apply his tactics with app arently the same success. As in
the case of the Covenant, the plan of the Committee in

dealing with the protocols seemed to have been the addition
the

specific

of reservation after reservation

for

purpose of making the provisions

unacceptable to

the
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members of the Court or of stalling off a
final vote until
the strategic time came.
In any case, the campaign of the

opposition against adherence to the Court so nearly
paralleled tnat of the anti-Leagua?s that I am of the
opinion
thao the practical identity of leadership and
principles

among the opponents was one of the most important factors
in the defeat of adherence to the Court.

Evidence to back up the statement that the public
was quite generally in favor of adherence was found in the

reports of the hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

There is no evidence, however, which would in-

dicate why the opinion of the public was not expressed in
the vote of the Senate.

Therefore, the only conclusion

which can be arrived at is that the senators followed their
own opinions in the matter and ignored those of their constituents.

These conclusions are those which seem most reason-

able in the face of the available evidence.

Whether they

are the real ones or not, only time and the publication
of more evidence will tell.

The failure of the Senate to ratify adherence to the
V/orld Court in the face of the consistent and wholehearted

desire and approval of successive administrations, begin-

ning with the administration of President Harding and ending
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D.

-

Roosevelt, is one of the many

examples of the ascendency of the Senate in
its constitutional power in the treaty-making machinery
of the United
States Government.
It serves to indicate the important

position which the Senate can and may hold in future
negotiations of treaties with foreign nations.
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APPENDIX

I

PROTOCOL FOR THE ACCESSION OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE OF DECEMBER 16, 1920.

OPENED FOR

SIGNATURE AT GENEVA. SEPTEMBER 14. 1929.

The states signatories of the Protocol of Signature
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, dated December 16, 1920, and the United States
of America, through the undersigned duly authorized representatives, have mutually agreed upon the following provisions regarding the adherence of the United States of
America to the said Protocol subject to the five reservations formulated by the United States in the resolution
adopted by the Senate on January 27, 1926.
,

Article

I

The States, signatories to the said Protocol, accept the special conditions attached by the United States
in the five reservations mentioned above to its adherence
to the said Protocol upon the terms and conditions set out
in the following articles.

Article II
The United States shall be admitted to participate,
through representatives designated for the purpose and
upon an equality with the signatory States Members of the
League of Nations represented in the Council or in the
Assembly, in any and all proceedings of either the Council
or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputyjudges of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
provided for in the Statute of the Court. The vote of the
United States shall be counted in determining the absolute majority of votes required by the Statute.

Article III
No amendment of the Statute of the Court may be
made without the consent of all the contracting States.
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Article IV
The Court shall render advisory opinions in public
session after notice and opportunity for hearing substantially as provided in the now existing Articles
73 and 74
of the Rules of Court.

Article V

With view to ensuring that the Court shall not,
without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or
question in which the United States has or claims an interest, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
shall, through any channel designated for that purpose by
the United States, inform the United States of any proposal before the Council or Assembly of the League for obtaining an advisory opinion from the Court, and thereupon,
if desired, an exchange of all views as to whether an interest of the United States is affected shall proceed with
all convenient speed between the Council or Assembly of the
League and the United States.
Whenever a request for an advisory opinion comes to
the Court, the Registrar shall notify the United States
thereof, among other States mentioned in the now existing
Article 73 of the Rules of Court, stating a reasonable time
limit fixed by the President within which a written statement by the United States concerning the request will be
received.
If for any reason no sufficient opportunity for
an exchange of views upon such request should have been
afforded and the United States advises the Court that the
question upon which the opinion of the Court is asked is
one that affects the interests of the United States, proceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable
such an exchange of views between the Council or the
Assembly and the United States to take place.
With regard to requesting an advisory opinion of the
Court in any case covered by the preceding paragraphs,
there shall be attributed to an objection of the United
States the same force and effect as attaches to a vote
against asking for the opinion by a member of the League
of Nations in the Council or in the Assembly.
If, after the exchange of views provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, it shall appear that
no agreement can be reached and the United States is not
prepared to forego its objection, the exercise of the
powers of withdrawal provided in Article 8 hereof will
follow naturally without any imputation of unfriendliness or unwillingness to co-operate generally for peace and
goodwill.

.
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Article VI

^

Subject to the provisions of Article P h^inw +v^
Pr t0 ° 01 sha11 have
““ effect as the provisions
for^and^fect'anr'
?
of the Statute of the
U Ur
si 5“ a t ure of the Protocol of
December
16
I92S shali h J
P">visions if toe prlsenWrotoco!.*" a00eptanoe ° f

Article VII

fo^^

nt r t0C01 Sha11 be ratified
Each State
?
shall forward the instrument
of ratification to the Seca
ene al f the League of Nations, who
shall inform
a?i ntv^
T n atory
?
er sl
States.
S
The
instruments
of
ratification
ohoii be deposited in
^hail
the archives of the Secretariat of
the League of Nations.
The present Protocol shall come into force
, ,
__
as soon
tate w ich have ratified the Protocol of
December
!
?
alS ° tlie United States have deposited
their
ratifications

/

-
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»

Article VIII
The United States may at any time notify the Secretary-Genera. 1 of the League of Nations that it
withdraws its
adherence to the Protocol of December 16, 1920. The Secretary-General shall immediately communicate this notification to all the other States signatories of the Protocol.
In such case, the present Protocol shall cease to
be in force as from the receipt by the Secretary-General
of the notification by the United'' States
On their part, each of the other contracting States
may at any time notify the Secretary-General of the League
of Nations that it desires to withdraw its acceptance of
the special conditions attached by the United States to its
adherence to the Protocol of December 16, 1920, The Secretary shall immediately give communication of this notification to each of the States signatories of the present
Protocol.
The present Protocol shall be considered as
ceasing to be in force if and when, within one year of the
date of receipt of the said notification, not less than twothirds of the contracting States other than the United States
shall have notified the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations that they desire to withdraw the above-mentioned

acceptance.
Done at Geneva, the fourteenth day of September,
nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, in a single copy, of
which the French and English texts shall be both authorized.

.
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APPENDIX II

VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE COVENANT OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INCLUDING THE FOURTEEN LODGE RESERVAT IONS AND THE IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION RESERVATION

MARCH 19, 1920.

•

YEAS 49

Ashurst
Ball
Beckham
Calder
Capper
Colt
Curtis
Dllingham
Edge
Elkins
Fletcher
Frelinghuysen

Gore
Hale
Henderson
Jones ,Wash.
Kellogg
Kenyon
Keyes
King
Lenroot
Lodge
McClean
McNary

Myers
New
Nugent
Owen
Phelan
Phipps
Pittman
Pomerene
Ransdell
Smith, Ga.
Smith, Md.
Smoot

NAYS

Borah
Brandegee
Comer
Culberson
Dial
Fernald
France
Cray

G-lass

Spencer
Sterling
Sutherland
Trammell
Walsh, Mass.
Walsh, Momt.
Warren
Watson
Wolcott

H

McCormick
Gronna
McKellar
Harris
Moses
Harrison
Norris
Hitchcock
Johnson, Cal. Overman
Johnson, S. Dak .Reed
Robinson
Kirby
Sheppard
Knox
Sherman
LaFollette

Shields
Simmons
Smith, S.C,
Stanley
Swanson
Thomas
Underwood
Williams

NOT VOTING

Cummins
Fall
Gerry

Harding
Jones ,N.Mex.
McCumber

Nelson
Newberry
Penrose

Poindexter
Smith, Ariz
Townsend
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APPENDIX III

VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE STATUTE OF

ADHERENCE OF THE WORLD COURT JANUARY 27, 1926.
YEAS 76

Ashurst
Bayard
Bingham
Bratton
Broussard
Bruce
Butler
Cameron
Capper
Caraway
Copeland
Couzens
Cummins
Curtis
Dale
Denien
Edge
Edwards
Ernst

Ferris
Fess
George
Gerry
Gillette
Glass
Goff
Gooding
Hale
Harris
Harrison
Heflin
Howell
Jones, N. Hex
Jones Wash
Kendrick
Keyes
King
,

.
.

Lenroot
McKellar
McLean
McMaster
McNary
Mayfield
Means
Metcalf
Neely
Norbeck
Norris
Oddie
Overman
Pepper
Phipps
Pittman
Rands dell
Reed

Robinson
Sackett
Shortridge
Simmons
Smith
Smoot
Stanfield
Stephens
Swanson
Trammell
Tyson
Underwood
Wadsworth
Walsh
Warren
Weller
Wheeler
Willis

NAYS 17

Blease
Borah
Brookhart
Fernald
Frazier

Harr eld
Johnson
LaFollette
Moses
Nye

Watson
Pine
Williams
Reed, Mo.
Ind.
Robinson,
Schall
Shipstead
NOT VOTING

Dill

duPont

Greene

e
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APPENDIX IV

VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE STATUTE OF

ADHERENCE OF THE WORLD COURT JANUARY 29, 1935.
YEAS £2

Adams
Ashurst
Austin
Bachman
Bankhead
Barbour
Barkley
Bilbo
Black
Brown
Bulk ley
Burke

Byrd’

Byrnes
Capper
Caraway
Clark
Conally
Costigan
Couzens
Cutting
Dieterich
Duffy
Fletcher
George

Glass
Guffey
Hale
Harrison
Hatch
Hayden
Keyes
King
Logan
Lonergan
McNary
Maloney
Minton

Moore
Neely
0 'Mahoney

Pittman
Pope
Radclif f
Robinson
Sheppard
Thomas Utah
Truman
Vandenberg
Van Nuys
Wagner
,

NAYS 36

Bone
Borah
Bulow
Carey
Coolidge
Davis
Dickinson
Donahey
Frazier

Gerry
Gore
Hastings
Johnson
LaFollette
Lewis
Long
McCardan
McGill

Metcalf
Murphy
Nor beck
Norris
Nye
Reyno Ids
Russell
Schall

NOT VOTING

Copeland
Gibson

McAdoo
Overton

Steiwer
Tydings

Schwellenback
Shipstead
Smith
Thomas ,0kla.
Townsend
Trammell
Walsh
Wheeler
White
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